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This report analyses how schools in England have interpreted and begun to respond to 
the government’s ‘self-improving school-led system’ (SISS) policy agenda, an overarching 
narrative for schools policy since 2010 that encompasses an ensemble of reforms including 
academies, multi-academy trusts (MATs) and Teaching School Alliances (TSAs). Based on 
a large-scale, four-year, mixed-methods study, the report asks whether or not the models 
of co-ordination and school support emerging locally since 2010 represent a genuine basis 
for an equitable and inclusive ‘school-led’ system. It explores the factors that support and 
hinder such developments as well as the implications for schools and school leadership. 
The analysis draws on governance theory to evaluate the reforms, which are conceived as 
an attempt to mix and re-balance three overlapping approaches to co-ordinating the school 
system: hierarchy, markets and networks. This shows that while one popular interpretation 
of the SISS agenda is that it requires inter-school partnerships to ‘self-organize’ their own 
‘school-led’ improvement, this is in fact a partial account that underplays the dominant 
influences of hierarchical and market mechanisms on the thinking and actions of schools 
and school leaders and the networks they are developing. 
The report includes important new empirical findings, for example on the impact of MATs 
of different sizes and on the relationship between Ofsted inspection outcomes and levels 
of socio-economic stratification between schools. It also combines the perspectives of 
multiple case study schools across four different localities to provide rich insights into 
leadership decision-making and agency in the context of local status hierarchies and 
rapid policy-driven change. As a result, while focusing on changes in England, it provides 
a unique set of insights into how different governance regimes interact across different 
local contexts to influence patterns of schooling and school-to-school collaboration – 
insights that will have relevance for research and practice on school system governance 
more widely.
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8Foreword 
Anyone who has recently tried to explain the English education system to 
overseas visitors will be sharply aware of its startling complexity, so we 
may sympathize with the school leaders and other professionals who have 
to navigate it on a daily basis. Is our multi-faceted middle tier working? 
And is the autonomy and accountability, competition and collaboration 
that policy-makers have sought to promote generating the desired system 
improvement – or simply impossible competing demands on professionals? 
This report, addressing these very questions, could not be more urgent.
In spite of the evident complexity and resulting challenges, and calls 
for clarification and better alignment from various quarters1, sorting out 
our middle tier has not been high on the political agenda. Compared to 
eye-catching issues in education, teacher recruitment challenges, and Brexit, 
the technicalities of our education system’s governance structures sound 
tedious, and perhaps trivial. But they comprise the mechanisms for system 
accountability (to individual pupils and families, in addition to policy-
makers), for system improvement, and for safeguarding. In other words, 
they are absolutely vital, and we overlook them at our peril.
This report focuses on the concept of the self-improving system. In 
doing so, the research reported addresses all the key agendas at work in 
the middle tier – different forms and levels of accountability, collaboration 
and competition, system incentives and constraints, and the parameters of 
autonomy. Fundamentally, it asks whether the English education system 
is self-improving (or indeed improving), and analyses those elements that 
facilitate and impede this intention.
The scale and rigour of the research – focused on four different 
English localities, including 47 school case studies and a survey of school 
leaders, and coupled with the strength of Greany’s and Higham’s analytical 
grip on educational policy-making – ensure credibility and influence for 
this report. Their mapping of ‘multiple sub-systems, with different, partially 
overlapping “middle tier” organizations holding diverse views on how the 
school system should be organized’ lends credence to calls for clarification 
in the system. And their diagnosis of ‘chaotic centralization’, characterized 
by ‘competing claims to authority and legitimacy but diminishing local 
knowledge about schools’ should galvanize policy-makers to urgent action. 
The report also identifies some of the increasingly traceable consequences 
for social (in)justice in the schooling system. 
1 House of Commons Education Committee (2017) Seventh Report of Session 2016–
17: Multi-academy trusts. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/
cmeduc/204/204.pdf;
 House of Commons Education Committee (2016) The Role of Regional Schools 
Commissioners. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/
cmeduc/401/40102.htm 
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Nevertheless, the report also identifies and celebrates the increase 
in partnerships and meaningful collaborations between schools, and 
the genuine gains in shared learning and professional development as a 
result. ‘School-to-school’ collaboration and learning does appear to have 
flourished, even as new groupings are also creating new forms of inequality 
between schools. As such, the report addresses head on the complexity of 
the outcomes and trends that our complex system has precipitated. 
This important report makes a vital contribution to timely debates. 
The empirical findings provide invaluable evidence to inform educational 
policy-making towards a productive system that has professional learning 
and improvement front and centre. 
Professor Becky Francis, FAcSS, 
Director of UCL Institute of Education
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Executive summary 
This report analyses how schools in England have interpreted and begun to 
respond to the government’s ‘self-improving school-led system’ (SISS) policy 
agenda. While largely undefined in official texts, the SISS agenda has become 
an overarching narrative for schools policy since 2010, encompassing an 
ensemble of reforms on academies, the promotion of multi-academy trusts 
(MATs), the roll back of local authorities (LAs) from school oversight, and 
the development of new school-to-school support models, such as Teaching 
School Alliances (TSAs). The government argues that these reforms will 
‘dismantle the apparatus of central control and bureaucratic compliance’ 
(DfE, 2010: 66) by ‘moving control to the frontline’ (DfE, 2016b: 8).
While there has been a range of research on specific aspects of these 
school policy changes, there is as Woods and Simkins (2014) observe a 
paucity of analysis on how the SISS agenda is influencing change at the local 
level. This report seeks to address that gap by asking whether or not the 
models of co-ordination and school support emerging locally since 2010 
represent a genuine basis for an equitable and inclusive ‘school-led’ system. 
We explore the factors that support and hinder such developments and the 
implications of this for schools and school leadership. 
The research was carried out between 2014 and 2017 and included 
47 school case studies across four localities. The localities were selected 
on the basis that they contained a variety of socio-economic contexts 
and represented two areas with relatively high densities and two areas 
with relatively low densities of academies and nationally designated 
‘system leadership’ roles, such as Teaching Schools and National Leaders 
of Education (NLEs). The research also included a survey of almost 700 
school leaders, an analysis of national Ofsted results over a ten-year period 
and statistical analysis of the impact of MATs on student outcomes. 
To inform our analysis we draw on governance theory to analyse 
the SISS agenda reforms, which we conceive as an attempt to mix and re-
balance three overlapping approaches to co-ordinating the school system. 
These are:
❯ Hierarchy – the formal authority exercised by the state, including 
through statutory policies and guidance, national, regional and local 
bureaucracies (including Regional Schools Commissioners [RSCs] 
and LAs), and performance management and intervention (including 
through Ofsted inspections and forced academization);
❯ Markets – the incentives and (de)regulation aimed at encouraging 
choice, competition, contestability and commercialization, including 
through existing parental choice and funding mechanisms that 
encourage schools to compete for pupils, and through new policies on 
academization and free schools and encouragement for a marketplace 
in school improvement services;
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❯ Networks – the (re)creation of interdependencies that support and/or 
coerce inter-organizational collaboration, partnership and participation 
(including through the introduction of Teaching School Alliances that 
are intended to encourage schools to share capacity and expertise).
Informed by these perspectives, we start by exploring the Government’s 
use of the SISS agenda as a policy narrative as well as Hargreaves’s (2012) 
idealized model of a ‘self-improving system’ founded on ‘deep’ partnerships, 
system leadership and a culture of co-creation and local solutions. We review 
a range of existing evidence on the school system in England since 2010 
that highlights, among other things, the diversity of responses to policy 
change, concerns over capacity and funding, the risks of fragmentation, 
new inequalities and a ‘two-tier’ system, and the national pressure for 
conformity and prescription. 
We also locate our research in the context of wider debates on 
governance and neoliberal reform in education. Many governments 
around the world have stepped back or are stepping back from traditional 
hierarchical control of schools as they look to increase choice, improve 
quality, enhance equity and encourage innovation. Yet despite this apparent 
policy orthodoxy (Sahlberg, 2011) governments have also worked to retain 
authority both by ‘steering at a distance’ (Hudson, 2007) through meta-
governance (Jessop, 2011) and through direct intervention and coercion 
(Davies, 2013) by remixing combinations of hierarchy, markets and 
networks to try to achieve their goals. The implication of this for schools 
and school leaders is a semblance of autonomy and self-governance, but 
which in practice is frequently experienced as a loss of support coupled 
with increased pressure to perform against measured targets as student level 
data is used nationally to hold schools publicly accountable (Ball, 2017). 
In this context we show that while one popular interpretation of the 
SISS agenda is that it requires inter-school partnerships to ‘self-organize’ 
their own ‘school-led’ improvement, our findings demonstrate that this is a 
partial account that underplays the parallel influences of decentralization, 
re-regulation and performance management and choice and competition. 
Hierarchy
The government argues the SISS policy agenda is premised on ‘high 
autonomy’ and ‘high accountability’ for schools, with a promise to ‘trust’ the 
profession, reduce bureaucracy and ‘roll back’ the state (DfE, 2010; 2016). 
We find, however, that any increase in operational automony for schools is 
more than balanced out by changes to the accountability framework, which 
have allowed the state to continue to steer the system from a distance and 
to increasingly intervene and coerce when and where it deems necessary. 
Our case study schools reported a constant need to focus on national 
exam results and to prepare for the possibility of an Ofsted inspection. Many 
argued that this now demands greater consistency and self-policing. In our 
survey, more than three-quarters (77 per cent) of school leaders agreed with 
Toby Greany and Rob Higham
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the statement ‘making sure my school does well in Ofsted inspections is 
one of my top priorities’. As a result, case study school leaders regularly 
felt incentivized to prioritize the interests of the school over the interests of 
particular groups of, usually more vulnerable, children. High levels of stress 
were widely reported to result from these pressures for compliance and 
standardization, with a clear sense of a constrained professionalism among 
school staff.
We report mixed views on academization: three-fifths (60 per cent) 
of survey respondents working in academies agreed that academization 
had had at least some positive benefits, while two-thirds (69 per cent) of 
respondents working in maintained schools reported there were no benefits 
to becoming an academy, especially when weighed against the additional 
responsibilities. The threat of forced academization had created a sense 
of fear among many of our case study schools that if their performance 
were to drop they would be ‘taken over’ by a MAT, which would impose 
standardized systems and a narrow curriculum. Some schools were choosing 
to form or join ‘local MATs’ to pre-empt external take over.
With academization, powers of school oversight are moving from 
local to national government. This process has been uneven and often 
fraught. We identify a series of sharp differences between national and 
local government over how policy changes should be enacted locally, 
particularly where LAs have resisted academization. We also highlight 
differences between different parts of national government around aspects 
of strategy and attempts to ‘implement’ policy. The picture that emerges is 
of chaotic centralization, characterized by competing claims to authority 
and legitimacy but diminishing local knowledge about schools. 
Faced with significant funding cuts, a common trend was for LAs to 
become part of a more commercial middle tier, for example by establishing 
trading arms from which schools could purchase non-statutory services. 
This was not the only trajectory, however, as all four of our LAs sought 
to sustain oversight of maintained schools and to retain influence – both 
by working to reshape school clusters to replace traditional improvement 
services and by developing new governing networks involving ‘system 
leader’ schools, but not always wider stakeholders, in order to co-ordinate 
school improvement services and support. 
As support from LAs has reduced, however, schools have had to 
become more proactive in identifying and addressing their own improvement 
priorities. A majority of secondary headteachers welcomed what they saw as 
greater flexibility in where and how they accessed external support. Primary 
schools were often less enthusiastic and could experience this as a further 
unwanted burden. In our survey, ‘local clusters’ of schools were reported as 
the most common source of external support for schools. This was true for 
secondary as well as primary schools, although secondaries and especially 
those with a Requires Improvement (RI) or Inadequate Ofsted grade were 
also likely to draw on other forms of support, including peer reviews, 
commercial consultants, NLEs, TSAs, and, to a lesser extent, MATs. 
13
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School ‘system leaders’ – including nationally designated NLEs and 
TSA leaders as well as academy CEOs – were increasingly at the epicentre of 
this evolving system, particularly in the secondary phase. They often faced, 
however, conflicting and unreasonable demands from central government 
while being perceived by their peers to be an increasingly ‘co-opted elite’, 
working as part of the managerial state and accruing a range of personal 
and organizational benefits as a result. A range of interviewees, including 
RSCs and from Ofsted, also expressed concerns about the designated ‘system 
leadership’ model, including because of the importance it places on the Ofsted 
Outstanding grade and because of the influence it can accord to certain 
charismatic, authoritarian leaders. The ‘system leaders’ we interviewed all 
identified benefits from their roles, but also a series of challenges, including 
significant pressure to make short-term improvement in other schools and 
the fear that their own school might drop in performance as a result of their 
external work. 
Markets
Building on long-standing quasi-market policies in England, we show 
how the SISS agenda also contains policies that simultaneously seek to 
make schools more responsive to parental choice, more diverse and more 
entrepreneurial. 
The majority of headteachers we interviewed perceived that their 
school faced local pressures to compete for students, staff and/or status, 
but the extent of competition varied within and between our four localities. 
One common variation was school phase: in the survey, 91 per cent of 
secondary school respondents agreed that ‘schools in my locality compete 
with each other to recruit students’, whereas among primary schools, only 
33 per cent agreed and 48 per cent disagreed. 
There was broad recognition that schools are organized by choice 
and competition into local status hierarchies. In the survey, 85 per cent of 
secondary and 52 per cent of primary school respondents agreed that ‘there 
is a clear local hierarchy of schools in my area, in terms of their status and 
popularity with parents’. Importantly, school status was rarely seen to be 
a simple or ‘real’ reflection of ‘school quality’, with wider factors such as 
the school’s context, history and student intake all combining to position it 
relative to others. 
The schools we visited were all working more or less overtly to 
protect their status or to engineer a move up the local hierarchy. Improving 
a school’s Ofsted grade was the most immediate strategy for improving its 
reputation and position in the local status hierarchy, but we also observed 
a range of other practices. These ranged from gradual, authentic work to 
enhance the quality of learning and engage parents, through to aggressive 
marketing campaigns and ‘cream skimming’ aimed at recruiting particular 
types of students. 
Our analysis of national Ofsted data for the periods 2005–10 and 
2010–15 showed a relationship between inspection grades and the changing 
Toby Greany and Rob Higham
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socio-economic composition of a school’s student body, highlighting the 
importance of inspection in co-influencing parental choice and in structuring 
competition. Schools that sustained or improved their judgement to 
Outstanding in the 2010–15 period saw, on average, a reduction in the 
percentage of students eligible for free school meals (FSM), while schools 
retaining or being downgraded to a Requires Improvement and Inadequate 
judgement saw, on average, an increase in FSM eligibility. 
Linked to these findings, there was a consistent view among many of 
our interviewees that the SISS agenda is furthering the creation of ‘winners 
and losers’. While higher-status schools were seen to be benefiting in terms 
of new opportunities and resources as a result of policy reform, the lower-
status schools we visited faced a concentration of challenges often including 
under-subscription, higher mobility and disproportionate numbers of 
disadvantaged, migrant and hard to place children. Two-thirds (66 per cent) 
of respondents agreed that inequalities between schools are becoming wider 
as a result of current government policy. 
We also explore the evolution of the market in school improvement 
services. As sources of ‘free’ advice and support (for example from the 
LA) have reduced, knowledge and expertise around aspects of school 
improvement have become a more important ‘commodity’ for schools. 
High-status schools are well placed to compete with LAs and consultants 
and companies in this new marketplace, but they are responding in different 
ways. We outline examples of three Outstanding primary schools in one 
locality that were, respectively, seeking to sell, protect and share knowledge 
and expertise. We also show, however, that new local and regional markets 
in improvement services are particularly incentivizing a focus on the types of 
knowledge and expertise that can most easily be codified and commoditized 
(as ‘best practices’) rather than on the joint-practice development and 
learning processes advocated by Hargreaves (2012) as essential for a SISS. 
Networks 
Schools in England have collaborated in networks for many years, even while 
in many cases also competing. Our analysis focuses on inter-organizational 
partnerships between schools, which we show to have become more 
extensive and more important to schools since 2010, but we also find that 
this has created a range of new tensions and inequalities.
The vast majority of schools in our sample reported collaborating 
with other schools. In the survey, two-thirds (67 per cent) of primary leaders 
and two-fifths (40 per cent) of secondary leaders stated that their school’s 
strongest partnership was a ‘local cluster’. Around one in five secondary 
schools described their strongest partnership as a TSA (20 per cent) or a 
MAT (22 per cent) – although we argue below that MATs should not be 
conceived as partnerships.
The local clusters we visited varied widely in terms of the strength of 
ties between schools and in the depth and breadth of cluster activity. All four 
LAs were encouraging their primary schools into ‘improvement’-focused 
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clusters, largely as a way of sustaining some level of monitoring and 
improvement support in the face of reducing resources and capacity at LA-
level. We show, however, that this was often problematic, for example where 
schools were in competition or where clusters, or schools within them, were 
unable or unwilling to embrace these new approaches. 
Teaching School Alliances (TSAs) were advanced in policy from 2010, 
with the ‘best schools in the country’ (DfE, 2010: 23) designated nationally 
and encouraged to lead new alliances. We exemplify three common 
development trajectories for the TSAs in our localities, while noting that 
many alliances adopt hybrid approaches. In hierarchical alliances, one 
or more lead school dominated developments and was seen by alliance 
members to be benefiting disproportionately. In exclusive alliances, a subset 
of higher performing schools had formed the network as a way of securing 
their own performance, providing relatively limited opportunities or 
support for schools more widely to engage. In marketized alliances, the lead 
school/s sold services in a transparent but transactional way, with limited 
commitment to ongoing partnership or reciprocity with ‘client’ schools. 
In the face of growing DfE pressures on Teaching Schools to secure 
short-term improvement through ‘school-to-school support’ and the need 
to generate income, many Teaching Schools in our sample were forming 
MATs, as they saw this to offer greater financial security and clearer lines of 
accountability and authority over other schools. 
MATs are commonly referred to as a form of partnership, but we 
argue that this is inappropriate given a common definition of partnerships 
as ‘legally autonomous organizations that work together’ (Provan and 
Kenis, 2008). By contrast, a MAT is a single legal entity in which individual 
academies may have delegated powers, but these can be removed by the 
board. We argue MATs are best understood in terms of ‘mergers and 
acquisitions’, with prescribed models of governance and leadership largely 
derived from the private and, to a lesser extent, voluntary sectors. We show 
how MATs that had originally pursued flatter more lateral organizational 
models have been encouraged or required by RSCs to adopt more corporate, 
bureaucratic and standardized approaches over time. This was leading to a 
further dominance by academy sponsors, including higher-status schools, 
as well as towards increasing fragmentation as MATs compete against each 
other for status and schools. 
MATs have been encouraged to grow or merge by the DfE, in search 
of efficiencies and ‘economies of scale’. However, our statistical analysis 
of MAT impact on pupil attainment and progress (which we publish in 
a separate, parallel paper2) shows there is no positive impact from MAT 
status for pupils in either primary or secondary academies when compared 
to pupils in similar standalone academies. We also reveal important 
2 Bernardinelli, D., Rutt, S., Greany, T. and Higham, R. (2018) Multi-academy Trusts: Do 
they make a difference to pupil outcomes? This can be downloaded from the publisher’s 
website at www.ucl-ioe-press.com/books/education-policy/hierarchy-markets-and-
networks/
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differences between MATs of different sizes, suggesting that the economic 
drive for MAT growth may be in tension with an educational argument 
for smaller groupings of schools. Pupils in small and mid-sized MATs tend 
to perform better, on average, than their peers in comparable maintained 
schools in both phases and, in the primary phase, than comparable 
standalone academies. Conversely, secondary school pupils in larger MATs 
(16+ schools) tend to do worse in comparison to both standalone academies 
and maintained schools. 
Conclusion 
We conclude that rather than ‘moving control to the frontline’, the SISS 
agenda has intensified hierarchical governance and the state’s powers of 
intervention, further constraining the professionalism of school staff and 
steering the system through a model we term ‘coercive autonomy’. Our 
findings are unambiguous in illustrating the importance of Ofsted and the 
wider accountability framework in influencing the behaviour of schools, 
suggesting that hierarchical governance is more influential than market or 
network co-ordination in England. 
But it is also more complex than that, most obviously because 
hierarchical governance operates in combination with market mechanisms 
to create such strong incentives for schools. For example, our analysis of 
Ofsted results and student composition indicates the co-influence of Ofsted 
in shaping both parental choice and competitive practices by schools. 
Furthermore, the hierarchical state is no command and control 
monolith. Since 2010 the government has closed or amalgamated many 
‘quangos’, but we find the state is no less ‘congested’ (Skelcher, 2000). 
There are now multiple sub-systems, with different, partially overlapping 
organizations in the bureaucratic hierarchy holding diverse views on how 
the school system should be organized. 
This has created new pressures and contradictions for school-level 
leaders as they try to make sense of and navigate a new emergent landscape. 
Analysing the ways in which hierarchy, markets and networks intersect to 
influence decisions and behaviours across different local contexts is thus 
challenging and depends on a complex array of factors. We show that these 
include: the history of local relationships between schools and with the local 
authority, as well as the alliances, consensus and conflicts that have shaped 
local schooling; the context of individual schools and where and how they 
are situated socially, economically and geographically; and the agency of 
local actors, including their capacity to act and how this is informed by 
their personal and professional values. 
We identify two important perspectives on how local systems might 
be reshaped as a result of these factors. The first sees local agency being 
fatally diminished in the face of centralization and data surveillance: 
with a model of ‘unbalanced’ governance and ‘highly centralized system 
steering’ (Ozga, 2009: 149). The second allows more room for local 
agency, while acknowledging significant centralization: as power moves 
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away from traditional local democratic structures, space is created for the 
local to be remade by private, voluntary and existing public sector actors 
(Lubienski, 2014). 
Our research evidences how these moves are increasingly part of 
the same set of processes. For higher-status schools and their leaders, in 
particular nationally designated ‘system leaders’ and those forming MATs, 
as well as for LAs willing to ‘reform’ themselves, there are new opportunities 
to influence and reshape local landscapes, albeit while being bound closer 
to the performance management of central government. The motivations 
of these local actors are often mixed and can include aims to support more 
inclusive and equitable local school systems. At the same time, however, 
school-level actors are being encouraged to enhance their own positions 
and the positioning of their school(s), both by working entrepreneurially to 
sell services in new markets in school improvement and by working in new 
regional and sub-regional governing networks. These governing networks 
combine the hierarchical authority of RSCs with the professional networks 
of an increasingly co-opted elite of school leaders. 
In these ways the SISS agenda further develops New Labour’s 
evolution of New Public Management, including by extending the roles and 
responsibilities of particular school leaders from management to governance 
and from schools to multi-school groupings. There is no doubt that both 
networks and new groupings of schools have become more important to 
schools since 2010, in particular as LA support has been rolled back and 
as new ‘school-led’ models of improvement have emerged. However, these 
do not represent an alternative to hierarchy and markets. They are not 
‘self-organized’ networks (Rhodes, 1997) and rarely represent the ‘deep 
partnerships’ promoted by Hargreaves (2012). Rather, they reflect complex 
local responses to hierarchical and market governance, as schools work 
together to try to meet accountability requirements and/or to protect their 
positioning in local status hierarchies. 
In this context, while a minority of our respondents were optimistic 
about the potential for their local school system to become ‘self-improving’, 
the majority view was that the SISS agenda is creating a system of ‘winners 
and losers’. Many saw the contemporary policy framework as problematic, 
not least because of the incentives to act ‘selfishly’ in a highly regulated 
marketplace. There was also a prevailing view that the system has become 
increasingly incoherent. As one secondary school leader interviewee put 
it: ‘“System” implies that there’s a good degree of articulate design. And I 
think what’s happening nationally is that there are all sorts of systems … 
there isn’t really a system, and I think there are lots of emergent means of 
managing the problem that was set up. But nobody knows what works.’
Individual school leaders were generally positive about their own 
capacity to interpret and manage external change. For instance, 89 per 
cent of survey respondents agreed that their school had the capacity it 
needs to sustain its own improvement over the next three years. However, 
this did not mean that schools supported current government policy: half 
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(53 per cent) of our survey respondents reported that they did not support 
the overall trajectory of current policy, while only 20 per cent did. They 
were also clear about the tensions, paradoxes and ironies that exist (Greany 
and Earley, 2017). For example, current reforms were seen to be moving 
the system away from the original promise of increased school autonomy 
and towards a model of MATs in which school-level autonomy is reduced. 
Further, as MATs get larger, the number of managerial levels often increases, 
meaning that the ‘bureaucracy’ of the LA is replaced by another, potentially 
more complex and less accountable bureaucratic form – which develops 
hierarchical authority without a local democratic mandate. 
Active resistance to this ensemble of policies was largely absent in 
our case study schools, apart from where a school was resisting forced 
academization. School leaders usually tried to resolve the dilemmas they 
faced through ‘pragmatic compliance’ or sometimes ‘passive resistance’, 
in which they sought to hold true to a core set of professional values 
while quietly protecting the school from external change. Such resistance 
was generally only possible, however, if the school was performing above 
minimum benchmarks. Furthermore, it often relied to some degree on 
solidarity between local schools, but if one school started to adopt more 
self-interested behaviours then others often felt a need to respond or face 
being disadvantaged in a competitive environment.
We conclude by identifying four themes that emerge from this research 
that merit further focus and attention among policy makers, researchers 
and practitioners:
i) A new economy of knowledge: in the context of our findings that 
highlight the incentives for higher-status schools to codify and sell ‘best 
practice’ knowledge geared towards the demands of the accountability 
system, we ask how the system could be reshaped to encourage more 
inclusive and professional forms of knowledge development and 
mobilization. 
ii) Fragmentation: in the context of our findings on Ofsted and student 
intakes, we ask how changes to the existing model of hierarchical and 
market governance, including changes to the ‘middle tier’ above schools, 
could reduce the trend towards a system of ‘winners and losers’.
iii) Equity: in the context of our findings on the concentration of vulnerable 
children in deprived schools, we ask how policy on admissions and fair 
access could be reformed and how services for the most vulnerable 
children could be reshaped to redress the trend towards further 
stratification. 
iv) Legitimacy: in the context of our findings on an increasing local 
democratic deficit, we ask how the school system could secure trust 
among professionals as well as parents and students, and what might be 
required to create meaningful engagement for these core stakeholders. 
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Chapter 1
About the research 
This report summarizes the findings from a mixed methods research 
study undertaken between 2014 and 2017 by Professor Toby Greany and 
Dr Rob Higham at the UCL Institute of Education (IOE). The quantitative 
strands of the project were undertaken with a team at NfER – Simon Rutt, 
Daniele Bernardinelli, David Sims and Susan Bamford. Dr Iain Barnes and 
Dr Melanie Ehren at UCL IOE supported some of the school case study 
data collection. The project was funded by the Nuffield Foundation and 
Education Development Trust. The project team were supported by an 
Advisory Board (see Acknowledgements).
The study analyses how schools in England have interpreted and 
begun to respond to the government’s ‘self-improving school-led system’ 
(SISS) policy agenda. This broad policy ensemble (Ball, 1993) has been 
an overarching government narrative for schools policy since 2010 
(House of Commons Education Committee, 2016). Drawing on earlier 
policy frameworks, the contemporary SISS agenda was introduced by 
the Conservative-led coalition government in its 2010 white paper The 
Importance of Teaching (DfE, 2010), but this has since been extended and 
developed by the Conservative governments elected in 2015 and 2017. We 
outline the key features of the SISS policy agenda in Chapter 2. 
While aspects of the SISS agenda have been evaluated in isolation, this 
study provides an empirically based and critical analysis of policy reform 
and the ways in which this is influencing change across different contexts. 
The research also seeks to contribute to wider debates on school system 
governance, reform and leadership, not least by drawing on governance 
theory to analyse the ways in which hierarchy, markets and networks 
interact with local contexts and the agency of different actors to reshape 
local school systems. 
The research questions for the project were as follows:
❯ How are school leaders interpreting and responding to the ‘self-
improving system’ agenda? 
❯ To what extent are ‘deep’ school-to-school partnerships emerging and 
how do partnerships differ by phase, context and leadership approach?
❯ To what extent do emergent local models represent a genuine basis for 
school-led improvement that meets the needs of all schools? 
❯ What factors support and hinder the development of school-led 
approaches and what are the implications for schools and school 
leadership?
❯ What is the evidence of impact on pupil outcomes for multi-academy 
trusts? How does this differ by size of MAT?
❯ What trends can be observed in Ofsted ratings over the period 2005–15 
and how, if at all, do these relate to changes in school characteristics?
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The project involved qualitative and quantitative analysis in several strands 
(see Annex 1 for more details on the methodology):
❯ An initial literature review and the development of a theoretical 
framework. 
❯ Forty-seven primary and secondary school case studies completed in 
four localities across England, based on 164 interviews with a range of 
staff. The four localities were selected based on analysis of national and 
local data (see Annex 1 for details). Our aim was to select two areas 
with relatively high and two areas with relatively low proportions of 
academies and nationally designated ‘system leaders’, so as to include 
localities that had engaged differently with these core aspects of the 
SISS policy agenda.3 The four localities and schools within them 
were also selected to represent a range of socio-economic contexts, 
performance against national metrics and geographic, local authority 
and school type differences. 
❯ Interviews with a further 18 system informants – individuals such as 
regional schools commissioners, Ofsted regional directors and LA 
leaders who provide a perspective both on developments in the four 
localities and nationally. 
❯ A representative national survey of school leaders from 699 schools. 
❯ Analysis of the impact of primary and secondary multi-academy trusts 
(MATs) using propensity score matching (the methods and findings 
from this strand are published in full in a separate, parallel paper, 
with only the summary findings included in this report for reasons 
of space4). 
❯ Analysis of Ofsted judgements and student intake characteristics 
nationally over a ten-year period.
The qualitative research in the four localities was carried out between spring 
2015 and autumn 2016. The quantitative strands (national survey, MAT 
impact analysis and Ofsted analysis) were carried out between autumn 
2015 and spring 2017. 
This report offers a research perspective on how the SISS agenda is 
impacting on schools, their students and the local organization of schooling. 
In order to try to keep this report accessible we set out our summary findings 
here, with more in-depth analysis and further conceptual work to follow in 
subsequent publications.
We recognize that in this report we offer only a partial account of 
the complexity of local areas and responses to change. There are also wider 
3 Throughout this report we refer to Teaching School leaders alongside NLEs and 
LLEs as ‘nationally designated system leaders’. Teaching Schools are designated at an 
organizational level, so are not defined as ‘system leaders’ in an individual sense, but 
we use this terminology for the sake of simplicity. Headteachers of Teaching Schools 
were also commonly designated as NLEs in our four localities, so there is considerable 
overlap in practice. 
4 This can be downloaded from the publisher’s website at www.ucl-ioe-press.com/books/
education-policy/hierarchy-markets-and-networks/
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limitations to our approach that we acknowledge. For example, we did not 
collect longitudinal data so have not developed a perspective on change over 
time and while our research sample includes school leaders, teachers, local 
authority officers and a range of other middle tier actors, due to time and 
resources it does not include students or parents. Further, while we provide 
some insight into classrooms and the work of teachers, our findings – 
reflecting the SISS policy agenda – concern predominately: relations between 
schools, LAs and other ‘middle tier’ actors; the re-structuring of schools as 
organizations; and the work of school leaders and their positioning(s) in 
relation to policy. Finally, we visited primary and secondary schools, but 
not special schools, except one in Northern LA. The decision to exclude 
special schools was partly driven by resource limitations, but also by the 
advisory board’s view that special schools tend to collaborate and compete 
with other schools in unique ways, partly depending on the nature of 
their specialism and context, thus making it difficult to draw out common 
findings from a relatively small sample.
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Chapter 2
Literature review and conceptual 
framework 
Introduction 
This chapter describes and analyses the key features of the government’s 
SISS agenda and briefly reviews existing literature in this area. It then sets 
out the conceptual framework that has informed the research and which 
provides a structure for this report. 
Defining the ‘self-improving school-led system’?
The idea of a ‘self-improving system’ has been widely referenced since 
2010, but it is notable that the concept remains largely undefined in official 
texts (Greany, 2014).5 Government ministers have referred at different 
times to both a ‘self-improving’ and a ‘school-led’ system. These terms can 
be traced back before 2010, for example to New Labour initiatives such as 
the London and City Challenges (Greaves et al., 2014; Rudd et al., 2011) 
and its efforts to increase school-centred teacher education (McIntyre 
et al., 2017). 
The earliest official reference to a ‘self-improving system’ (we could 
find) was made in a Cabinet Office (2006: 1) pamphlet titled: ‘The UK 
Government’s Model of Public Service Reform’.6 This argued that all public 
services could increase efficiency and quality through a tailored combination 
of ‘elements’ that together create: ‘a “self-improving system” because 
incentives for continuous improvement and innovation are embedded 
within it’ (p.4, our emphasis). These elements were:
❯ pressure from government, with top-down performance management 
through stretching targets, regulation, inspection and direct intervention
❯ competitive provision, with market incentives to create both 
competition between ‘providers’ and contestability over who provides 
public services 
5 One interpretation of ‘self-improving, school-led system’ is that it is no more than 
a rhetorical slogan that has little genuine meaning. In analysing policy documents 
and Ministerial speeches, however, we argue that the idea of a SISS can be better 
understood as a narrative that has developed to promote and legitimize an ensemble 
of contemporary reforms (see page 23). We therefore refer in this report to the SISS as 
a ‘policy agenda’, which we understand to mean a set of intended reforms that may be 
internally inconsistent and even contradictory – including as policy priorities change 
in response to failures and new opportunities – but that has an overarching desired 
trajectory, which has implications for the organization of schools and the school system.
6 The pamphlet was produced by the prime minister’s strategy unit and was ‘not a 
statement of government policy’ but rather a ‘working document intended to facilitate 
discussion and debate’ (Cabinet Office, 2006: 2).
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❯ pressure from citizens, with ‘users’ shaping services though voice and 
choice (and funding following user choices) 
❯ measures to build the capability and capacity of civil and public 
servants, through leadership and workforce reform and the promotion 
of ‘best practice’ through funding dissemination and incentivizing 
collaboration.
This outline of a self-improving system continues to inform contemporary 
policy (Ball, 2017), although since 2010 there has also been a stronger 
narrative on ‘school autonomy’. The New Labour government was critiqued 
by David Cameron (2011: 2), the then Prime Minister, for running ‘centrally 
controlled public services’ and, in its first white paper, the Conservative-led 
coalition government stated that schools and the teaching profession need 
to ‘feel highly trusted to do what they believe is right’ (DfE, 2010: 18). 
Our analysis of policy texts since 2010 suggests that government 
policies that currently constitute the idea of a ‘self-improving school-led 
system’ include:
❯ de-regulation and decentralization – with schools encouraged to 
become academies to gain independence from local government and 
new ‘freedoms’ over finance, staffing, the curriculum and admissions 
(DfE, 2016b: 8) 
❯ re-regulation and centralization – with new curriculum requirements, 
central funding contracts, performance indicators and new forms of 
intervention, including powers for Regional School Commissioners to 
intervene in academies and schools judged as ‘inadequate’ or ‘coasting’
❯ choice and competition – with ‘much more information about schools 
available in standardized formats’ to increase ‘direct accountability’ 
to parental choice and the ‘freeing up’ of the system to create new 
types of schools and for private and third-sector providers to sponsor 
state schools
❯ adoption of business practices and governance models – with academies 
encouraged (and sometimes forced) to create or join multi-academy 
trusts, as these hard-governance structures are argued ‘to improve 
standards and increase financial efficiencies and sustainability’ (DfE, 
2016b: 8)
❯ school-led capacity building and knowledge transfer – with centrally 
designated ‘system-leading’ schools providing support to other schools, 
to ‘spread best practice’ (DfE, 2016: 75) and to allow ‘the best schools 
and leaders to extend their influence’ (DfE, 2016: 16).
Across these policies, the government can point to rapid change (DfE, 
2017). The number of academies has increased from just over 200 in 2010 
to more than 6,700 by October 2017. The number of MATs overseeing 
two or more schools has also increased, with around 1,000 such MATs 
overseeing a total of around 5,000 academies by October 2017. The number 
of ‘system-leading’ schools has also increased since 2010, with more than 
700 Teaching Schools designated and the number of National Leaders of 
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Education (NLE) up from about 400 in 2010 to more than 1,100 in 2017. 
Meanwhile, most ‘quangos’ have been closed or merged into the DfE and 
central funding for local authorities has been significantly reduced, with 
overall central funding for LAs reduced by over a quarter between 2009–10 
and 2014–15 (IFS, 2015). 
Beyond government, proponents of the SISS approach tend to 
emphasize the interdependence of schools and the importance of inter-
organizational networks within a ‘self-improving system’, rather than 
school autonomy or choice and competition (Greany, 2014; 2015a; 2016). 
This has included arguments for collective leadership of local systems by 
schools (Ainscow, 2015), shared accountability between schools (Gilbert, 
2012) and ‘a profession-led system that is evidence-informed, innovative 
and ethical’ (Cruddas, 2015: 21). One widely cited contribution was set 
out by Hargreaves (2010; 2012), who argued that a ‘self-improving system’ 
requires local ‘co-construction’, in which schools share priorities, build 
trust and devise solutions collegially. For this to occur, Hargreaves argued, 
schools need to cluster into ‘deep and tight’ partnerships capable of leading 
mutual improvement, with staff trained to co-interrogate teaching through 
shared rounds of evaluation and innovation. The initial direction for these 
partnerships would be provided by system-leading schools, but over time, 
Hargreaves (2012: 17) argued, ‘everyone in a partnership shares the values 
and practices of the original system leaders’. 
A number of research findings have challenged any simplistic 
assumptions about the realization of this idealized narrative. These include 
questions about:
❯ school capacity and whether schools generally, and designated system-
leading schools specifically, have the capacity to take on the roles 
envisaged for them (Chapman, 2013)
❯ co-ordination and whether, given attempts to ‘dismantle’ the local 
authority system, there will be sufficient coherence, planning and 
feedback in a system of academies, MATs and system-leading schools 
overseen by central government (Gilbert et al., 2013)
❯ funding and whether the government will provide sufficient investment 
to develop the ‘school-led’ infrastructure of a self-improving system, 
especially given wider austerity (Greany, 2015b)
❯ evidence and whether the predicted creation and sharing of knowledge 
about ‘effective practice’ will occur in practice, especially given 
historical limitations to scaling up ‘best practice’ (Brown, 2015)
❯ inclusiveness and whether there will be access to appropriate support 
in a school-led system, with evidence of cuts in wider services for 
vulnerable children and disparities in engagement in school-led 
networks by school size, type, Ofsted grade and regionally (Sandals 
and Bryant, 2014; Higham and Earley, 2014; Cousin, 2018)
❯ involvement and whether the variety of stakeholders in local education, 
including teachers and parents, will be allowed to participate and 
have a representative voice in decisions over the restructuring of local 
schools systems (Hatcher, 2014; Higham, 2017). 
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There are also notable variations in the initial enactment of government 
priorities. For example, about two-thirds of schools – predominately 
primary schools – remain locally maintained. As the DfE itself notes (DfE, 
2017: 20), there are significant differences in Teaching School engagement 
by geography and socio-economic context with, outside London, 43 per 
cent of secondary Teaching Schools located in the wealthiest quintile of 
local areas and only six per cent in the most deprived areas. There is also 
a range of critical concern about the self-improving system policy agenda 
– including that inequalities between schools will increase and that the 
system as a whole will become more fragmented (Greany, 2014; Coldron 
et al., 2014). 
The Government’s response to these concerns appears to be that 
specific ‘school-led’ policies should be ‘implemented’ more widely. For 
example, the former secretary of state, Justine Greening (2017: 5), argued:
I believe strongly in the school-led system – taking what happens in the 
very best classrooms and schools in this country and spreading it, driving 
improvement through collaboration and school-to-school support. But I 
also recognize that, although this system has flourished in many places, 
it hasn’t yet done so in others. So we need to take a more active, stronger 
approach where it is most needed … I want to ensure we develop a 
full national network of teaching schools and prioritize attracting good 
sponsors and growing MAT capacity in challenging areas, ensuring our 
best tools for improvement are not just concentrated where they are 
easiest to establish.
Yet this focus on the idealized potential of MATs and Teaching Schools 
neglects the wider structures in which schools are embedded. The SISS 
agenda is simultaneously seeking to reform the quasi-market and the 
incentives this creates for autonomous schools to act in their own interests, 
particularly in the absence of a co-ordinating ‘middle tier’. There are aims 
to open up the ‘supply side’ through new free schools and to create new 
markets in school improvement services, increasing competitive pressures 
in the system. Hierarchical control is also central to the SISS agenda, with 
government targets, inspections and intervention policies serving to further 
centralize power and expose schools to tightening accountability pressures 
that further incentivize test performance and institutional self-interest over 
wider collaboration. 
In reality, then, our interpretation of the ‘self-improving system’ 
agenda is that it is replete with, and is being layered on top of, existing and 
contrasting systemic governing structures and incentives for schools. While 
policy advocates stress the importance of particular types of networks, 
these co-exist with both hierarchical control and markets, which are often 
‘airbrushed out of analyses of school networks’ (Lumby, 2009: 312). 
There is a need for research to investigate how these governing structures 
and, crucially, the responses of schools and other actors to them, may be 
reconstituting local school systems. 
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Governing systems: hierarchy, markets and networks
Governance theory provides a useful lens for making sense of the complexity 
and contradictions that underlie the SISS agenda. Governance theory 
draws on a range of different theoretical traditions (Bevir, 2011), but we 
focus here on the ways in which hierarchy, markets and networks operate, 
both separately and in overlapping and sometimes contradictory ways, to 
co-ordinate different spheres of social life (Jessop, 2011; Keast et al., 2006; 
Rhodes, 1997; Thompson et al., 1991). 
Each of these co-ordinating mechanisms is seen to have strengths and 
limitations. For Adler (2001), in idealized form:
❯ Hierarchy enables control by using formal authority as a means of co-
ordination, but can weaken collaboration and lateral innovation. 
❯ Markets rely on price to co-ordinate supply and demand and promote 
flexibility, but can corrode trust and undermine relations that support 
knowledge sharing and equity. 
❯ Networks co-ordinate on the basis of trust and promote shared 
knowledge generation, but can become dysfunctional by allowing 
complacency or exclusivity on the basis of familiarity.
One popular view is that government policy has shifted over time, moving 
from hierarchical co-ordination to markets and then to network governance, 
although the reality is more complex (Exworthy et al., 1999; Cousin, 2018). 
The post-war period certainly saw a dominance of hierarchical, bureaucratic 
governance, although this coexisted with strong professional networks. The 
1980s saw the introduction of markets and privatization, reflecting the 
wider rise of neoliberalism (Hood, 1991; Ball, 2011), but these new market 
mechanisms coexisted with new forms of hierarchical governance as the 
state became both market maker and regulator, for example through the 
new National Curriculum, national tests and inspectorate. From the late 
1990s, networks were argued to be displacing markets as a dominant mode 
of co-ordination, reflecting the ICT revolution and globalization (Castells, 
1996; Rhodes, 1997). In public services, the need for inter-agency working 
was emphasized and networks were seen as a response to the fragmentation 
created by markets, but the new networks did not simply recreate older ones: 
private and third sector actors took on extensive public sector roles and 
sector boundaries were blurred in ‘public-private partnerships’ (Ball, 2007). 
These changes led to arguments that the state was being ‘hollowed 
out’ (Rhodes, 1997), but more recently it has been seen to be adapting. 
In a move from ‘government to governance’ (Kjaer, 2004), hierarchical 
command and control is being replaced by models that enable steering at a 
distance (Hudson, 2007). One way to understand this new role of the state 
is as ‘meta-governance’ (Jessop, 2011), which sees the state seek overarching 
authority by setting and adapting the conditions in which governance occurs, 
including by actively mixing and managing combinations of hierarchy, 
markets and networks to try to achieve its goals. This perspective can afford 
the state significant powers, although messiness, ad hoc-ery and governance 
failure remain endemic (Ball, 2011). Furthermore, and critically, the mixing 
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and overlaying of different governance structures creates tensions that are 
felt particularly in local contexts (Hoyle and Wallace, 2007). As Newman 
and Clarke (2009: 127) argue:
responsibility for managing tensions and dilemmas becomes devolved 
to individual agents … [and] tend to be experienced as personal, 
professional or ethical dilemmas. 
In these ways, governance theory holds significant implications for how 
the contemporary SISS policy agenda may re-organize local school systems. 
Woods and Simkins (2014) argue there is the potential of a range of 
outcomes including: healthy diversity in response to local need; undesirable 
fragmentation and threats for equity; and/or national pressure for conformity 
and prescription. For these reasons, Simkins and Woods argue (2014: 321): 
‘One of the most pressing questions in a complex and evolving process is 
what is actually happening at the local level, how is it being reshaped?’
Conceptualizing local school systems
It is clear that local government has been ‘relentlessly squeezed’ through the 
changes described above (Woods and Simkins, 2014: 328), but there are 
different perspectives on how local contexts are being reshaped as a result.
One perspective sees local agency being fatally diminished in the 
face of centralization. Ozga (2009) argues for instance that the state now 
depends on rapid flows of data to evaluate and steer schools. Rather than 
diminish the state’s influence, however, this has made schools more visible, 
allowing the central state a panoptic view, while also amplifying the impact 
of its performance indicators on professionals work, as these are used as the 
bases of data collection. In the process, Ozga argues, local authorities have 
already been substantially weakened, so that the local is no longer either an 
obstacle to change or a space of democratic agency. Instead local authorities 
are cast as one ‘service agent’ among others. The effect, Ozga (2009: 149) 
argues, is a model of ‘unbalanced’ governance and ‘highly centralized system 
steering’.
Another perspective allows more room for local agency, while 
identifying significant centralization. Lubienski (2014) argues that 
decentralization policies, designed to by-pass middle tier actors, often set 
up a dual movement locally. Power is moved away from traditional actors 
and structures that have a local democratic mandate, but opportunities are 
also created for new actors to occupy and exercise influence in the spaces 
left behind. These actors are often voluntary, not-for-profit and for-profit 
organizations (Ball, 2011), but can include older actors willing to ‘reform’ 
themselves, including, for example, local authorities willing to become 
more commercially entrepreneurial (Boyask, 2016). In the process the 
local is remade, both as a space for specific kinds of agency, and by the 
state defining entry conditions and regulation – which can also work to 
bind local actors and institutions ‘closer to the will of central government’ 
(Wilkins, 2016: 74).
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Research framework
Informed by these perspectives, our research investigates: i) how the SISS 
policy agenda attempts to govern and re-position different actors, ii) how 
these different actors interpret and respond to the SISS agenda, to the 
extent that they do, and iii) how the emerging outcomes impact on different 
schools, students and the wider local co-ordination of schooling.
To conceptualize these issues we drew on the three regimes of 
governance outlined above to inform the research design, defining each at 
a system level as:
❯ Hierarchy – the formal authority exercised by the state, including 
through statutory policies and guidance, bureaucracies and performance 
management and intervention
❯ Markets – the incentives and (de)regulation aimed at encouraging 
choice, competition, contestability and commercialization
❯ Networks – the (re)creation of interdependencies that support and/
or coerce inter-organizational collaboration, partnerships and 
participation.
Investigating how the SISS agenda has mixed and re-balanced these regimes, 
we recognize that new policies are often layered onto and interact with 
a range of ‘messy’ local and contextual issues, including prior processes 
of policy enactment (Ball et al., 2012). In order to gain insight into these 
local differences and to address the research questions, we have focused 
on whether and how schools and local school systems are being re-shaped, 
the extent to which these can be considered more or less inclusive, and the 
influence of the following factors in this process:
i. the local history of relationships – between schools, the LA and the 
wider community, as well as the relationships, alliances, consensus and/
or conflicts that have shaped the local provision of schooling
ii. the context of schools – where and how schools are situated and 
structured, socially and geographically, as well as who they serve 
iii. the perceived agency of local actors – reflecting their capacity and freedom 
to act, as well as their professional beliefs and values (Gewirtz, 2002).
Reporting our findings we structure the report’s chapters in relation to 
our analysis of hierarchy, markets and then networks, while continuing 
to recognize the interplay between these three regimes of governance and 
how this influences change in particular contexts. Throughout we use 
pseudonyms for the four localities, school networks and individual schools 
to provide anonymity for our respondents. When using quotes we note the 
respondent’s role and, if school based, the school’s phase and school type 
and the school’s overall Ofsted grade at the time of the research (including 
because of the significance of Ofsted grading in our findings). 
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Chapter 3
Hierarchy: policy, accountability 
and the changing middle tier
Introduction 
In this chapter we draw mainly on our locality research, as well as the survey, 
to explore the changing ways in which the state’s hierarchical authority 
is being exercised and the local interpretations and responses to this. 
First, we analyse how the central state, particularly through performance 
management and a reformed accountability system, has since 2010 further 
constrained the professionalism of school leaders and teachers, offering a 
level of ‘coercive autonomy’ to schools. We then analyse recent reforms to 
the ‘middle tier’ that sits above schools, arguing that this has influenced 
three parallel processes: ‘chaotic centralization’, the development of a more 
‘commercialized middle tier’ and a ‘co-opted elite’ of nationally designated 
school system leaders.
Constrained professionalism
An important claim in the SISS agenda is that schools and the teaching 
profession should ‘feel highly trusted to do what they believe is right’ 
(DfE, 2010: 18). In order to enable this the Government (DfE, 2010: 66) 
promised that: 
We will dismantle the apparatus of central control and bureaucratic 
compliance.
In this chapter we argue that schools have not experienced a ‘dismantling’ 
of ‘central control’. One of the school leaders we interviewed did argue 
that ‘the previous framework (i.e. before 2010 under New Labour) was too 
prescriptive’ and that this ‘disempowered people to think independently’. 
They went on, however, ‘now I think you’ve got the appearance of 
autonomy … but we’re going to measure you in this particular way’. This 
highlights the central role of the accountability framework – in particular 
the new National Curriculum and exams and the more demanding Ofsted 
inspection framework – in influencing school behaviour. One headteacher 
expressed a widespread view: 
I think in terms of what drives or what motivates people, I think that the 
accountability framework is the biggest. I don’t necessarily agree with 
that, but it’s everything that we’re about. 
Headteacher, secondary academy, Ofsted Outstanding 
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Our case study schools highlighted three common ways in which external 
accountability steers the school system and constrains the professionalism 
of school staff. 
Standardization and pressure to perform
The first concerned how the accountability system generally, and Ofsted 
inspections in particular, placed tremendous pressure on schools and school 
leaders to secure improvement in relation to externally defined metrics 
and frameworks. In the survey, the majority of respondents (77 per cent of 
primary and 83 per cent of secondary schools) agreed or strongly agreed 
that ‘making sure my school does well in Ofsted inspections is one of my 
top priorities’. 
Since 2010 reforms have been made to the Ofsted framework and 
approach that, while related to the wider guise of reducing bureaucracy, 
were aimed at making inspection more demanding. One key change 
introduced as part of the 2012 framework was the shift from judging 
schools as Satisfactory to Requires Improvement (RI). Schools judged RI 
receive monitoring visits from Ofsted and a re-inspection within two years. 
Schools judged ‘inadequate’ face sponsored academization or, if already an 
academy, re-brokerage to a new sponsor (DfE, 2016). 
As a result, external accountability was seen by our interviewees to 
have become more punitive since 2010. A related concern was with the 
consistency now demanded by Ofsted, which combined with a view that the 
measurement of student outcomes had become more narrow, for example at 
GCSE as a result of the removal of many vocational qualifications from the 
approved exams list. Several school leaders used the metaphor of a factory 
to convey the ‘standardized quality control’ now expected of them. 
With increasing central surveillance of pupil-level data by both the 
DfE and Ofsted to ‘assess risk’, there was also a widespread sense of being 
continually watched (Ozga, 2009). Schools judged to be ‘outstanding’ 
have since 2012 been technically ‘exempted’ from routine inspection but 
reported needing to be constantly prepared for an inspection. Further, 
rather than being able to fabricate a positive image of the school for a 
one-off inspection visit as they might have been able to do in the past 
(Perryman et al., 2017), school leaders reported needing to be able to show 
they understood where the school would be judged to be failing to meet 
external standards and to evidence what was being done to rectify this. As 
one headteacher described, where:
previously [I] would have done my damnedest to hide every weakness … 
now we know anybody coming in from outside, will find them. We want 
them to be well aware that not only do we know where they are, these 
are the actions we’re taking to remedy.
Principal, secondary convertor academy, Ofsted Outstanding
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Self-policing
The second connected theme concerns the ways in which external 
accountability influences and constrains school leaders’ priorities and ways 
of thinking. This relates to what Perryman (2009) termed ‘normalization’ – 
a process of ensuring that behaviour that is externally judged to be effective 
becomes the only acceptable or ‘normal’ behaviour in a school. 
All of the schools we visited recognized the need to perform for 
Ofsted and it was notable how language and concepts from Ofsted had been 
widely internalized into school practices and ways of thinking, particularly 
at secondary level. For example, in one school’s staff appraisal system:
Everybody has, you all have the same success criteria, which is the Ofsted 
framework, for what outstanding progress looks like. Yes, and the second 
one is about your marking through that assessment. Again, we’re just 
taking the [Ofsted] framework. So, that’s been successful. And a third one 
[i.e. staff performance objective] they can develop for themselves. 
Headteacher, maintained secondary, Ofsted Good
This was also evident in school self-evaluation, improvement planning and 
the commissioning of advice and practice inspections (‘mocksteds’) from 
consultants. Wherever possible, schools wanted to draw on consultants to 
support this work who, as one headteacher described it, ‘are very up to date 
with the Ofsted framework for obvious reasons’. 
An example of how this ‘self-policing’ by schools is now being extended 
is the rapid growth of peer review. More than two-fifths (44 per cent) of the 
school leaders interviewed in the survey said that their school had received a 
peer review in the past 12 months and this figure was higher (57 per cent) for 
leaders in secondary schools with an Ofsted grade 3 (RI) or 4 (Inadequate). 
Our case study visits indicated that there is no single model for these peer 
reviews, but most involved a team of heads or senior leaders from partner 
schools reviewing one or more aspects of a host school’s practice and then 
providing feedback and, sometimes, reciprocal support for improvement. 
Within this diversity were examples that were closer to ‘mocksteds’, for 
example involving an externally commissioned Ofsted inspector alongside 
the staff from another school and providing an indicative ‘Ofsted grade’ for 
the school. Others sought to be more developmental, a way of reviewing 
and sharing practice in a specified area. Some schools paid for support from 
one or other of the national organizations that offer frameworks for peer 
review, but many school partnerships had developed their own approach. 
Inviting this peer scrutiny was seen to require ‘courage’ on the part 
of heads, since reviews were often ‘hard-hitting’ and ‘painful’, with several 
school leaders conscious of needing to better manage the process as their 
teachers had initially been ‘adversely affected’. Not all school leaders were 
prepared to engage in this and this could impact on their involvement in 
school networks, an issue that we return to in Chapter 5. Those that did often 
valued the feedback and opportunities to review other schools. A minority 
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argued this provided a space ‘outside’ the accountability system in which to 
be honest without fear of reprimand. The majority, however, acknowledged 
that their focus and methodology reflected the Ofsted model and that 
they used the reviews as a way to prepare for Ofsted and to evidence and 
legitimize the need for driving through related changes internally. Indeed, 
as one headteacher argued, referencing Foucault, in the context of paying 
a national organization for an annual peer review visit, this was one more 
way for schools to self-police: 
Someone wrote about the panopticon, ‘that we are all self-policing 
now’ … that we don’t have to have Ofsted every year, yet that is what 
[national organization] is offering. … It looks just like Ofsted. So, yes, 
it’s a sharing of data, but it’s only because you paid all the money for it; 
you have to. There’s a selectiveness about what data is shared; it’s shared 
in a transactional relationship: you give me a judgement that I can then 
use in my Ofsted report, when it comes around.
Principal, secondary convertor academy, Ofsted Outstanding
Narrowing focus and prioritizing the needs of the school 
The third related theme concerns the ways in which external accountability 
can exert pressure on schools to narrow their focus onto student attainment 
and progress in external tests – including by making decisions that prioritize 
some children’s progress at the expense of others. All the school leaders 
we interviewed acknowledged the importance of student attainment and 
progress, and the idea that schools should be responsible for student 
outcomes was widely accepted. A significant proportion, however, saw 
league tables and inspections as working against both a broad and balanced 
curriculum and professional discretion to identify and respond to students’ 
needs and interests.7
For example, almost half of the survey respondents (49 per cent) 
agreed with the statement: ‘Ofsted inspections and league tables reduce my 
school’s ability to tailor teaching to our students’ needs and interests’, while 
only a third (35 per cent) disagreed. Respondents were also asked whether 
they agreed or disagreed with the statement: ‘External accountability, for 
example via Ofsted and league tables, has a positive influence on teaching 
and learning in my school’. Half of respondents (51 per cent) disagreed with 
this statement, while 31 per cent agreed. 
The dominant response to increased external accountability pressure 
since 2010 has been an increasingly relentless focus on improving externally 
measured student progress and attainment. This deepened the existing 
trend towards tracking, monitoring and scrutiny of students and teachers 
7 Our fieldwork was undertaken as student progress data was being introduced as a 
new additional measure in national performance tables, so it was too early to capture 
detailed insights into how schools were interpreting and responding to these changes. 
The inclusion of progress rather than solely raw attainment data was broadly welcome, 
but there were concerns about progress measures being decontextualized, and in 
secondary schools about the introduction and constraints of EBacc.
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as core tasks of school leadership (Gunter, 2001; Courtney, 2015). The 
following quote gives a sense of how relentless the focus on improving 
exam results can be: 
It’s amazing what you can achieve – the results if you make it a big 
deal. And you make things a big deal by focusing on them. Some people 
probably talk about their results every now and again. Maybe they’ll 
say once a term. I talk about them every two weeks. We sit down and 
go through every student. Everything that’s being put in place, every 
intervention. What’s happening? What can we do more? What can we 
make sure happens? 
Executive head, sponsored secondary academy, Ofsted Good 
In a small number of cases our interviewees acknowledged that this ‘no-
excuses’ approach had created an autocratic, perhaps even toxic culture 
(Craig, 2017). For example, one headteacher described how:
When I came here as a deputy … it was leadership by ‘You do this; you 
do that’. Very effective, at the time. But the notion was: ‘We’re now just 
ratcheting up achievement’ and the means of doing that was all of those 
really effective, rigorous things you can do at the end of the game, at year 
11 … But I couldn’t see – and it was a shock to me – any kind of learning 
culture. Among staff, professional development was very tokenistic. 
Amongst pupils, it wasn’t about learning, it was about achieving. 
Principal, secondary convertor academy, Ofsted Outstanding
An increased need for schools to ‘keep up’ with policy change 
In the context of such high-stakes accountability, deciding how to interpret 
and enact policy changes – particularly those that related to performance 
metrics and indicators – had been a relentless process since 2010 for leaders 
and teachers in the schools we visited. 
The new National Curriculum and the removal of the existing 
framework of assessment levels, for instance, was accompanied by a 
requirement that schools develop alternative approaches to ‘assessment 
without levels’, which Ofsted would inspect. Many teachers and leaders 
talked about the stress and disruption caused by this, both as a result of 
the tight timescales involved and because there was no policy guidance or 
exemplars for schools to draw on. 
More widely, the roll back of local authorities, discussed below, which 
had previously played a key role in communicating and interpreting new 
policy for schools, meant that school leaders in particular needed to become 
even more engaged and adept at scanning for policy-related information 
and advice. Many schools were paying for information services, such as 
The Key8, to try to keep up to date. Schools also relied on local or national 
networks, including some that they paid to join, such as PiXL, Challenge 
8 See https://schoolleaders.thekeysupport.com/ (accessed 22 June 17). 
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Partners or Whole Education9, for information and implementation support. 
In paying for this support, schools were often trying to both make sense of 
complex information and understand the new ‘rules of the game’ – with 
expressions such as ‘staying ahead of the game’ and less commonly ‘finding 
gaming strategies’ used by school leaders we interviewed to describe this. 
We return to the issue of access to these particular types of knowledge in the 
following chapter, on markets. 
Pressure to place the success of the organization first 
So we see that while some aspects of bureaucratic prescription have been 
reduced, this has not been comparable to increases in external accountability 
and intervention, leading to an increasingly ‘constrained professionalism’. 
Combined with the operation of markets, which we explore in the 
next chapter, this creates strong systemic pressures for school leaders 
to prioritize the success of the organization over the needs of particular 
children. For example, the high stakes nature of accountability coupled 
with the timing of the annual student census could incentivize schools to 
make tactical decisions around whether and when to accept new students – 
in this case asylum seekers:
When Ofsted comes and I’ve just taken in five asylum seekers so that my 
results plummet. It’s a horrible way to be talking about children. They’re 
children. It’s the situation that we’re in. If I take five new children in the 
last week of year 4, they count on my data. If I take those children on the 
first week of year 5, they don’t. 
Headteacher, maintained primary school, Ofsted Good
These decisions and the wider organizing of schools in response to 
performance targets (Ball, 2003; Perryman et al., 2017) was often critiqued 
by our case study school leaders, some of whom recognized clearly the 
ethical challenges it creates for schools:
As a system, we have gotten so used to thinking that we can just put 
some numbers on something, and it will happen. And actually, you 
can do that … you can make the numbers happen by sacrificing your 
principles along the way, sacrificing ethics.
Principal, secondary convertor academy, Ofsted Outstanding
A minority of leaders in our sample did try consciously to resist the pressure, 
for instance, to exclude specific children or to narrow the curriculum, 
although such resistance was never outright and was usually only possible 
from a position of strength, in that the school was already Good or 
Outstanding in Ofsted terms. A more common response was compliance – 
which was widely referred to as ‘pragmatism’.
9 See www.pixl.org.uk, www.challengepartners.org and http://wholeeducation.org 
(accessed 22 June 17).
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In this context, a significant minority of school leaders reported 
that the original purposes for which they came into teaching – to make a 
difference for children – were being lost as a result of increasing pressures to 
perform. High levels of professional stress were widely reported and there 
were questions about the professional status of teachers and school leaders: 
You know education’s lost its status professionally to some degree … 
And I think we’ve got a battle on our hands to get that back and again. 
… Where they are seen – and it doesn’t help when the government starts 
announcing, putting a stamp on you; you’re outstanding, you’re not 
outstanding. None of that has helped education. None of that has helped 
learning. None of that has helped the credibility of the value of education 
and skills. It’s diminished it; it’s sent us to war with one another. 
Headteacher, voluntary aided primary school, Ofsted Outstanding
Coercive autonomy
By contrast, the government argues that by giving academy schools formal 
independence from LAs, together with new freedoms over finance, staff 
conditions, the National Curriculum and admissions, this will enable schools 
to be more locally responsive and ‘effective’. The Academies Act, passed in 
2010, allowed all schools deemed Good and Outstanding to convert to 
academy status voluntarily, while schools deemed ‘coasting’ or Inadequate 
can be forced to academize under a government-approved sponsor, usually 
now within a MAT. These legal changes have been accompanied by policy 
encouragement, including financial incentives, for schools to convert to 
become academies.
Given the external accountability pressure on schools, we question, 
however, whether academies can genuinely claim to be autonomous. 
Rather, we argue that what is on offer is a form of ‘coercive autonomy’, 
with schools being ‘required to use more discretion and to take more 
responsibility while also being more closely monitored from above’ 
(Edwards 2000: 154). Previous observers (Simkins, 1997; Higham and 
Earley, 2014) have identified that School Based Management policies offer 
schools new operational powers, but not new criteria power – where criteria 
power confers the authority to define the aims and purposes of a service, 
while operational power concerns the authority to decide how the service 
is to be provided (Winstanley et al., 1995). We argue that academization is 
an extension of the operational powers offered to schools through Local 
Management of Schools policies in the late 1980s, but we also show how 
the hierarchical threat of forced academization, with MATs often delegating 
less operational power to schools, adds further coercion and fear into the 
school system. 
New operational freedoms
How schools in our study interpreted academy status was often influenced 
by their context and positioning. For early converters to academy status, 
financial autonomy from the LA had been an incentive, not least because 
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schools had gained additional funding. One deputy principal of a primary 
academy described this as a funding ‘handshake’ and noted how previously 
the school’s budget was top-sliced for LA services, such as special education 
needs, which the school did not use as it served a more affluent area. The 
delegation of this top-slice to academies has contributed to declining 
funding for LAs although the additional amount received by academies has 
decreased over time as part of wider cuts (LGIU, 2015).10 
A second perceived benefit for academies is their ability to deploy 
resources differently. It was notable, however, that in the majority of 
academies we visited, senior leaders did not want to change staff terms and 
conditions, other than by offering additional benefits to retain or recruit 
staff, particularly in shortage areas. 
There was limited evidence in our interviews of any direct benefits 
for teaching and learning from academization. Some leaders, particularly in 
primary academies, did note the importance of greater curriculum flexibility 
in the face of new National Curriculum changes, but most reported that any 
such freedoms had been cancelled out by the new accountability measures 
described in the previous section. 
These perspectives were broadly corroborated by our survey 
respondents. Schools that were already academies (n=212, of which 56 
primaries, 156 secondaries) were asked about the overall impact that 
academization had had on their school. The majority (72 per cent) were 
clear that becoming an academy had made their schools more sharply 
accountable to government and its agencies. Sixty per cent reported that 
academy status has had at least some positive effect on their school, with 
24 per cent saying it has made no difference, 14 per cent saying it is too 
early to tell and two per cent saying it has had a negative impact. Over 
half reported that academy status has enabled the school to form stronger 
partnerships (57 per cent), improve the curriculum (52 per cent) and 
improve the quality of school governance (52 per cent). Only around a 
quarter reported changing their staff’s pay and conditions (28 per cent) or 
their admissions policy (22 per cent). 
Forced academization 
A second perspective on academization relates to the state’s model of 
mandating structural change where it judges schools to be underperforming. 
This involves ‘forced academization’ where a school is required to become 
a sponsored academy and is usually then run by another school or sponsor 
within a MAT structure. In our case studies, schools reported that the 
potential of forced academization had created a widespread sense of fear, 
not only among schools judged Inadequate and Requires Improvement, but 
also among those judged Good. Many of our interviewees – particularly 
primary school leaders – expressed real concern that their school could be 
10 In 2015 the government cut £200m from the central Educational Services Grant 
(previous LACSEG), which is paid to LAs and academies to fund education support 
services, with the grant to be cut by 75 per cent from £800m to £200m by 2020.
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‘taken over’ by an academy chain, which one deputy headteacher referred 
to as ‘amalgamations’:
I think amalgamations and academization are the two things educators 
fear the most. They can cope with another education minister telling 
teachers off. They can cope with [government] raising the target 
randomly to some percentage point that we’re going to find really 
difficult to meet. But they do fear academization a lot, and they fear 
mergers and amalgamations even more. 
Deputy headteacher, maintained primary school, Ofsted Good
As we explore in Chapter 5, these fears could lead maintained school leaders 
and governors to contemplate ‘jumping before being pushed’, by forming or 
joining a locally determined MAT and thereby avoiding the threat of forced 
external sponsorship. 
We visited two primary schools in different localities that had both 
resisted pressure from the DfE to academize, one successfully and one 
unsuccessfully. These examples highlight the importance of contextual 
factors, including the extent to which individual leaders are prepared to 
challenge external pressure. In the first school, which had had a dip in exam 
results and was judged to be ‘satisfactory’ at the time, the headteacher and 
governing body resisted pressure from the DfE to become sponsored ‘quite 
ferociously’, despite a lack of support from the LA, ‘because I’m quite an 
experienced headteacher, who’s worked in difficult places … I have a pretty 
good idea of what I’m doing’. The school was inspected by Ofsted and 
judged to be Good before the DfE could push through the new arrangement, 
meaning that the school no longer met the criteria for forced sponsorship. 
Despite this, the headteacher argued that the pressure to perform and the 
threat that the DfE might return was never far away: ‘it’s kind of like the 
birds, vultures circling’. The second school had been judged Inadequate by 
Ofsted and the previous headteacher had left a year before our visit. A 
young new headteacher had been appointed, but within days of their arrival 
the school’s governing body resigned en masse in protest at the proposed 
sponsorship arrangement. The new headteacher was also successful 
in gaining an Ofsted Good judgement in advance of the sponsorship 
arrangement being formalized, but the DfE-imposed Interim Executive 
Board, which had replaced the governing body, decided to proceed with the 
sponsorship arrangement nonetheless. 
Academization as a distraction from the core purpose of schools
Another aspect of ‘coercive autonomy’ relates to a view that there are no 
benefits of becoming an academy and that, more broadly, the policy was 
based on a false premise that local authorities were a ‘hindrance’ to school 
improvement. This perspective was widespread among maintained schools 
in our two localities where academization was less prevalent and was 
particularly strong among primary schools. While the secondary maintained 
school principals in these areas were generally less positive about the role of 
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local authorities than the primaries, they did not see any clear benefit from 
academy status either: 
This is a highly successful school. … I wasn’t an academy before; I’m not 
one now. It makes absolutely no difference. 
Headteacher, maintained secondary, Ofsted Outstanding
A small proportion of locally maintained schools had considered academy 
status but concluded there were insufficient financial benefits for doing so 
and indeed financial costs in the conversion process. A much larger group 
of schools argued that the added workload – in terms of finance and 
administration – was not only unattractive but would actually distract them 
from a core focus on classroom teaching and learning. Some leaders were 
also opposed to academization in principle and argued for the importance 
of a local education system and local democratic governance. 
These perspectives were broadly corroborated by our survey 
respondents in locally maintained schools (n=450). Eighty-three per cent 
reported having no plans to become an academy (87 per cent among 
primaries, 56 per cent among secondary schools). Two-thirds could not see 
any benefits from becoming an academy (69 per cent) and did not want to 
lose the support they were currently receiving from their local authority 
(62 per cent). Almost half reported that the cost and effort of becoming 
an academy was too great (50 per cent), that their governing body was 
opposed in principle to academy status (47 per cent) and that becoming 
an academy would weaken their local community of schools (45 per cent). 
Despite this widespread resistance to academization, however, 
there was, as we discuss below, a belief among national civil servants that 
funding cuts to LAs would coerce change among primary schools. One RSC 
interviewee argued, for instance, that:
Fundamentally it’s got to change … we’re starting to see a change in 
that now, and in part that’s being driven by some of the realization that 
what they [primary schools] are dependent on from local authorities is 
no longer viable in the future. So they’re having to look at what else is an 
opportunity. 
Regional Schools Commissioner 
Chaotic centralization
The SISS policy agenda has also involved significant and ongoing 
restructuring of the central and local state. This has involved new processes 
of centralization, with new powers invested in regional representatives of 
the state, including those tasked with building a system of academies and 
MATs. At the same time, local authorities have needed to reshape themselves 
to meet their statutory duties in the context of substantial budget cuts and 
declining, but still significant, numbers of maintained schools.
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In this section we outline how these changes have created a growing 
sense of incoherence in the system. There are now multiple sub-systems, with 
different, partially overlapping ‘middle tier’ organizations that hold diverse 
views on how the school system should be organized. This reflects, in part, a 
system in transition and an incomplete process attempting to shift authority 
from local to central government. But we argue that central government 
is also far from coherent or aligned behind a single framework. Indeed, 
the picture that emerges is one of ‘chaotic centralization’ – characterized 
by competing claims to authority and legitimacy but diminishing local 
knowledge about schools. 
Tensions between new regional structures 
We observed clear tensions between the various bureaucratic structures that 
oversee and regulate schools. These structures include: civil servants, such 
as RSCs and representatives of NCTL11, who are accountable to ministers; 
representatives of Ofsted, an independent regulator (non-ministerial 
department) that reports directly to parliament; and representatives of LAs, 
who are accountable to their locally elected councillors. We focus initially 
on the differences between the three national organizations – Ofsted on the 
one hand, and the RSCs and NCTL representatives on the other. 
Under Sir Michael Wilshaw12, in addition to the new inspection 
framework introduced in 2012 and substantially revised again in 2015, 
Ofsted made a number of other changes to its operating model and approach. 
These included: ending the use of commissioned for-profit inspection 
providers (following criticisms of inconsistency); the introduction of a new 
regional office structure; and a move towards actively supporting schools 
judged to ‘Require Improvement’ (RI) to improve. 
Our civil service respondents were often critical of these changes. One 
RSC argued that supporting RI schools compromised Ofsted’s regulatory 
role as it could not act as an impartial regulator: ‘I think it has to become 
the regulator, not the school improvement (agency)’. The same RSC also 
questioned Ofsted’s understanding of MATs and argued that it did not have 
the competence to inspect MATs properly. One of the NCTL regional staff 
interviewees argued similarly that Ofsted was out of touch with changes in 
practice and overly driven by the inspection framework: 
I don’t think they [Ofsted] always understand a ‘school-led system’ … 
Does Ofsted understand peer-to-peer review, collaborative working? 
11 After 2010, the government tightened its oversight of several existing educational 
agencies by turning them into executive agencies. In early 2013 it then merged the 
former National College for School Leadership and Teacher Development Agency into 
a single executive agency, named the National College for Teaching and Leadership. 
In November 2017 the DfE announced that NCTL would be merged into the main 
department. www.gov.uk/government/news/plans-to-further-boost-teacher-recruitment-
and-development 
12 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector from 2012 until 2016.
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They probably will argue they do but I’m not sure they do … it only 
judges what it says on the framework. 
NCTL Teaching and Leadership Associate 
The RSC role was itself established by the Department for Education in 
September 2014 as a way to manage the growing number of academy 
schools and MATs, following several high profile failures in terms of school 
performance and financial mismanagement (Greany and Scott, 2015). Eight 
RSC posts were created to be responsible for specific ‘regions’ – although 
these did not replicate government office or Ofsted regions. Each RSC is 
advised by a headteacher board comprising a mix of academy principals 
elected by their peers and co-opted members. The legal powers of RSCs 
have increased over time and the size and cost of their regional teams has 
also grown (Hilary et al., 2017). 
One RSC described the role as having three main aspects: i) 
intervention with academies that are underperforming; ii) approving 
academies converting from local authority-maintained control as well 
as intervening to force academy sponsorship; and iii) increasing sponsor 
capacity and developing more multi-academy trusts across the region. The 
RSC reported that: ‘I would say the first one has been two-thirds of my time, 
and the other two roughly a third in total.’ In fact this RSC had intervened 
in more than 100 academies across the region in their first year in post, 
with 11 of these being re-brokered from an existing MAT to a different 
sponsor. This gives a sense of the scale of the task facing the RSCs, with one 
admitting how difficult the role had been at the outset: 
I’ll be honest. My perspective, previously, was that it was chaos in the 
programme. I was shocked, to be honest.
Regional Schools Commissioner 
There were also tensions between RSCs and Ofsted in the emerging regional 
system. One Ofsted interviewee argued, for instance, that the new regional 
commissioner bureaucracy was giving mixed messages to schools in terms 
of their quality and performance. A second Ofsted interviewee argued that 
the new system lacked clear lines of accountability: 
Some of the LA powers have been eroded, and given to academies, but 
what hasn’t happened is that the lines of accountability in that system 
haven’t been properly established. 
Ofsted interviewee
Some headteacher interviewees also raised questions about the transparency 
of decision-making and about the lack of local accountability in the RSC 
role. For example, one argued that: 
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It [the RSC role] seems to be very unaccountable and very strange. I do 
think it’s quite difficult to see how every school in the country … can 
report directly to Whitehall in a future system. It seems a bit insane to me. 
Headteacher, primary maintained school, Ofsted Outstanding 
One of our RSC interviewees acknowledged their lack of local or regional 
democratic mandate and questioned whether this would remain legitimate 
in the longer term. Another argued, however, that their role would gain a 
form of output legitimacy by demonstrating improved school results and 
that this was more important than any local democratic or input legitimacy.
Tensions between RSCs and LAs
We also encountered frequent tensions between representatives of national 
and local government. LA officers were keen to maintain a level of coherence 
in their locality in line with local political priorities and historic approaches. 
Meanwhile, RSCs in particular were charged with expanding the academy 
programme and a ‘school-led’ system in ways that often challenged the LA’s 
perspective. 
The relationships between RSCs and LAs were by no means uniform. 
In two of our localities, where academization rates were above national 
average, the relationship was fairly cordial. However, in another of our 
localities, where academization rates had been slower, the RSC described 
their relationship with the LA as follows: 
They’re an LA that has had an anti-academy stance. So, our work [there] 
has been difficult, and they’ve not been particularly receptive to our 
solutions to particular problems.
Regional Schools Commissioner
The RSC expressed frustration at the ‘political plays’ used by the LA to 
protect lower performing schools from forced academization. As a result, 
the RSC argued, the relationship with the LA was fraught: ‘It’s always a 
battle … [the LA] have been a barrier to us, as the RSC’. From the LA’s 
perspective, their resistance to the RSC was based on wanting to develop a 
coherent and inclusive local strategy that would avoid fragmentation. The 
LA’s director was sceptical about a ‘school-led’ system that relied on the 
‘moral purpose’ of school leaders, some of whom ‘get off on the power, 
the empire building … and it all came crashing down’. The LA Director 
was also concerned about the fragility of Teaching Schools, both because of 
their funding model and because they could be de-designated. There was a 
need, therefore, the LA director argued, for:
The local authority having a strong leadership role, as a convener, as a 
broker, as a commissioner, as a partner, because actually, when things fall, 
someone’s got to catch it. … that’s the bit that I’m trying to safeguard. 
Local authority interviewee
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Relations between the LA and RSC had reached an impasse and the RSC 
had decided to ‘back off’ from that particular LA and to focus their work 
on areas that were ‘more receptive’. Over the long term, as we noted above, 
the RSCs were quietly confident that continued funding cuts would ‘force 
pragmatism’ on both LAs and maintained primary schools, meaning that 
they would have to engage with the academy model at some point. In this 
view, MATs, TSAs, dioceses and private providers would populate a new 
middle tier co-ordinated by RSCs at a regional and ‘sub-regional’ level, 
with LAs relegated to helping ‘guide some of the decision making’. This 
aspiration for the future was not necessarily supported by one of our Ofsted 
interviewees, however, who noted that ‘some of the LAs that are proving 
to be more effective … are those who have probably retained some core 
function around school improvement … [whereas in LAs] where basically, 
everything’s outsourced, it’s interesting the number of schools that are 
challenged there around performance’. 
Commercialized middle tier
The SISS agenda is clearly forcing LAs to reshape their role in relation to 
school oversight, in particular through academization and wider central 
cuts to core LA budgets (IFS, 2015). Instead, LAs have been encouraged by 
the government to develop a rather nebulous new role, termed ‘champion 
for children’ that means advocating for parents, families and children 
(Department for Education, 2010). Meanwhile, though, LAs retain a number 
of statutory duties for children and young people, including ensuring there is 
fair access to schooling, support for vulnerable children and high standards 
in schools (Parish et al., 2012; Boyask, 2015). 
In this section we review the reorganization of the LAs in each of 
our four localities. All four LAs have had to rationalize their services to 
schools, although they have all sought to retain strategic influence over 
local academies and some level of service delivery for their remaining 
maintained schools. We show how the interpretations and actions of LAs 
have varied, reflecting in part the local history of relationships, alliances and 
conflicts between schools and the local authority. We also identify, however, 
an emerging trend away from traditional local hierarchical governance and 
towards commercialized network governance. This is not the only response 
among our four LAs, but it appears to be an increasingly common direction 
of travel that contains two related dimensions. On the one hand, LAs are 
creating new commercial structures for their traded services in order to 
sell services to schools both locally and sometimes beyond the locality. At 
the same time, LAs are working to develop new local governing networks, 
for example through ‘strategic school improvement boards’, as they seek 
to influence and share resources with the new school-led groupings of 
schools, such as MATs and TSAs. These findings provide some support 
for recent research and work that has emphasized the potential for LAs to 
work with schools in order to shape coherent local governance and support 
arrangements (ISOS Partnership/LGA, 2018; Gilbert, 2018), although our 
analysis highlights the tensions inherent in these developments, including in 
43
 Hierarchy: policy, accountability and the changing middle tier
terms of who is actually involved in these new processes of decision-making 
(Hatcher, 2014).
Reorganizing LA support for schools
Our four case study LAs had all embarked on major reorganizations since 
2010. Two of the four – Eastern and Northern LAs – had made rapid changes. 
Both had witnessed a majority of secondary schools become convertor 
academies after 2010 and both had an above national average number 
of Teaching Schools and other nationally designated ‘system leaders’, as a 
proportion of local schools.
Eastern LA had developed an ‘internal trading unit’ that was designed 
to trade the LA’s services for schools through annual service level agreements, 
which incorporated statutory and de-delegated provision as well as buying 
services and additional ‘consultancy’. The unit had been encouraged to 
be entrepreneurial and had begun to trade its services into neighbouring 
LAs, from which it made a small financial surplus that was reported to 
be reinvested in the LA’s improvement service. Separate to the unit, the 
LA retained a small school improvement team that monitored maintained 
schools and contracted school support from both the trading unit and TSAs 
and other local schools. To organize this work, and to try to co-ordinate 
a mixed maintained school and academy system, the LA had established 
a ‘strategic partnership’ that aimed to agree a locality-wide strategy for 
schools, including improving student attainment and inclusion, teacher 
recruitment and place planning. The partnership comprised local leaders 
of TSAs, MATs and diocesan representatives, the chairs of the primary and 
secondary headteachers’ associations and local business representatives. 
The terms of membership allowed only ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’ schools to 
join the partnership, thereby excluding the direct involvement of about one-
fifth of schools judged by Ofsted to be most in need of external support.
Leaders of the secondary schools we visited in the locality, which 
were all academies and had not been committed to the LA historically, 
were largely supportive of these developments. They reported that the 
LA had appointed ‘credible’ senior staff who had been able to broker 
solutions to complex shared challenges, such as the high rates of permanent 
exclusions. There were several concerns, however. First, one LA officer 
questioned how coherent the new model could be in the face of continuing 
fragmentation: ‘we keep trying to act as the umbrella and glue and if 
we didn’t do that then it would just be, you know, chaos and war and 
stuff’. Second, a majority of our primary school interviewees argued that 
the quality of local improvement support had declined since 2010. For 
example, for one primary TSA head, not only was the depletion of the LA 
‘dreadfully, dreadfully sad’, there was also a lack of capacity among local 
TSAs to ‘replace’ the LA team:
The LA still goes into those [‘failing’] schools and works with the heads 
to draw up a plan and then they come to the TSA and say, ‘Have you 
got somebody who could do some work on phonics in reception?’… 
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And that’s good and I think it’s good to draw on people doing the job, 
but it’s much more limited in my view. And I think we’ve found already, 
we haven’t got the capacity for half of the work that’s needed in [the 
locality] at the moment. 
Headteacher, maintained primary, Ofsted Outstanding 
Northern LA was reported by one headteacher to have ‘foreseen its own 
demise’ and, from 2010, had encouraged and helped schools in the locality 
to establish an ‘Educational Partnership’ (EP). After an initial start-up 
grant from the LA, the EP was core funded by an annual subscription from 
member schools, although it also increasingly raised income by trading 
services beyond the locality. The EP was governed by headteachers elected 
from subscribing schools, two school governor representatives and a co-
opted LA officer. It was led by a seconded LA officer who managed a small 
team of school improvement advisors. Schools could choose whether or 
not to buy-in to the EP, but all primary schools in the LA and a majority of 
secondary schools did so at the time of our visit. Member schools received 
support from a dedicated EP advisor, in-depth support to prepare for and 
undergo an Ofsted inspection and reduced fees to attend the EP’s CPD 
programme, which was run by external consultants and schools accredited 
by the EP for their expertise in particular areas. Alongside the EP, the 
LA had retained a small core school team that contracted statutory and 
de-delegated services as well as specific improvement support for identified 
schools from the EP. 
School interviewees had a range of opinions on the impact of the 
EP. Many, particularly primary schools, valued the EP’s services and the 
continuity this offered from historic LA provision. There were a range 
of concerns, however. These included: that the existence of the EP had 
constrained the development of local, spontaneous school networks, 
particularly at primary level; that the EP staff were sometimes guilty of 
favouritism towards particular schools and tried to control member primary 
schools; and that the EP’s focus on Ofsted was too narrow and lacked 
support for wider pedagogy. Secondary schools, the majority of which had 
become academies, had created their own school improvement partnership 
(STAR), which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
The LAs in our two other localities – Southern and Western LAs – 
where rates of academization were lower, had made less rapid changes and 
had sought to retain more of their pre-existing structures and approaches to 
school monitoring and support, at least at primary level where a significant 
proportion of primary leaders remained committed to the concept of an 
LA family and approach. Both LAs had weaker and sometimes fractious 
relations with their secondary schools and academies, who sometimes 
characterized the LA as ‘paternalistic’, ‘slow and bureaucratic’ and ‘lacking 
in challenge’. There had been less of a shift towards trading services and 
network governance, but there was increasing realization that this might 
occur – with both LAs working to re-engineer local school clusters as a 
way to rationalize their support for schools. Western LA had reduced the 
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number of employed school improvement advisors on its central team 
and was contracting serving school leaders to provide monitoring and 
support to other primary schools. It was also working to create a ‘strategic 
improvement board’ comprising TSAs and other ‘leading schools’ as well 
as the RSC as a way to oversee and help co-ordinate its work and support 
for schools, but which did not include representatives of schools judged by 
Ofsted to be most in need of external support. 
Southern LA had sought to retain a schools team that organized 
and took responsibility for system co-ordination and school support and 
intervention. To do this in the context of substantial cuts, including those 
already made to the number of LA School Improvement Officers (SIOs), 
the LA had strongly encouraged and helped schools to reorganize local 
clusters, so that an SIO could work with each cluster rather than every 
school, freeing up SIO time to focus on ‘schools causing concern’. The LA 
had also provided start-up funds for a company limited by guarantee (CLG) 
that organized local CPD provision for schools. The company was now 
independent of the LA and funded by annual school subscriptions. While 
primary schools were often positive about Southern LA they all reported its 
capacity was declining and that LA SIOs were good but increasingly had 
a ‘massive’ workload. One clear concern was that the strength and depth 
of ties in local primary school clusters varied considerably, and we explore 
the consequences of this in Chapter 5. The secondary schools had formed a 
single network, which the LA has now joined as an associate partner, paying 
an annual membership subscription, and again we explore this development 
in Chapter 5. 
A second common concern was the level of challenge facing more 
deprived schools as LA services to support vulnerable children were being 
cut back. These cuts were to specialist educational support services, such as 
education psychologists, speech and language, behaviour and attendance 
and CAMHS, where school leaders reported long waits and too few staff, 
including when they were attempting to buy in these services. These concerns 
were seen to be particularly severe in the most deprived LA following 
substantial recent in-migration, with the LA needing to place increasing 
numbers of vulnerable children, such as refugees, and with higher-status 
schools often unwilling to accept them, as we explore in Chapter 4. In our 
survey, just under half (48 per cent) of respondents agreed that provision 
for the most vulnerable children in their locality had deteriorated over the 
last three years. 
Where do schools turn for support? 
In the context of these different local changes, there was no simple or single 
interpretation of where schools were turning for external support. Secondary 
schools were more likely to co-ordinate their own improvement support 
and professional learning for staff – both by working collaboratively with 
and/or by buying services from schools as well as consultants, companies 
and indeed the LA. A majority of secondary schools were positive about 
this model, which appeared to represent the core of what a ‘self-improving, 
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school-led system’ meant for them. Some were also highly critical of their 
LA’s historic provision:
I think the old system of local authority advisors was just of no use at all 
… I think it’s far better … that we can go to the schools that we want to 
go to, that we trust, where we know the value’s going to be better. 
Headteacher, secondary academy, Ofsted Good 
This was not the only view, however, with less well-positioned secondary 
schools more likely to be cautious about a ‘get on with it yourself’ mentality. 
For example, one headteacher argued:
It isn’t what it was, in terms of somebody on the end of the phone who’s 
available to come in and talk to you about your literacy policy [for 
example] before it goes to governance. You don’t have that any more; 
it’s ‘Get on with it yourself’, or if somebody in another school has a 
policy, they might send it to you. But they don’t have time to come to 
you and sit down and explain what it all looks like. It just makes things 
more frantic. 
Headteacher, maintained secondary, Ofsted Good 
These views were echoed among our primary school interviewees, but with 
notably different levels of emphasis. The concept of schools collaborating 
and of teachers engaging with, as one deputy head described, other ‘practising 
teachers who can model some of their teaching strategies and pedagogies … 
and show other schools … what this would look like in the classroom’ was 
widely welcomed. At the same time, in contrast with a common secondary 
view, the majority of primary interviewees remained firmly committed 
to maintaining a coherent local system of support for schools and to an 
ongoing role for the LA in overseeing and co-ordinating this. Some expressed 
concern that the emerging model was difficult to navigate, with no means 
of judging quality when selecting between different TSAs, NLEs and the 
other commercial provision available. As the following quote from the head 
of a very small primary school highlights, small primary schools remained 
particularly reliant on the LA for support due to their limited capacity:
The LA is just crucial. We couldn’t manage financially without their help 
and support … we can’t run the IT without buying in external support 
… The SEN, the behaviour support – if we do have specific problems, as 
they come up, because we don’t have it a lot, we don’t build up the skills 
base within school and retain it.
Headteacher, maintained primary school, Ofsted Good 
These school phase differences were also apparent in our survey. Nearly 
half of primary school respondents (46 per cent) reported that the external 
support available to their school was better three years ago than it was 
now, while just 28 per cent agreed that it was better now. Among secondary 
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schools this view was almost exactly reversed, with 41 per cent reporting 
that external support was better now than three years ago, and 25 per cent 
reporting it was better before. 
We also asked school leaders about the sources of external support 
their school had drawn on in the past year. The LA remains a regular source 
of external advice and support, particularly for primary schools (78 per 
cent) but also for more than half of secondaries (58 per cent). Overall, the 
most common form of external support was reported to be a local cluster 
of schools (88 per cent overall: primary – 94 per cent; secondary – 75 per 
cent), which we discuss further in Chapter 5. Unsurprisingly, Ofsted Grade 
3 and 4 (RI and Inadequate) schools were more likely to draw on a wider 
range of support, including from the LA and Ofsted/HMI visits. Secondary 
schools with an RI or Inadequate Ofsted grade were also more likely to 
draw on new forms of external support from NLEs/LLEs (55 per cent), 
TSAs (48 per cent) and MATs (31 per cent). This was significantly different 
from primary schools, of which only 20 per cent drew on TSAs for support, 
35 per cent on NLEs/LLEs and eight per cent on MATs. 
School system leaders – a co-opted elite?
School ‘system leaders’, such as NLEs and Teaching Schools as well as 
academy sponsors, were increasingly at the epicentre of the evolving system 
described above, particularly in the secondary phase. In this section we argue 
that, while there is substantial local variation, ‘system leaders’ are increasingly 
being co-opted to work towards the national vision of reform, supporting 
hierarchical governance as a local or sub-regional managerial elite. 
System leadership: a problematic concept 
Our interviews with representatives of local and national government 
regularly highlighted how they saw designated school ‘system leaders’ as 
an important resource for enacting their particular agenda. This was an 
important further dimension of the local–national tensions we described 
above. School ‘system leaders’ were seen by a variety of government actors 
to have the potential of modelling behaviours and/or developed structures, 
such as TSAs and MATs, that could influence the actions of schools more 
widely. In a tight funding environment, ‘system leaders’ were also seen to 
represent or have authority over scarce ‘capacity’ that could be directed 
or commissioned to support under-performing schools. One of our RSC 
interviewees reported, for instance, that: 
I’ve spent quite a lot of time courting Teaching Schools, because one of 
the things that I don’t have is access to any kind of school improvement 
… I need to go and commission school improvement.
Regional School Commissioner
There was also significant concern, however, expressed by other school 
leaders and LA officials as well as RSCs about ‘system leadership’ – both 
in terms of how this was conceived in the SISS policy agenda and in the 
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ways in which particular charismatic individuals were undertaking ‘system 
leader’ roles. 
Among other school leaders there was concern that nationally 
designated ‘system leadership’ was contributing to an increasingly 
imbalanced system. While, as we explore in Chapter 5, a wide range of 
school staff were working with and offering reciprocal support to staff in 
other schools, a national network of ‘system leaders’ was seen to be an 
increasingly separate, elite grouping: 
There’s a trade in MBEs and knighthoods for serving heads … an 
emergent cohort of people who are very strong, because they were Wave 
1 Teaching Schools … or are getting elected to the Teaching Schools 
Council … and there’s an awful lot that can channel into these great 
schools, and the funding goes there and the resources go there, the 
students go there and the NQTs (Newly Qualified Teachers) go there. … 
There is a danger that you can just pick up a copy of Animal Farm to see 
where it will go. That’s the thing that worries me the most.
Principal, secondary convertor academy, Ofsted Outstanding
Another common concern was around the importance that national ‘system 
leadership’ designations attach to the Ofsted Outstanding grade, reflecting 
a widespread view that being judged Outstanding does not mean that an 
individual or school is well equipped to support other schools or contribute 
to the development of the wider system, either in temperamental or practical 
terms. This was seen to reflect a policy focus on identifying the ‘best schools’ 
(DfE 2016: 16) and ‘spreading best practice’ (DfE 2016: 75) rather than 
on developing local solutions and networks of joint practice development 
(which we discuss in Chapter 5). Notably, some of our RSC interviewees 
also expressed concerns about such policy use of the ‘Outstanding’ grade – 
with one RSC arguing that one route to Outstanding was by ‘pulling up a 
drawbridge’ and focusing internally, but:
that doesn’t necessarily mean you know how to go help another school 
get out of special measures … There are so many benefits of being called 
an Outstanding school, in terms of what opportunities are opened up 
to you … there’s an assumption that you can do everything. And that 
clearly can’t be right.
RSC interviewee
Our RSCs also highlighted worries over the ways in which certain designated 
‘system leaders’ behaved, which was connected to a particular, ‘charismatic 
autocratic’ leadership style, or as one RSC put it: ‘they will do it in their 
way or no way’. At the same time RSCs also criticized the managerial 
‘competence’ of some Teaching Schools – with one arguing their impact 
was ‘a bit mixed’ and only about a third were ‘really credible’ in terms of 
providing school-to-school support in their view. 
49
 Hierarchy: policy, accountability and the changing middle tier
These issues clearly reflect the wider tensions in ‘system leadership’. On 
the one hand, ‘system leaders’ are encouraged and expected by government 
to drive relentless and rapid improvement across multiple schools. Many 
are working at the same time to address other ‘school-led’ policy priorities, 
such as to expand the numbers of trainees on school-led Initial Teacher 
Training routes. Meanwhile, to differing degrees, they are charged with 
working on behalf of an idealized ‘self-improving’ system, engaging their 
peers in building collaborative alliances and ‘deep partnerships’, even while 
operating in a competitive marketplace for school improvement services. 
The ‘system leaders’ we interviewed recognized these tensions. Most 
were not obvious members of the national network of power brokers described 
above. More commonly, they were headteachers who felt that they had ‘put 
their head above the parapet’ and were now sometimes questioning why 
they had done so. They did generally, however, see clear benefits to their own 
schools from providing school-to-school support or leading new ‘alliances’, 
for example because this provided new opportunities for developing 
and retaining their own staff and recruiting new staff. Other motivations 
included: professional development; wanting to enhance the attractiveness of 
their school to parents; financial benefits; and a view that supporting other 
schools and ensuring that every child gets a good education reflects the moral 
purpose of leadership (although some were cautious about making simplistic 
claims given the complexity of incentives involved). Another motivation 
concerned their own sense of personal value and confidence as a leader: as 
one head commented, ‘a little part of me is quite flattered when I’m asked to 
do it. It provides me with a feedback loop that I’m doing alright.’ 
At the same time this was ‘greedy’ (Gronn, 2002) and sometimes 
almost impossible work, and ‘system leader’ interviewees identified a range 
of challenges. External pressure to secure improvement in other schools 
combined with a concern that if school staff focused too much time and 
effort on supporting the wider system, the school might suffer and its results 
drop, which could mean their designation would be removed. This linked 
to concerns over the difficulty of gaining and managing funding for such 
work, which could come in unpredictable bursts from central government, 
making it hard to plan for staffing and activity. There was also a view that 
school ‘system leaders’ were being asked to provide school improvement 
‘on the cheap’.
To gain funding and other policy-related opportunities, system leaders 
needed to engage with the bureaucracy of national government agencies, 
which many found frustrating. They often found it difficult to navigate the 
respective roles and politics of RSCs and NCTL as well as LAs. However, 
this was seen to be crucial work because, as one NCTL interviewee noted 
– in explaining the commissioning process – ‘who you know’ within these 
governing networks was important:
the Regional Schools Commissioners might have contacted us and said 
look, you know, there are two academies in your patch that we’re really 
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worried about, can you find us somebody to support them. And then 
what I would have done was looked down my list of National Leaders, 
of Teaching Schools, and contacted them. And I have to be honest that 
to some extent those that you know best are the ones that you contact. 
NCTL interviewee
Accountability was also a concern for many of the ‘system leaders’ we 
interviewed, who argued that they were being asked to play a leadership 
role across their locality, but they were not always clear on what they were 
actually responsible for or how far their authority stretched, for example if 
the supported school was not open to their suggestions. One increasingly 
common answer to these challenges was for ‘system leaders’ to establish 
MATs, as they saw this to offer a level of secure income and clearer lines of 
accountability and authority over other schools. As we discuss in Chapter 
5, MATs have also become the government’s preferred structure for the 
system, so there have been financial and other forms of encouragement for 
‘system leaders’ to develop them13. 
So we see that the notion of school ‘system leadership’ is problematic. 
Some ‘system leaders’ were responding to the tensions involved by 
developing entrepreneurial, commercial activities (see Chapter 4). At the 
same time, a substantial proportion of ‘system leaders’ were being co-
opted as a managerial elite to work as part of the ‘central machinery of 
government’ (Hatcher, 2008; Gu et al., 2016; Cousin, 2018). There were 
gradations to this: our respondents ranged between those operating in 
national or sub-regional elites and those who claimed to be providing local 
solutions to ‘help’ schools avoid imposed national MATs. However, even 
this latter group could be seen to be working more or less overtly towards 
a national agenda of change characterized by academization and executive 
leadership across groups of schools. This work came with significant new 
pressures, but also new resources, prestige and authority.
Conclusion
This chapter argued that the SISS policy agenda is premised on ‘high 
autonomy’ and ‘high accountability’ for schools, with a promise to ‘trust’ 
the profession, reduce bureaucracy and ‘roll back’ the state. However, we 
found that any increase in operational power available to academies has not 
been comparable to the changes to the accountability framework, which 
have allowed the state to continue to steer the system from a distance and 
to increasingly intervene and coerce when and where it deems necessary. 
We highlight commonalities as well as differences within and between 
our four localities and between primary and secondary schools as they have 
begun to interpret these policy changes. These differences are certainly 
influenced by the contextual factors we outlined in Chapter 1, including the 
13 For example, DfE funding was made available through the Regional Academy Growth 
Fund www.gov.uk/government/publications/regional-academy-growth-fund-award-
recipients (accessed 14 January 2018). 
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history of local relationships, the context of schools and the agency of local 
leaders, but there were also wider factors at play. For example, Northern 
LA was seen to have ‘foreseen its own demise’ and worked to establish an 
Education Partnership, an approach that reflected and responded to existing 
levels of academization and nationally designated ‘system leadership’ in the 
locality. But Northern was also the least deprived of the four localities we 
studied and had the highest performing schools overall, so it arguably had 
more room for manoeuvre as it responded to policy change. By contrast, the 
other LA with high densities of academies and ‘system leaders’, Eastern, was 
more deprived and its schools were historically lower performing, meaning 
that it had higher proportions of sponsored academies and MATs and the 
LA was seeking to work more reactively to engage these academies in a 
collective dialogue while also supporting its remaining maintained schools. 
As a result of these differences it remains difficult to generalize 
about how schools and local systems are responding and adapting to 
the policy changes we describe. One overall observation is that while the 
school leaders we interviewed were frequently critical of policy changes, in 
practice they appeared relatively powerless to actively resist the influence of 
high stakes accountability. In the survey, just over half (53 per cent) of all 
leaders reported that they did not support the overall trajectory of current 
education policy, while only 20 per cent reported that they did. Two-thirds 
(69 per cent) agreed that they are usually able to adapt government policy 
to fit their school’s aims and values, but in our case study schools such 
adaptation was often cast in terms of how and when to comply.
We did observe isolated examples of active resistance by schools, 
for example the experienced primary school head who had resisted forced 
academization that we described above. We also observed examples of what 
might be called ‘passive resistance’: schools that were trying to hold true to 
a core set of professional values and beliefs about education in the face of 
external change, as this quote from a secondary head reflects: 
We try quite hard to be a good ‘bog standard’ comprehensive school, 
almost deliberately, actually deliberately. … It’s a conscious decision to 
carry on doing what we do and focus on what we do and help some 
other people locally in our own way, without the interference of other 
people from outside of that. 
Headteacher, secondary maintained school, Ofsted Good 
While these acts of ‘passive resistance’ were possible as long as the school 
continued to perform above minimum benchmarks, it was clear that 
resisting external change in this way required bravery and an easier path 
was to adapt the school’s aims and values to fit the policy environment. 
Deciding when and how to adapt in these ways, and how to balance the 
needs of the school with the wider needs of children and policy, lay at the 
heart of the personal, professional and ethical dilemmas that many of the 
respondents reported. 
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Chapter 4
Markets: local markets and a new 
knowledge economy for schools
Introduction
All the schools in our case study sample were aware of the formal quasi-
market in which they worked and the majority of heads perceived that their 
school faced local pressures to compete for students, staff or status.14 It was 
not uncommon for heads to initially downplay local competition, before 
going on to describe how market incentives influenced their behaviour and 
practice. One primary head described how: ‘at the end of the day, children 
are money … you want parents to like your school’. Another primary head 
noted how: ‘Everybody knows the game … you’re not too noisy about it, 
but you try and make sure you have your events in the paper … there’s that 
sort of competition. It gives us an incentive to make sure that we’re doing 
things that stand out.’
In this chapter, we draw primarily on the case study research, but also 
the survey and the analysis of Ofsted data, to analyse the local quasi-markets 
in which schools are situated, the competitive incentives and pressures they 
face and the responses they are developing. We conclude by exploring the 
ways in which particular ‘knowledge’ has become a more valuable and 
commoditized resource for schools. We explore the different ways in which 
three high-status primary schools are responding, by protecting, selling or 
sharing their knowledge. 
Local markets
The extent of competition experienced by schools varied within and between 
localities. As Woods et al. (1998) identified, while the formal properties 
of the quasi-market as set out in policy are important, it is the actions of 
schools within ‘local competitive arenas’ that establish local cultures of 
competition. In these terms, each of our four localities could be understood 
to contain multiple overlapping competitive arenas, with variations in levels 
of competition within and between these. 
14 We use the commonly referred-to term ‘quasi-market’ here to recognize that the formal 
market mechanisms introduced into the state school system under the 1988 Educational 
Reform Act differed in a number of ways from ‘conventional’ private-sector markets 
(Le Grand, 1991). The 1988 Act introduced open enrolment, per-capita funding and 
decentralized budgets with the intention that schools would become more responsive 
to parental preferences and be strongly incentivized to do so through competition for 
students. However, in contrast to private-sector markets: supply and demand were not 
to be coordinated through a price mechanism (Tooley, 1995: 22); schools were not 
allowed to make a direct profit (Le Grand, 1991: 1260); and there was no free entry for 
‘new providers’ (Glennerster, 1991: 1268).
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One common variation was between primary and secondary schools. 
In part this reflected recent demographic growth among primary school age 
children, with the majority of primary schools reporting increased intakes 
and reduced viability pressures. By comparison, secondary schools were more 
likely to report a current over-supply of places locally. The dynamics of local 
secondary school markets were also important. Secondary students were 
reported to be more likely to travel to school independently and their parents 
to be less reliant on neighbourhood schools. In part as a result, secondary 
schools were seen to be more willing to act as independent organizations with 
the financial and managerial capacity to engage in marketing. These school 
phase differences were reflected in our survey. Among secondary schools, 91 
per cent of headteachers (tended to or strongly) agreed that ‘schools in my 
locality compete with each other to recruit students’. Among primary schools, 
only 33 per cent agreed and 48 per cent disagreed with this statement. 
There was less obvious variation between schools located in rural 
and non-rural areas, with little difference reported here by our survey 
respondents. However, in one of the four localities – Western – there was 
clear rural/urban variation, with rural schools reporting that distance and 
travel times reduced, but by no means eliminated, competitive pressure. In 
another locality, however, competition between rural primary schools was 
reported to be increasing. 
It was also the case that neighbouring schools could, in practice, be 
part of different, partially overlapping, sub-markets. Taylor (2001) argued 
that ‘parallel markets’ can exist where, for instance, neighbouring private, 
selective and/or faith schools recruit across different socio-spatial catchments. 
In our localities, faith schools were often reported to recruit across a wider 
radius than other schools, creating a partially parallel market, although this 
did not insulate faith schools from competitive pressures, either between 
each other or with other, non-faith, schools. 
Local status hierarchies
While the intensity of competition depended on context and the interactions 
between local schools, a clear commonality was the reproduction of local 
status hierarchies. The majority of schools in all four localities reported the 
existence of a status hierarchy among schools locally. This was reflected 
in our survey findings, with 85 per cent of secondary and 52 per cent of 
primary school respondents agreeing that ‘there is a clear local hierarchy 
of schools in my area, in terms of their status and popularity with parents’.
Importantly, a school’s positioning in a local status hierarchy was 
rarely seen by schools to be a simple reflection of ‘school quality’. Schools 
perceived that local status hierarchies were created and reproduced in 
relation to a range of criteria. These included:
❯ school context – where the school was located and its perceived history 
❯ student composition – the socio-economic status of potential peers, 
their ethnicity and home language 
❯ student attainment and progress – particularly the government’s 
headline indicators
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❯ Ofsted judgement – particularly the most recent overall inspection grade
❯ educational ‘offer’ – how academic and extra-curricular activities are 
used to differentiate a school and appeal to particular groups of parents.
These criteria combined over time to position a school relative to other 
local schools. Once gained, a positioning could be hard to change. One 
secondary headteacher in a rural area reported, for instance, how a 20-year-
old history of the school and the composition of the student body continued 
to influence the school: 
Reputation lasts a long time around here. A lot of parents of our kids 
or parents of kids in this area went to this school, and it used to be, 
20 years ago, a really rough school, like seriously rough school … Those 
people tend to want to send their children, especially their daughters 
interestingly, to [a competitor school] because that’s a ‘nice’ school. We 
still have to fight that back all the time. 
Headteacher, secondary maintained, Ofsted Good
The role of Ofsted grades in influencing local status hierarchies 
A school’s Ofsted grading was seen widely to influence the status of a school. 
This offered a means for hierarchical moves, as a drop or increase in Ofsted 
grade could impact on local patterns of choice. One secondary headteacher 
reported how a group of parents had organized to bus their children to 
his school after their existing school had been downgraded two levels by 
Ofsted. A primary headteacher differentiated between attracting potential 
new parents and retaining existing parents after being downgraded to 
Requires Improvement:
In terms of our parental body, they did have questions. ‘Why had we 
gone from being Good to RI?’… We haven’t lost anyone from within 
the body. I think we struggled a bit to attract parents. That has probably 
damaged us more, people who don’t know us. 
Headteacher, sponsored primary academy, Ofsted RI 
But the impact of Ofsted was not always clear-cut. In the context of an 
over-supply of places, for example, one Ofsted Good school we visited had 
remained over-subscribed and attractive to middle-class parents despite 
another local school achieving an ‘Outstanding’ judgement. Similarly, a 
distinctive ethos and ‘brand’ were seen as important differentiators for a 
minority of schools: for example, the head of a primary school judged Good 
by Ofsted stated that the school was oversubscribed because it was ‘selling’ 
an alternative, Steiner-like education, which was particularly valued by 
some local parents. 
School positioning and context influence how competition is experienced 
by schools 
Positioning in a local hierarchy was certainly seen by our case study schools 
to affect a school’s ability to influence local patterns of parental choice. Being 
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towards the top of the local hierarchy, for instance, often meant being over-
subscribed, which afforded greater financial certainty and more influence 
over who attended the school through more or less overt ‘cream-skimming’ 
(including over mid-year entry and hard to place students). The context-
specific nature of markets meant this could be expressed in different ways, 
as illustrated by two primaries in the same locality.
The first school was judged to be ‘Good’ and had a reputation as a 
good local community school. It was located in an area of high deprivation 
with a relatively flat local hierarchy, in which local schools admitted broadly 
similar intakes. The headteacher argued that there was competition locally, 
but that the school was full and so did not experience this competition as 
acute. The school did market itself locally, including through a website and 
school prospectus, but the headteacher argued that word of mouth and 
having a nursery were more important. In part this reflected local factors 
as, often, ‘parents want their children to be in the nearest school, regardless 
of provision.’ 
By comparison, the second school was very aware of competitive 
pressure. Judged also to be ‘Good’, the school was located in a suburb 
with low overall levels of deprivation, but a steeper local hierarchy with 
schools admitting dissimilar intakes. The headteacher identified two ‘main 
competitors’ and was working explicitly to influence the school’s intake:
There is a certain pressure on schools to make sure that you have a 
good open evening, you attract the right intake, if you like. … And I 
suppose my vision of [the school] is that we would provide a very high 
level of education, commensurate almost with private education, but we 
are state-funded. So, it’s that perception that we want to give to the 
community.
Headteacher, primary convertor academy, Ofsted Good
The headteacher reported governors also wanted to attract ‘a certain kind’ 
of parent who was ‘fairly middle-class – you would expect a certain level of 
intellect, certain level of income’. In this context, the deputy head noted the 
importance of promotion, as parents were often ‘active choosers, who visit 
a number of schools before making a choice’. The school needed, the deputy 
argued, to be seen to be better than other schools, particularly in terms of 
Ofsted, with the current main aim being to achieve an ‘Outstanding’ grade. 
The school also worked hard on external activities seen as high status. 
The assistant head explained these included working with charities and 
local businesses, keeping the school’s profile high in the local newspaper 
and ensuring students did well in performing arts festivals, as these were 
important competitive events.
Strategies for moving up the local status hierarchy 
Efforts by schools to protect their status or engineer a move up the local 
hierarchy were widely reported across the four localities, particularly among 
secondary schools. Sometimes these moves were slow and unspectacular, 
including where a school’s leaders and teachers worked hard over time to 
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build trust and support in the local community for authentic improvement 
in student learning. But hierarchical positioning and moves generally 
reflected wider patterns of stratification, with school intakes changing as a 
result of leadership actions as well as wider changes in the socio-economic 
and ethnic composition of local areas. 
Van Zanten (2009) argues (from research in eight European cities, 
including London), that the competitive orientations of schools commonly 
reflect both their hierarchical positioning and the nature of the local 
market. In a closed and stable local market, Van Zanten argues, higher-
status schools are often ‘monopolistic’, relying on their reputation without 
actively competing. By contrast, lower-status schools, sensing the market 
is impervious, are ‘adaptive’, turning inwards to adapt to their existing 
students. In a more open and unstable market, however, high-status schools 
often need to become ‘entrepreneurial’, paying close attention to promotional 
and selective strategies, while lower-status schools are ‘tactical’, seeking to 
improve their positioning but recognizing their own strategies will rarely be 
as powerful as those of higher-status schools.
Among our sample of secondary schools – where competition was 
often intense and hierarchies widely recognized – there was a clear tendency 
for schools to be entrepreneurial or tactical. This was perhaps most notable 
where a school actively sought to return to a higher intermediate position 
having slid down the hierarchy. In one school, for instance, after a new 
headteacher was appointed, the school’s improvement strategy included 
two main priorities. First, there was an intensive attainment push in Years 
10 and 11, with closer tracking of student progress, regular work scrutinies 
and staff trained, as a head of department reported, on ‘teaching to the 
exam’ and improving coursework. Second, after this had helped the school 
gain a ‘Good’ Ofsted grade, there was a significant marketing campaign 
with a new website, promotional videos and advertising on local buses 
all highlighting the ‘Good’ grade and enrichment activities in science and 
music. This campaign focused, particularly, on attracting students from two 
schools just outside the locality. The headteacher saw this as ‘aggressive’ but 
effective:
We were a little bit naughty there because [two] schools [outside the 
locality] went through a bad phase. So we stuck a minibus in there a 
few years ago and now we bring a double-decker out … But now we’ve 
become oversubscribed … they can’t all get in any more.
Headteacher, secondary convertor academy, Ofsted Good
By contrast, another secondary school was more tactical, accepting that it 
could not realistically move far up the local hierarchy, and so focusing on 
its ‘inclusive’ ethos as a way to attract parents: 
In terms of our marketing, we will tend to, we’re always looking at 
different angles of marketing. We’re never going to be able to sell our 
site as the best in [the locality], so it’s in a sense, again, you can’t worry 
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about the things you haven’t got. We will sell inclusion, we will sell the 
arts … because we’ve got such a strong reputation of the arts, parents 
are very much drawn to us, inclusion, SEN … we will sell high progress. 
Headteacher, secondary academy, Ofsted Good 
Selective competition
Some leaders were more open about adopting selective competition tactics, 
or ‘cream skimming’, as a way to enhance their school’s intake and status. 
Glennerster (1991: 1271) argued that competition in quasi-markets would 
create a context in which ‘any entrepreneur acting rationally would seek 
to exclude pupils who would drag down the overall performance score of 
the school, its major selling point for parents’. While we know that school 
leaders rarely act purely in economically rational terms (Levacic, 2001, 
Van Zanten, 2009), there were nevertheless real pressures to take decisions 
in the perceived interests of one’s own institution, even where these were 
also considered morally dubious or against one’s professional or personal 
values. For example, one headteacher of a previously monopolistic school 
faced now with a new school build in the most affluent part of its catchment 
and a nearby free school, reported how: 
We work very hard with the portrayal of the school, the image of the 
school, marketing, pulling parents in … it is a very, very competitive 
group [of schools] and it doesn’t sit easily with my values as a teacher, 
but everybody wants those bright, sharp, well-motivated, middle class 
children who are going to get the top grades, and they do. … It’s who 
has which children. Well it is isn’t it? [pause] I’m sorry to say that. It 
shouldn’t really be like that. 
Headteacher, secondary academy converter, Ofsted Outstanding 
There was widespread recognition of the reasons for this headteacher’s 
competitive and entrepreneurial yet uncomfortable position in our localities 
research, although there was very little support for the quasi-market policies 
that incentivized such practices. Similarly, among our survey respondents, 
less than a third of primary schools and only 12 per cent of secondary 
schools agreed with the statement: ‘the level of competition between schools 
locally has a positive effect’. (One reason for this phase difference may be 
that primary schools reported facing less competition.) 
Our analysis of national Ofsted data indicates a clear overall 
association between retaining or changing an Ofsted grade and the socio-
economic composition of a school’s student body. We set out headline 
findings from the analysis in Box 1. This shows that schools judged Good 
and Outstanding between 2010 and 2015 saw a relative reduction in the 
percentage of students eligible for free school meals (FSMs) compared 
to the 2005–10 period, while schools judged Satisfactory, Requires 
Improvement and Inadequate saw a relative increase. Furthermore, this 
association was accentuated by changes in Ofsted grade: so, for example, 
schools that retained an Outstanding grade between 2010 and 2015 saw 
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a greater relative reduction in FSM pupils compared to schools that were 
Outstanding in 2010 but that had been downgraded by 2015. The nature of 
Ofsted data makes this analysis essentially descriptive and we did not aim 
to disentangle correlations in terms of causality. However, it does indicate a 
clear association between changes in Ofsted grade and changes in levels of 
student deprivation. 
Box 1: Are changes in a school’s Ofsted grade associated with changes 
in the socio-economic composition of a school’s students?
We analysed Ofsted grades over the decade 2005–15. This included analysis 
of whether changes in Ofsted grading over time were associated with 
changes in a school’s student composition, including the socio-economic 
composition of students using Free School Meal (FSM) eligibility as a 
proxy.14 This analysis suggests a clear association between Ofsted grade 
and changes in student intake by FSM eligibility. 
Table 4.1a sets out this analysis for primary schools. It shows that 
schools that were judged Good and Outstanding in 2010 saw a relative 
reduction in the level of deprivation in their pupil intake between 2010 
and 2015. By contrast, schools judged Satisfactory/RI and Inadequate in 
2010 saw a relative increase in deprivation over the same time period. 
Tables 4.1b, 4.1c and 4.1d show these trends in relation to whether 
schools retained the same Ofsted grade in 2015 (4.1b), received a higher 
rating by 2015 (4.1c), or were downgraded by 2015 (4.1d). These show 
how the overall association between Ofsted grade and Free School Meal 
eligibility was accentuated by changes in Ofsted grade. Schools that 
retained an Outstanding grade saw a greater relative reduction in FSM 
pupils (0.1903) compared to Outstanding schools that were downgraded 
(0.1337) between 2010 and 2015. Similarly, for Good schools, improving 
to Outstanding was associated with a larger relative reduction in FSM 
eligible students than Good schools that retained the same grading. Schools 
that were judged Satisfactory/RI in 2010 but then improved their Ofsted 
grade between 2010 and 2015 saw little relative change in FSM eligibility 
(0.0088). By comparison schools that either retained a Satisfactory/RI 
grade (0.0794) or were downgraded (0.0953), saw a relative increase in 
FSM eligibility. Schools that retained an Inadequate grade experienced the 
largest relative increase in FSM eligibility.
15 See Annex 1 for the methodology for this phase of the research. It is important to note 
the standard errors (se) throughout this chapter – the lower the standard error, the 
more accurate the estimated mean and the more precisely the mean can be generalized 
to the entire population. The use of colour coding in the tables is intended to support 
ease of reading and does not denote statistical significance. The analysis was based on 
standardized FSM eligibility rates, to account for overall trends over the decade. The 
analysis reports changes in the standardized averages (for 05/10 and 11/15) and as such 
measures change in terms of standard deviations. This analysis is therefore comparable 
between the groups of schools graded differently by Ofsted and is independent of 
underlying trends in FSM rates.
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Table 4.1a – Changes in primary school 
FSM levels by 2010 Ofsted rating
Table 4.1b – Changes in primary school 
FSM levels by 2010 Ofsted rating where 
the rating remained the same in 2015
Ofsted Diff Se N Ofsted Diff Se N
Outstanding -0.1664 0.0069 1,592 Outstanding -0.1903 0.0084 920
Good -0.0749 0.0039 5,821 Good -0.0768 0.0046 4,081
Satisfactory/RI 0.0274 0.0055 3,999 Satisfactory/RI 0.0794 0.0121 813
Inadequate 0.0974 0.0214 315 Inadequate 0.1591 0.1135 11
Table 4.1c – Changes in primary schools 
FSM levels by 2010 Ofsted rating where 
the rating was higher in 2015
Table 4.1d – Changes in primary school 
FSM levels by 2010 Ofsted rating where 
the rating was lower in 2015
Ofsted Diff Se N Ofsted Diff Se N
Outstanding Outstanding -0.1337 0.0114 672
Good -0.1552 0.0108 727 Good -0.0093 0.0099 1,013
Satisfactory/RI 0.0088 0.0063 2,991 Satisfactory/RI 0.0953 0.0243 195
Inadequate 0.0952 0.0218 304 Inadequate
These trends were very similar among secondary schools. As set out in 
Table 4.1e, Good and particularly Outstanding schools saw a relative 
reduction in the level of deprivation in their pupil intake between the 
two periods, while Satisfactory/RI and Inadequate schools saw a relative 
increase. This applies to all schools irrespective of their 2015 rating (with 
the exception of Satisfactory/RI schools in 2010 that improved their 
rating by 2015 and experienced a reduction in FSM eligibility).
Table 4.1e – Changes in secondary school 
FSM levels by 2010 Ofsted rating
Table 4.1f – Changes in secondary school 
FSM levels by 2010 Ofsted rating where 
rating remained the same in 2015
Ofsted Diff Se N Ofsted Diff Se N
Outstanding -0.1598 0.0084 601 Outstanding -0.1678 0.0102 353
Good -0.0611 0.0063 1,163 Good -0.0642 0.0079 664
Satisfactory/RI 0.0160 0.0096 881 Satisfactory/RI 0.0631 0.0171 280
Inadequate 0.1244 0.0220 105 Inadequate 0.1908 0.0491 12
Table 4.1g – Changes in secondary school 
FSM levels by 2010 Ofsted rating where 
rating was higher in 2015
Table 4.1h – Changes in secondary school 
FSM levels by 2010 Ofsted rating where 
rating was lower in 2015
Ofsted Diff Se N Ofsted Diff Se N
Outstanding Outstanding -0.1483 0.0145 248
Good -0.1214 0.0137 199 Good -0.0143 0.0141 300
Satisfactory/RI -0.0107 0.0122 502 Satisfactory/RI 0.0176 0.0321 99
Inadequate 0.1158 0.0240 93 Inadequate
The consequences of local hierarchies and selective competition 
One consequence of local hierarchies and selective competition was that 
schools – and particularly school leaders – could end up with different 
perceptions of their locality and the children within it. 
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It was not uncommon, for instance, for higher-status schools to 
describe recent growth in student numbers as a locality-wide phenomenon, 
while lower-status schools held concerns about either under-subscription or 
increasing numbers of international migrants, refugees and ‘Bedroom Tax 
migrants’ being concentrated in lower cost housing in their community. 
Similarly there was evidence schools had different interpretations of 
what constituted ‘challenging’ student behaviour. Several schools in one 
locality, for instance, had been shocked to learn a higher-status neighbour 
made referrals to children’s social care for ‘repeated swearing’ when, one 
of the headteachers argued, referrals ‘in my staff’s head [are for] things like 
biting, kicking, spitting … injuring people’. Another headteacher argued 
that this created real tensions between schools, stemming from the fact that 
‘some schools are so completely different to other schools’.
These differences in perception reflected more fundamental differences 
in the experience of different schools. The lower-status schools in our sample 
frequently faced a concentration of challenges including under-subscription, 
higher student mobility and disproportionate numbers of disadvantaged, 
migrant and hard to place children. 
As we explore in Chapter 5, there were several examples in our locality 
research where potentially meaningful and mutually beneficial collaboration 
had been undermined by competitive pressures between schools. In more 
competitive environments, for example, school leaders were more likely to 
report an unwillingness to work with other local schools, particularly if they 
perceived doing so would put their own school’s hierarchical status at risk. 
Efforts to reduce the influence of competition
The localities research did reveal a variety of attempts to actively manage 
down local tensions and competitive incentives. These efforts ranged from 
individual schools agreeing to not market in each other’s neighbourhoods 
to new locality-wide principles for behaviour, including agreements not 
to ‘deliberately poach’ existing students or staff. Combined with these 
actions, ‘fair access panels’, brokered by LAs, were reported to have the 
potential of giving lower-status schools a stronger voice in decisions over 
admissions and hard to place students. Encouragingly, just over half of our 
survey respondents agreed with the statement: ‘There is a strong “fair access 
protocol” in my locality that works well.’
These attempts to ‘manage down’ competition could, however, 
appear as sticking plaster solutions – attempting to cover over underlying 
problems rather than solving them. While the LAs in our localities were 
working in different ways to secure equity and ensure that the needs of the 
most vulnerable students were addressed, these efforts did not address the 
structural reproduction of unequal and segregated student intakes. Rather, 
the placing of students could work to exacerbate choice patterns, where 
local authority staff, under pressure to place a child and faced with resistance 
from over-subscribed schools, went back time and again ‘to the [schools] 
where [students] get a better welcome … that did a good job … because 
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they knew that would be easy’. In this context, one headteacher argued, fair 
access panels were welcome but too often meant going to defend the school 
over individual cases rather than working to change the wider culture. 
Local agreements on competition were also fragile when unwritten 
rules were broken. One primary headteacher, for instance, described a 
context in which schools asked each other: ‘Is it OK if we advertise in 
the paper for our open day?’ This was a polite veneer, as the headteacher 
admitted: ‘I think we’d still do it, even if they said no’. The veneer cracked, 
however, when one higher-status school converted to become an academy 
increased its Published Admissions Number and quickly admitted more 
students, which, another local headteacher argued ‘had a terrible effect on 
us’. Similarly, what initially looked like a non-competition pact could in fact 
be a temporary strategic truce. One secondary head described, for example, 
‘wading in’ as the new head, with adverts and a prospectus, before finding 
‘all hell breaks loose because apparently that’s not cricket’. 
New market pressures resulting from the SISS policy agenda
Overlaying these complex local patterns and status hierarchies, the SISS 
agenda was widely perceived to be encouraging, and sometimes demanding, 
new types of competition between schools. While these newer forms of 
competition could often be traced back to the local status hierarchies 
described above, their terrain was often much broader, for example as schools 
became providers of school improvement to other schools in the context of 
reduced LA capacity. Higher-status schools were often ‘well positioned’ to 
take on these new positions of influence (Coldron et al., 2014), for example 
as a result of formal system leadership designations and roles. 
At least three emerging processes were identifiable in our four 
localities.
First, the new relations between schools encouraged by the SISS agenda 
were simultaneously creating both new spaces for collaboration and a new 
terrain over which competitive relations were being extended. TSAs, for 
instance, offered a structure in which existing and new inter-organizational 
networks could be developed. At the same time, tensions and struggles were 
manifest over which schools led TSAs, how TSAs were organized, which 
schools became alliance partners and how tensions between TSAs were to 
be resolved – which we discuss in Chapter 5.
In one locality, for example, a TSA organized by the historic highest 
status school had replicated an existing collaborative of secondary schools, 
in which staff development was co-organized and competitive relations 
managed down. The creation, however, of a second TSA in the locality 
– by a school that had made recent upward hierarchical moves – meant 
the two Teaching Schools were competing, particularly for primary school 
alliance partners. For the headteacher of the newer TSA, this was difficult 
territory. S/he felt the original Teaching School had assumed a position of 
privilege and power, that was now being challenged. Equally, however, the 
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headteacher was clear s/he didn’t want to ‘create conflict at a local level that 
could impact badly for our school’. 
Secondly, running within this mix of collaboration and competition 
were new relations of dependence and patronage. A range of schools noted 
how they were coming to rely more on higher-status schools, whose growing 
influence they either needed to accept (often because such school-to-school 
support came with national funding attached) or try to find alternatives. 
This was reported widely for instance in relation to staff recruitment at 
a time of widespread recruitment challenges. Being involved in School-
Centred Initial Teacher Training (SCITT) or leading the selection of School 
Direct candidates had significant advantages in this context, since it gave 
the school first choice from any local pool of trainees. But these choices 
were not distributed evenly. For example, one secondary headteacher noted 
the school’s increasing reliance on a TSA – located outside the locality – 
that the school had joined as a strategic partner. While the headteacher was 
involved in the provision of School Direct within the Alliance, when s/he 
tried to appoint the trainees it became clear that the Teaching School had 
already offered them jobs.
Third, and more widely, a ‘new knowledge economy’ was emerging 
in which schools not only needed to identify and secure their own support, 
they also faced new incentives and opportunities to both share and co-
construct knowledge and to think of their own organizational resources and 
‘intellectual capital’ as tradable commodities. This was seen to be creating 
hybrid organizational aims, for instance, where TSAs were combining a 
mix of non-charged collaborative provision (in which member schools both 
provide and receive services from each other without payment) and paid for 
provision. We explore TSAs in more detail in Chapter 5, setting out three 
typical trajectories for how they are developing. 
This mixing of aims was developing alongside a diversifying economy 
of support for schools. In the previous chapter we showed findings from 
the survey of where schools have drawn on external forms of support over 
the past 12 months. While traditional sources of support from LAs and 
local clusters of schools were the most common sources used, a significant 
minority used services provided by commercial service providers and 
consultants and by designated ‘system-leader’ schools. For example, around 
half of secondary schools rated Requires Improvement or Inadequate had 
drawn on a Teaching School, a commercial consultant, or an NLE or LLE 
in the past year. 
In this variety of ways, old and new forms of support and influence 
were developing in the context of existing competitive interdependences 
between schools. In part because of their higher status and in part because 
of the new opportunities for influence and responsibility they were taking on 
(or choosing not to), the actions of particular schools – and the values and 
disposition of their senior leaders – were becoming increasingly important 
locally. This is clearly illustrated in the case of three primary schools in one 
locality – discussed in the extended vignette below – that took up different 
positions in relation to the emerging ‘knowledge economy’. 
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Extended vignette: sell, protect or share?
The positioning of three primary schools in relation to their own and other 
schools’ ‘intellectual capital’ gave a clear insight into the emerging new 
knowledge economy. All three schools were judged to be Outstanding and all 
three were strategic partners in the same primary TSA. They were all leading 
on aspects of the Big Six locally16 – but they were all doing this in different 
ways, with very different effects. The schools’ actions partly reflected their 
dominant values – and the dispositions particularly of their headteachers 
– but were also, in the schools’ own analyses, part of their response to the 
wider context and policy environment. The local direction of travel was 
towards both the commercialization of knowledge and the encircling of 
schools into independent hard governance groupings, but the three schools 
were responding very differently. Their dominant ‘logics of action’ (Van 
Zanten, 2009) were: to sell; to protect; and to share. We consider each in 
turn before then exploring the tensions experienced in each case.
School 1) Selling 
School 1 was working to sell knowledge and sought explicitly to make 
money from doing so. It was a relatively open school, particularly if schools 
were prepared to pay. The headteacher described the school’s positioning 
as follows:
We converted to be a MAT … this year. When you are an academy, as 
you probably know, you have the opportunity to trade, if you so wish. 
And we wish. … The trading arm offers professional development and 
support … and we want to make money.
The school’s ‘trading arm’ had developed out of a series of activities. The 
school had been asked by the LA to provide local CPD courses. It had 
also developed a hard governance federation and then a MAT to take 
over a nearby primary school. The headteacher described how the school’s 
systems had been transferred, almost in replica, to the federated school, 
having asked the deputy head ‘to write a manual for how to do our school, 
a comprehensive (instruction) manual, like you might have for a car’. The 
two schools were now, the headteacher argued, essentially one school with 
two locations: ‘they’re like branches of the same company’. 
These experiences informed the new ‘trading arm’. Having run 
CPD on Ofsted and leadership locally, the trading arm added ‘hot topics 
such as assessment’, but the focus was on selling training to help improve 
inspection outcomes. This was because, the headteacher argued, ‘some 
things fly. Anything to do with Ofsted usually does, because it’s the only 
thing people are really frightened of.’ The headteacher and two senior 
leaders were trained and practising Ofsted inspectors as this offered insight 
and credibility. The school’s MAT was also used in the trading arm’s courses 
16 The ‘Big Six’ areas were: Initial Teacher Education; CPD and leadership development; 
succession planning; Specialist Leaders of Education; school-to-school support; research 
and development.
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as ‘a real working example’ so that ‘when we run events, we want people to 
come into the classroom, typically practitioners, and see, with regular kids, 
how we work … how you can become part of a dialogue with a practitioner 
to help you’. This was seen as a unique selling point and the headteacher 
reported it produced ‘income, so we have a target to turn over six figures 
within two years, with more after that’. 
School 2) Protecting 
The second school, by contrast, worked to protect its organizational 
knowledge, time and resources, which it understood as both ‘looking after’ 
and ‘shielding’. The school did this by organizing almost all CPD internally, 
buying in consultant support and collaborating only on specific practices, 
where another school had clearly identifiable strengths. The school was 
often seen locally as exclusive and closed, even purposefully isolationist. 
The headteacher described the school as follows:
We’re strong enough to be able to do it on our own, and I think we have 
sufficient expertise within our four walls … occasionally, we will need to 
pull in some support … So, we are not arrogant to think we’re so good, 
bye-bye! We would want some verification that we are doing the right 
thing. … We have enough to pay for that.
The school’s willingness to pay for external review contrasted with its critique 
and even suspicion of collaboration. The school’s focus, the headteacher 
argued, was on ‘retaining Outstanding’ which was ‘very difficult’ and 
collaboration was seen to: waste staff time; involve other schools that may 
not have specific expertise to offer; imply unwanted reciprocity; and, most 
importantly, lead to staff being poached. The school’s work in the TSA 
focused on School Direct and organizing the candidate selection process 
– allowing relatively independent work and the headteacher to be clear on 
‘what’s in it for me’. The headteacher had developed relations of support 
with a small number of trusted peers, but few, if any, of these external ties 
engaged classroom teachers in meaningful collaboration with teachers in 
other schools.
School 3) Sharing
Unlike School 2, School 3 was willing to find common ground with partners 
and try to balance its own needs and interests with those of other schools 
equitably. School 3 attached real importance to collaboration and worked 
to share and jointly develop practice-based knowledge with a range of 
different partners. As a result, the school had collaborated with a majority 
of primary schools in the locality and was seen locally as an expert and 
ideal collaborator. The deputy headteacher described the school’s dominant 
positioning as follows:
We think something that is really important, in the culture of the school, 
is to share that good practice, so I think it’s always been driven that way 
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here, always seeing it like, you can never run on your own … and not 
just be seen as ‘oh that’s my idea so I’ll just keep it in this organization’ 
or whatever … You can’t be Outstanding without sharing good practice 
… it’s always been seen as very, very, very important. It’s one of our 
school priorities.
Alongside a wide range of informal partnerships, School 3 also led the 
‘research and development’ theme for the primary TSA – work that was 
widely praised locally – and had recently joined a new secondary TSA to lead 
Initial Teacher Training for primary schools. The ability of a three-form entry 
primary school to take on so many local network roles came, in part, from 
pooling resources and expertise with collaborating partners. The school had 
also organized itself to clearly identify staff time for collaboration. School 
leaders co-ordinated and co-managed school networks as part of their 
leadership roles. Teachers were also actively involved in network research 
projects and in offering CPD training – activities that were scheduled to 
prevent conflicts with teaching timetables and to allow staff from other 
schools to participate.
tenSionS
In all three cases – but particularly for the schools ‘sharing’ and ‘protecting’ 
their ‘intellectual capital’, there were tensions in and disruptions to the 
schools’ dominant positioning. These highlighted the possibilities and 
difficulties in pursuing certain types of work.
- Sharing
In the case of School 3, a clear tension was building lateral, collaborative 
networks in the contexts of markets and hierarchy. One challenge was 
funding. While the school sought out external support for research projects, 
the majority of funding for collaborative work came from running CPD 
courses. This was not secure funding and, crucially, encouraged the school 
to run courses as a traded service. The school needed to advertise locally and 
online and reported a clear difference between working with collaborators 
and running courses with attendees cast as paying customers. The school 
did not want to develop a business mentality, but as the assistant head 
noted, there were incentives to do this in the local school support model: ‘It 
kind of works that way … People pay us to do that’.
A second related tension was that the school was expected to provide 
‘support’ to other schools when this was brokered by the LA. This stood in 
tension with the school’s commitment to lateral, joint practice development. 
The assistant head explained how there had been a lack of consent from 
two ‘supported schools’, leading to a lack of sustainability and little mutual 
learning for School 3 that came from greater openness and trust. It had 
been hard for the school to differentiate its collegial support aims from the 
interventional roles it was being asked to take on. 
In this context, the school had no plans to build a federation or a 
multi-academy trust or to sell CPD or support services more widely. Rather 
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it was focused on working with and finding partners that shared the school’s 
aims and values.
- Protecting
For School 2, protecting and shielding its knowledge and resources, there was 
real concern about sustaining its independence while receiving ‘less human 
resources, less legal support, less of those periphery things that you got in 
the local authority’. This had created financial and organizational pressures 
to change its isolationist stance. Initially the headteacher had investigated 
converting to academy status, arguing: ‘Believe you me, if we could have 
done it alone, we would be an academy long ago.’ There was, however, the 
headteacher argued, insufficient funding for a primary school to academize 
alone. The funding incentives were to ‘go in a group’ and there was also a 
perceived need to achieve economies of scale in a ‘federation in order to 
buy in all those other periphery things that you never bought before’. In 
response the school was looking to build and lead a local federation or 
MAT, but, in part due to its broader outlook, the headteacher had found it 
difficult to recruit partners: ‘We are finding it very difficult to get schools to 
come in with us.’ 
- Selling
Tensions were less apparent in School 1. The headteacher had to convince 
the MAT’s directors that the trading arm was in the interests of the 
federation. This was done, the head argued, by showing: how paying 
‘£5,000 extra a year’ to run CPD courses helped retain staff; and that profit 
was being invested in specific school projects and acted to mitigate the 
risks of continued austerity. A second challenge might have been selling 
courses and improvement support, but the headteacher argued this had 
become increasingly easy: ‘in the world where the reach and power of the 
local authority’s school improvement teams has dwindled, in some places 
disappeared, therefore there is nothing locally for schools to turn to, no one 
to turn to’. In some cases schools were paying simply for ‘encouragement’. 
There were competitors – particularly ‘the big boys, the Capitas, the 
SERCOs, and so on’, but ‘we’re probably a bit cynical about the quality of 
that work’. To compete, the school had branded the trading arm because: 
‘You need an identity. You need to market it’. Going forward, School 1’s 
MAT was planning to increase from two to four schools but no further, the 
headteacher argued, based on a clear financial business model.
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the continuing importance and influence of 
quasi-market policies within the SISS policy agenda. The core elements of 
this policy framework – parental choice of school and funding following 
the learner – date back to the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA). Not 
surprisingly therefore, many of the findings set out in the first part of 
this chapter reflect and update previous research into quasi-markets in 
England. We saw that the vast majority of schools recognize local status 
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hierarchies and are working to protect or improve their position within 
such hierarchies through a mixture of strategic and tactical measures. 
Improving a school’s Ofsted grade is often the most immediate strategy 
for improving its reputation, although this worked differently in different 
contexts and school leaders were frequently engaged in a wider array of 
more or less overt marketing activities aimed at attracting particular parents 
to their school – efforts that Glennerster (1991) termed ‘selective’ rather 
than ‘efficient’ competition. Our analysis of Ofsted inspection data also 
showed that schools with higher inspection grades had become relatively 
less deprived during the period 2010–15, while the reverse was true for 
schools judged as Requires Improvement or Inadequate. 
We also saw that the SISS policy agenda is creating new forms of 
competition and that this is often accentuating the role of local status 
hierarchies, as ‘well positioned’ schools take advantage of their status to 
acquire additional resources and influence. These ‘system leader’ schools 
now operate as part of the wider school improvement marketplace, often 
competing with LA traded services and private sector providers to trade their 
knowledge and expertise. This ‘knowledge’ includes both tacit expertise that 
resides in expert practitioners (such as SLEs) as well as explicit procedural 
knowledge (for example, sold as courses on how to improve your Ofsted 
grade). We saw in the example of the three Outstanding primary schools 
that different schools can have very different conceptions of whether to 
protect, sell or share this knowledge. 
Finally, the development of the ‘new knowledge economy’ in which 
high-status schools either protect, sell or share practice-based knowledge 
is contributing to increased differentiation between schools in the system. 
The incentives for high-status schools to package and ‘sell’ their procedural 
knowledge, in particular, constrasts with the development of ‘deep 
partnerships’ and joint practice development, which Hargreaves argues 
are core requirements for a ‘self-improving system’. Where knowledge and 
expertise are sold in this way, we found there is a tendency to focus on 
the types of knowledge that can be easily codified and commoditized (as 
‘best practices’). We explore these issues further in the following chapter on 
Networks.
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Chapter 5
Networks: school-to-school 
partnerships and the move 
towards MATs
The English school system has a diverse array of often overlapping and 
sometimes competing networks, many of which pre-date the advent of the 
SISS agenda. These networks exist within, between and beyond schools, 
disrupting the idea that schools or local school systems are organized simply 
through hierarchy and markets (Weick, 1976). 
Networks are often argued to involve both a level of trust, so that 
a reputation for (sufficient) honesty and consistency develops between 
members; and a set of interdependencies, so that network members share 
resources and/or work towards common purposes (Thompson, 2003). 
Through these experiences, networks can develop multiple lateral relations 
that sustain a variety of communication and co-operation – including mutual 
support and advice, resource sharing, knowledge diffusion and innovation. 
As a result, networks are often argued to be effective in responding to 
intractable or ‘wicked’ issues that require ‘distributed expertise’ (Daniels 
and Edwards, 2012). 
For these reasons, networks can be an appealing concept, holding 
out the potential for horizontal, equitable and participative relations as an 
alternative to the administrative orders of hierarchy and the competition 
of markets (Powell, 1990). But networks can also sustain contrasting, 
even contradictory, relations (Grimaldi, 2011). For instance, networks can 
develop equitable partnerships, but can also support asymmetric power 
relations in which particular members gain authority and secure unequal 
gains and this can erode trust (Kamp, 2013). Networks can be open and 
inclusive, but can also be closed and exclusive where members develop a 
preference to interact with insiders or seek to manage and restrict flows of 
knowledge (Hatcher, 2008). Networks can be flat and horizontal, but can 
also contain their own internal hierarchies (Lieberman and McLaughlin, 
1992). Further, while networks can be co-ordinated on the basis of trust, 
external risk, suspicion and fear can also motivate people or organizations 
to collaborate without trust (Cook et al., 2007). 
These tensions are more or less apparent in different contexts. How 
a network is formed is significant: mandated or externally incentivized 
networks can struggle to move beyond surface-level collaboration, while 
even non-mandated networks can struggle with power imbalances that 
corrode trust (Popp et al., 2014; Kamp, 2013). The agency of network 
members is also important: leading and managing networks has been argued 
to require sophisticated ‘network competencies’ as well as an openness to 
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engage with the moral and political dilemmas that networks present, but 
such leadership skills and agency are by no means universally present in 
all contexts (Popp et al., 2014; Wheatley and Frieze, 2011; Lumby, 2009; 
Vangen and Huxham, 2013). 
In the context of these potential tensions, the focus in this chapter 
is on inter-organizational partnerships between schools. We follow Provan 
and Kenis to define these partnerships as being constituted by three or more 
‘legally autonomous organizations that work together’ (Provan and Kenis, 
2008: 231)17. This focus on inter-school partnerships limits our analysis 
and we recognize that we thereby exclude a diversity of other networks, but 
argue that it is justified because such partnerships and particular new types 
of multi-school groups are one preoccupation of the SISS policy agenda. 
We begin by examining ‘local clusters’, as a widespread inter-organizational 
partnership form in England. We then analyse Teaching School Alliances, 
which were advanced in policy from 2010 and were posited by Hargreaves 
(2012) to be a basis of the ‘deep partnerships’ that he argued should be 
central to a ‘self-improving system’. Finally we analyse MATs, although we 
challenge the notion that MATs operate as partnerships, given they are in 
fact a ‘single legal entity’ (DfE, 2017: 47) and academies within MATs have 
‘no legal existence free standing from the chain of which it is part’ (Wolfe, 
2013: 109). 
School-to-school partnerships – an overview 
We start by providing an overview of school-to-school partnerships in 
our case study localities and from our survey. We asked our case study 
headteachers to identify all of: ‘the schools your school collaborates with, 
in a meaningful way’.18 Primary headteachers reported collaborating, on 
average, with ten other schools, while secondary headteachers reported an 
average of 13 schools. The overall range was from two to 28 schools. Ties 
with schools in the same phase were reported to be the most common: 
among primary schools, 82 per cent of meaningful ties were with other 
primary schools, while among secondary schools, 64 per cent of ties were 
with other secondaries. 
We also collected a small amount of data on each identified tie. The 
average length of time a tie had existed with another school was reported 
to be just over five years, but the mode was one year. We also asked about 
the regularity of collaborative activity between schools, in terms of the 
approximate number of staff interactions the schools had had the previous 
term. While a minority of schools only collaborated infrequently (once 
or twice a term), the majority had both regular interactions with one or 
17 We sometimes use the terms partnership and network interchangeably in this chapter, as 
our definition recognizes that a partnership is a formalized network. Our interviewees 
used both terms along with wider terminology, such as cluster and alliance, which we 
adopt in the relevant sections. 
18 Twenty-five primary and 15 secondary schools completed this task. Eight primary and 
four secondary schools did not complete the proforma due to time constraints reported 
by the headteacher. 
Toby Greany and Rob Higham
70
two schools (and less frequently three or four schools) and less regular 
interaction with their other ties. This indicates that a pattern of a smaller 
number of long-term and more intensive ties and a larger number of newer 
and less intensive ties is common for these schools. 
We also asked our survey respondents to identify how many schools 
their school collaborated with in a meaningful way. A similar number of 
ties was reported, with nine by primary and ten by secondary respondents 
(compared to nine and 13 respectively above). The range here was zero to 
64 ties, with two per cent of respondents reporting that their schools did not 
collaborate with any other school in a meaningful way. Respondents were 
asked to identify – from a list – which term best described their strongest 
partnership. As Figure 5.1 shows, primary schools (67 per cent) were most 
likely to describe this as their local cluster. Secondary schools were also 
most likely to describe this as their local cluster (40 per cent), although 
around one in five secondary schools described their strongest partnership 
as a MAT (22 per cent) or TSA (20 per cent).19 These findings are in line 
with the findings reported in Chapter 3 that schools are most likely to turn 
to their local cluster for improvement support. 
Figure 5.1: Survey response – strongest partnership with other schools. All secondary and 
primary respondents with at least one strong tie (n=612).
Local clusters of schools
We employed the term ‘local cluster’ in the survey as it was referred to 
regularly in our initial case study visits. In practice, ‘local cluster’ describes 
a range of network forms and relations between schools and a diversity of 
activities, including joint extra-curricular provision, headteacher meetings, 
19 We included MATs in this question to reflect both common policy statements and the 
findings from the locality research (where interviewees sometimes referred to MATs as 
partnerships) even though we do not define MATs as partnerships. 
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curriculum or subject leader networks, assessment and moderation groups, 
peer reviews, research projects and joint practice development or shared 
CPD. There were also, however, several common features to local clusters 
in our four localities. Cluster membership was often voluntary and could be 
fluid, but was usually drawn from a distinct local area with neighbouring 
or partly neighbouring schools. Clusters rarely had formal governance 
structures, with shared decision-making usually sited informally within 
a cluster headteachers’ group. Cluster origins often lay in previous local 
authority-led initiatives, but these had also commonly been overlain with 
other initiatives and aims over time.
We did encounter examples of cross-phase cluster activity in the 
research, but these were less common, so we focus here on primary to 
primary and secondary to secondary clusters. 
Primary school clusters
The aims and activities of primary school clusters and the regularity and 
perceived strength of cluster ties varied substantially. In Southern LA, for 
example, there were 11 primary school clusters and our research visits 
provided insights into five of them. We also interviewed a local authority 
officer who – in briefly describing each cluster – used three of these five as 
being characteristic of the diversity of clusters locally, so we outline these 
here to provide a sense of the range of practice and the issues that arise. 
The first cluster – Westside Heads – included seven primary schools 
in an area with low levels of deprivation. The cluster had existed for a 
decade and current activities included student sports competitions and 
music and drama events. The schools’ headteachers met three times a year 
to plan events and discuss ‘operational issues’. One headteacher described 
discussing issues such as: ‘How are you dealing with life after levels? I had 
an irate parent who did this – how would you deal with that situation?’ 
The headteacher also reported, however, that the school had weak ties with 
all the cluster schools and the deputy head described how cluster meetings 
(that s/he had attended instead of the head) were not always well attended. 
There was also increasing competition between several cluster schools over 
student recruitment, resulting from both an over-supply of nursery places 
and attempts by one school to become more socially selective (as discussed 
on page 55). 
The second cluster – Schools Together – included all the Catholic 
primaries in the authority. Having met termly while being members of 
other local clusters, one school proposed a ‘Catholic school improvement 
alliance’. This was initially resisted by other headteachers, who were reported 
to be cautious about the motives of the proposing school, which was the 
only ‘Outstanding’ Catholic primary locally and served the least deprived 
students. The idea of a new alliance resurfaced after two headteachers 
retired and another was removed from post after a diocesan inspection. 
The head of the Outstanding school reported how peers ‘kept saying “how 
do we stop that happening to one of us”’. S/he persuaded them the answer 
was ‘to support one another and collaborate’. With cautious acceptance by 
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the majority of schools, the cluster had developed cross-school moderation 
exercises and was embarking on joint research projects. Summarizing 
progress, another head reported how: ‘the overall general feeling is now 
there, but what that looks like on paper in terms of real actions is a little 
more difficult to pin down.’ 
The third cluster – Learning Links – was comprised of nine primary 
schools. Four schools serving deprived urban communities had established 
the network eight years earlier. The schools wanted to develop CPD for 
teachers collectively and argued that their existing local authority clusters 
did not share that focus. The cluster had grown through personal invitations 
to headteachers of schools that were perceived to offer something to the 
network. The cluster was thus a local but non-geographical network of 
schools serving predominately deprived urban neighbourhoods. To join 
the network, schools committed financially (£3,000 annually) and released 
senior leaders and (less regularly) teachers for cluster activities. Part of the 
funding paid for a retired headteacher (formerly of one of the member 
schools) to facilitate and chair the cluster. The cluster had retained a 
focus on teacher training, but had also developed a range of activities to 
share and jointly develop teaching and learning practices – see Box 2. For 
interviewees at both of the member schools we visited, Learning Links was 
very important to the work and daily life of their schools and their main 
source of staff professional development and external support.
Box 2: The Learning Links primary cluster 
The aims of the network are around student progress and improving 
the quality of teaching and leadership. One headteacher interviewee 
recognized that these aims could be seen as narrowly focused on 
national accountability requirements, but also gave an example of where 
membership of the network had given him/her both the confidence and 
peer pressure to resist narrowing the curriculum down to focus on core 
subjects in the face of some poor results.
Evolution: A gradual layering of activities
Learning Links’s work developed originally around CPD and NQT 
recruitment. The CPD programme now included: PGCE placements; an 
NQT programme; leadership development programmes and headteacher 
conferences.
Moderation of student work was also an early function of the 
network, with three deputy heads of member schools leading annual 
moderation meetings for Year 2, 4 or 6 teachers. This work had led to 
discussions about how the schools could share more information about 
their classroom practice and student progress data. This led into a layering 
of new activities over time, including:
i) The appointment of a common SIP for all member schools. 
ii) Common reporting to governors, and annual shared governor 
meetings. 
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iii) Peer-evaluation/review. 
iv) Sharing of student progress data, with the aim of developing the 
network’s identification of potentially good practice and areas for 
mutual support.
The schools had also trialled several different approaches to sharing 
practices between schools that had proved unwieldy or ineffective and 
so had been abandoned. These included a ‘good practice brochure’ 
and a co-ordinated brokerage system for school-to-school visits. At the 
time of our visit the schools were trialling an informal but structured 
approach to visits, in which each school organized its own visits but using 
a common format for preparation (including a training session on the 
theory of a specific practice), observation in pairs (with time for post-
observation discussion), action planning and feedback. The network was 
also developing new opportunities for staff to jointly research classroom 
practice. 
Network challenges
While there were clear strengths to the Learning Links approach, there 
were also a number of challenges. 
One recent example concerned a substantial ‘dead-end’ that had 
distracted the schools and the network from its core purposes. It started 
because a network Teaching School Alliance application was turned 
down. The schools decided to trial their own ‘training school’ instead – 
to provide NQT and CPD training and support inside and also beyond 
the network. They bought in a consultant to help establish this, but after 
six months the schools felt that the project was starting to ‘dictate what 
needs to be done’. Too many teachers were being taken out of class (to 
be trained as trainers and then to provide training) and the finances of 
the new venture had come to dominate network meetings. The overall 
experience, according to one head, had been ‘a bit of a difficult time really 
… People might have left, but they haven’t left. … We’ve come out of it’. 
Externally, some other schools in the LA accused Learning Links 
of exclusivity, as a result of the decision by the member schools to limit 
the network’s numbers (at ten) and to only grow through invitation. 
Some schools also argued that the network was a club for Good and 
Outstanding schools. The Learning Links schools disputed this, arguing 
that what united them was the disadvantaged nature of their intakes and 
that the network included schools that had performed lower in Ofsted 
over the years. 
Southern LA was now looking to work more directly with clusters rather 
than individual schools, informed by its work with Learning Links and a 
second cluster that it deemed effective. The LA saw in this a means to try to 
fulfil its responsibilities for school improvement, while managing funding 
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cuts. To make this shift, a priority for the LA was to focus clusters on 
‘school-to-school support’ and ‘improvement’, defined in terms of student 
attainment and progress and Ofsted grade. The LA interviewee described 
this as changing ‘old currency clusters’ – that had done ‘a lot of good work 
in arts activities, creative activities and whatever’ – into clusters with a 
‘tightening focus on improvement’. It was for clusters to decide their own 
agenda but the LA was active in steering this, both through the use of 
additional funding and through its School Improvement Officers. 
Schools, the LA interviewee argued, were generally supportive of this 
‘new model’, as a means to try to sustain reduced authority support. There 
were, however, a number of tensions for our case study school leaders. 
First, the ‘new model’ added to existing pressures on schools to narrow 
provision away from the arts, sport and extra-curricular activities, which 
clusters had often supported. Second, the ‘new model’ was as yet unable to 
prevent uneven development between clusters. While two clusters were used 
as exemplars, three were just beginning to (re)form around improvement 
work (including Schools Together) and three others were not (including 
Westside Heads). Two other envisaged clusters – both in areas of significant 
deprivation – had yet to be formed. 
A third tension related to how clusters should be governed internally, 
especially as they took on new responsibilities. While Learning Links had 
had a negative experience of external facilitation by a consultant, the 
authority was advocating for external facilitators and offered seed-funding 
linked to this expectation, arguing that facilitators could take on the burden 
of cluster co-ordination as well as guard against asymmetric power relations 
between schools: 
Without independent facilitation, you can get a very dominant lead … 
(it can be) orientated towards that head and what that head wants … 
you get other headteachers collectively agreeing, but individually not 
engaging.
Local authority interviewee
The governance of networks
One perspective on these governing dilemmas is offered by Provan and 
Kenis (2008) who analyse how networks co-ordinate collective action and 
address conflicts, with a focus on goal-directed (rather than spontaneous) 
networks of three or more organizations. They identify three typical models 
of governance:
❯ ‘Shared governance networks’ – are governed by the organizations 
that are network members, so that every organization (or a significant 
subset) interacts ‘with every other organization to govern the network, 
resulting in a dense and highly decentralized form’ (2008: 234).
❯ ‘Lead organization networks’ – are governed by one network member, 
with fewer member-to-member interactions over governance, so that 
governance occurs ‘by and through a single organization, acting as a 
highly centralized network broker’ (ibid: 234).
75
 Networks: school-to-school partnerships and the move towards MATs
❯ ‘Network Administrative Organizations (NAO)’ – are networks 
governed externally by a ‘separate administrative entity’, established 
either by members or through external direction, so that while the 
NAO may be monitored by members ‘key decisions are co-ordinated 
through and by a separate, independent’ person or organization, often 
appointed as a manager or CEO (ibid: 235). 
Figure 5.2 illustrates these structures and relations between members in 
each idealized network model. Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that, while 
many networks begin with informal ‘shared governance’, as they grow in 
size they commonly evolve towards a ‘lead organization’ or ‘NAO’ structure. 
This, they argue, is because the role of finding consensus, sustaining trust 
and organizing activities becomes more complex and burdensome in larger 
networks. However, Milward and Provan (2006: 22) acknowledge that lead 
organization networks can become dominated by the lead organization, 
while ‘NAOs’ can create a complex governing administration, with increased 
costs and decreased transparency. In both cases, this can precipitate declining 
commitment by members. 
Figure 5.2: Network governance archetypes, adapted from Provan and Kenis (2007) in Popp 
et al., 2015
This conceptualization offers insights into the process and impact of 
formalizing governance in LA-school clusters. In Southern, the LA clearly 
recognized a requirement to move away from the existing range of self-
governed networks, both because it saw a need for a focus on school-
to-school improvement and because it wanted to formalize its own 
steering relationship with the networks. However, it wanted to avoid lead 
organization networks that might be dominated by a single headteacher 
or school. Instead, it was allocating a dedicated LA SIO to work with each 
cluster and using its funding to incentivize clusters to appoint consultants 
as chairs/facilitators, thereby creating a hybrid, but relatively light-touch 
version of Provan and Kenis’ NAO model.
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In Northern LA, this trajectory towards an NAO was also apparent, 
although in a different form. As we noted on page 44, soon after 2010 
the authority had supported primary schools to establish a locality-wide 
Education Partnership (EP). The EP had both a governing body of elected 
heads, school governors and an authority representative and a separate 
management team, with a senior manager and a small number of SIOs. The 
EP aimed to provide termly advisor visits, numeracy and literacy support 
and subsidized CPD for schools that paid a subscription. Rather than local 
clusters, the EP accredited ‘hub’ schools to provide training and ‘tailored 
support’ to other schools. The LA commissioned support from the EP for 
schools ‘causing concern’. This model was welcomed by schools, although 
concerns were raised about the constraints set by the EP, with the senior 
manager ‘telling off’ hub schools that worked beyond their accreditation 
or did not charge for their services to other schools – thus placing limits 
on local spontaneous ties. The manager was also seen to use money as a 
form of control, using it to influence (or ‘bribe’) schools. Some schools had 
begun to question their membership, although all had renewed to date as 
they valued (some said ‘needed’) EP support and advice, particularly in 
preparing for and during Ofsted inspections.
As these cases demonstrate, moves to reorient and formalize primary 
school networks were widespread, but not unproblematic, in our case study 
localities. These networks took different forms, reflecting local histories 
and relations. Informal networks remained important to schools, but there 
were widely recognized motivations for formalizing local clusters, including 
austerity and cuts to LA support as well as national policy changes, including 
on assessment. LAs were working to sustain their own provision, manage 
down fragmentation and competition while finding new ways of governing 
‘with and through’ networks. A majority of primary schools recognized 
the pressures to ‘collaborate’ – often because they valued the continued 
authority support on offer in clusters or partnerships; sometimes because 
they respected the authority’s democratic mandate; and frequently because 
they reported feeling that ‘it’s more and more something we need to do’ 
– although, as we illustrate above, our respondents also recognized the 
tensions inherent in this shift. 
Meanwhile, a discourse on the dangers of ‘the isolated school’ was 
prevalent among our ‘national system informants’, underscored by concepts 
of efficiency (i.e. the need to purchase services and achieve economies of 
scale) and effectiveness (i.e. the need to find external ‘challenge’ and avoid 
risks of bounded rationality). As one NCTL respondent argued, for instance:
My personal view is the worst place to be at the moment is on your own. 
Secondary school clusters
These narratives on ‘partnering’ were also apparent among secondary 
schools, although interpreted slightly differently. Secondary schools were 
more likely to be or to have neighbours that were academies and to report 
working with greater independence from their local authority. They were 
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also more likely to perceive competition for students and, relatedly, local 
status, as we saw in Chapter 3. There were also contrasting influences on 
‘cluster’ formation and relations among secondary schools, which pushed 
and pulled in at least two directions. 
On the one hand, secondary schools were more likely to perceive a 
lack of trust between schools locally. For instance, asked about whether ‘a 
lack of trust between schools in your area hinders meaningful collaboration’, 
40 per cent of our secondary school survey respondents agreed, compared 
to only 12 per cent among primary schools. On the other hand, however, 
secondary schools were more likely to report a need to self-organize and 
commission external support, due to perceived historic limitations in LA 
support. As they commissioned this support, many secondary schools 
expressed a preference for drawing on serving and recent practitioners, 
rather than commercial providers, for this support, since they were seen as 
more credible. This created, in turn, incentives for secondary schools to co-
operate around school improvement, even where levels of trust were lower. 
How this was manifested locally was influenced by the history of 
local relations as well as political perspectives on how local schooling 
should be organized. Overall, LAs had less influence in the creation and 
maintenance of secondary clusters, although all four LAs were working to 
remain engaged with their secondary academies and to retain some level 
of local coherence as we saw in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, in the survey, 
only a third of secondary schools reported that their LA had supported the 
creation of partnerships locally, compared to half of primary schools. 
Geography was also an influence on secondary clusters. The two 
smaller LAs in our sample contained clusters encompassing the majority 
of, although not all, local secondary schools. The two larger LAs had a 
diverse range of clusters. In Eastern LA, for example, the headteacher of 
an academy within a regionally based MAT reported chairing the local 
secondary cluster. Collaboration between schools in the cluster was relatively 
limited, but there was nevertheless strong engagement on issues of policy: 
for example, the cluster had been tasked by the LA to develop proposals 
for enhanced LA-wide Alternative Provision. In Western LA, nine schools 
had formed what they referred to as a soft federation – called Coalition 
– that included ‘local’ schools up to 25 miles apart. A formal agreement 
on shared governance had been established, setting out how joint work 
would be decided upon, funded and staffed, with a shared commitment to 
ensure that all schools in the cluster would be at least Good in Ofsted terms. 
One example of joint work across Coalition involved schools working in 
triads to peer review their provision for disadvantaged students, leading 
to joint action research projects. However, the headteacher who chaired 
the partnership noted that member schools had neither the remit nor the 
capacity required to support member schools that were really struggling in 
terms of measured performance. 
By comparison, in one of the smaller LAs, ten secondary schools no 
more than five miles apart had sustained a long-term cluster – ‘STARS’. An 
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important first step, before 2010, had been the development of sixth forms in 
each secondary school. This had been fraught at the time, but had ultimately 
helped the schools to attract additional students from neighbouring LAs and 
thus reduce a surplus of places locally (while worsening them elsewhere). 
The schools then began to co-organize staff CPD, and this collaborative 
work gradually evolved into an ‘improvement framework’ that centred on a 
‘best practice directory’ and a peer-review process. After 2010 the majority 
of schools had converted to academy status, individually but at the same 
time collectively employing a consultant, as one headteacher put it, for 
‘all of that legal nonsense’ involved in conversion. A common purchasing 
agreement was also developed, through which the schools negotiated prices 
with potential service suppliers before then signing individual contracts. 
For STARS, the development of a Teaching School Alliance (TSA) was 
– the headteacher of the Teaching School argued – a ‘natural progression’, 
since the schools were already working together on several TSA policy aims 
(discussed below) and STARS had a history of searching out and benefiting 
from the preferential funding often associated with early adoption of 
external initiatives. Politically, the schools were broadly positive about the 
idea of autonomy from the LA, independently responsible for their own 
improvement, but with a commitment to what we might call ‘co-operative 
self-improvement’. As we shall see in the next section, however, there were 
tensions underlying this arrangement that were exposed and deepened with 
the creation of a TSA.
Further, the viewpoint that TSAs were a natural progression for local 
clusters was not always shared. A substantial minority of our interviewees 
expressed scepticism about the motivations of Teaching Schools and about 
the policy aim to nationally designate local schools as lead organizations. 
As the chair of Coalition (described above) argued:
I think I have some sort of fundamental philosophical problem with the 
idea of one school and often one person behind it, placing themselves on 
a pinnacle and saying, ‘We know how to do this. We’re going to help you 
out. … There’s a lot of people around at the moment who really think 
they are quite something … the marketing that comes from them is very 
‘come and learn how to do this’. 
Headteacher, maintained secondary, Ofsted Good
Teaching School Alliances: externally designated Lead 
Organization Networks 
Introduced in 2010, the Teaching Schools policy replicates several features 
of earlier Labour-sponsored programmes such as Beacon Schools, specialist 
schools and the Leading Edge programme. A Teaching School (or schools20) 
20 Schools can apply to become a Teaching School on their own or as a job-share (i.e. 
where the role and funding is shared between two or three schools). 
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is designated by government and is required to be ‘outstanding in all areas’21, 
so it can be described as an externally designated Lead Organization 
Network (Provan and Kenis, 2008). The policy clearly privileges the local 
status of one or more high achieving school/s, which was a strong critique of 
Beacon Schools (Fielding et al., 2005), although the concept of a ‘Teaching 
School Alliance’ and ‘strategic partners’ seeks to give more prominence to 
the intended network around the lead organization. The role expected of 
Teaching Schools is substantial, including Initial Teacher Training, school-
to-school support and CPD and leadership development.22
The first wave of 100 Teaching Schools was designated in 2011 and 
by 2017 there were more than 750 TSAs operating nationally. Gu et al. 
(2015: 51) found in a formal evaluation of Teaching Schools that there 
is ‘considerable’ regional variation and ‘a clear tendency that low reach 
areas are generally away from major cities’. There is also a clear over-
representation of secondary schools and schools with less deprived intakes 
in the Teaching School cohort as a whole. 
Gu et al. (2015: 180) conclude that Teaching School Alliances can 
be conceived as ‘loose partnerships’ that rely on ‘like-minded people’ 
working together through a process of ‘give and take’ to develop collective 
and collaborative intellectual and social capital for improvement. Our 
findings suggest that this presents a somewhat idealized view: while there 
were often webs of inter-connected schools working together within the 
TSAs we visited, Teaching Schools were also ‘providers’ of services, such as 
CPD programmes, which other schools purchased as ‘users’. At the same 
time, some lower-performing schools were effectively directed to become 
recipients of grant-funded provision from Teaching Schools. In these ways, 
TSAs faced competing pressures of hierarchical and market governance that 
influenced their development as networks.
Partly as a result of these pressures, we found that existing local 
partnerships or clusters that chose to make a TSA application were often 
changed as a result. The relatively non-prescriptive and voluntary nature 
of the initiative left scope for local adaptation and variation. Within our 
localities, TSAs faced common tensions in: whether to develop as equitable or 
hierarchical networks; whether to allow inclusive or exclusive membership 
locally; and whether to prioritize reciprocal or marketized relations. We 
illustrate these tensions by describing three common trajectories that TSAs 
were adopting – as hierarchical; exclusive; and marketized networks – 
although we note that, in practice, TSAs often reflected hybrid forms. 
21 The application process for Teaching Schools is conducted by central government. 
Recent application waves have been targeted by the DfE at specified low reach areas, 
linked to ‘Opportunity Areas’. Some aspects of the designation criteria have been 
changed to allow for a wider group of entrants. Details on the 2017 designation criteria 
for new Teaching Schools can be found here: www.gov.uk/guidance/teaching-schools-a-
guide-for-potential-applicants (accessed 7 June 2017).
22 Teaching Schools were initially expected to work across six areas, but these were merged 
into three in 2015.
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i) Hierarchical, but inclusive network
In the STARS collaborative, described above, the designated Teaching 
School head described the TSA as a ‘natural progression’. For two other 
schools in STARS, however, the TSA had quickly deepened asymmetric 
relations – that were previously managed through, as one head argued, ‘an 
implicit agreement that we would act collegially’. From this perspective, the 
TSA allowed three ‘powerful schools’ to take on lead positions and gain 
disproportionate influence. As new TSA activities were layered on top of 
existing ones and the Teaching School and two other schools took on the 
leadership of these activities, processes of decision-making began to take 
on a more hierarchical structure. One headteacher critiqued these changes 
as follows:
It was Hargreaves who talked about many tribes, ‘schools are members 
of many tribes’ – that’s fine, but quite often, when you’re a part of many 
tribes, the Venn diagram nature of your relationships is sometimes with 
one circle over there and a couple overlapping. But the model [here] 
is one stacked on top of the other, kind of like an ever-winding circle. 
And that has threats, that essentially [the Teaching School] have, in the 
teaching school alliance, replaced the local authority’s secondary school 
improvement arm, and they’re charging us thousands of pounds to get 
stuff that we used to get for free. And they are gaining – and we are 
part of that. 
Principal, secondary converter academy, Ofsted Outstanding
The TSA had appointed an alliance director to co-ordinate the TSA’s 
activities – which included an expanded CPD and leadership development 
programme and a formalized peer-review process. To fund this, STARS 
schools paid an annual membership fee of £5,000. In this process STARS 
was argued to have become more transactional, rather than participative 
and innovative, with school-to-school support now paid for rather than 
collaborated on, and with ‘a sense of “Ofsted-i-ness”’ about the peer-review 
process. One headteacher argued that this reflected a more general weakness 
in the TSA model nationally, that it could ‘embed hierarchies’ and ‘exclude 
some and allow others undue influence’: 
there is a paucity there that I think could allow the transfer of power, the 
transfer of money, the transfer of teaching … if you’re a strong Teaching 
School, and you have a SCITT, where is the clarity that you won’t just 
be taking the best teachers that come through that process, to support 
your school?
Principal, secondary converter academy, Ofsted Outstanding
The sense of increased hierarchy and formality had developed into a more 
significant split between members of the STARS collaborative. One of the 
two schools that were vocal in critiquing the TSA had been ‘until recently, 
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routinely at the bottom of the league tables’. The school had rapidly 
improved and gained an ‘outstanding in all categories’ judgement in a recent 
inspection. It had applied and been designated as a Teaching School itself. 
The hope, the headteacher argued, was to develop a different approach, 
focusing on pedagogy and practitioner-led research, rather than replicating 
external Ofsted judgements. However, as the head acknowledged, the new 
TSA was seen as a challenge by the existing Teaching School, with the future 
of STARS as an LA-wide collaborative in doubt as a result. 
ii) Exclusive, internally equitable network
A second approach had been developed by five neighbouring ‘high-
performing’ primary schools. All five had been part of a larger local cluster 
of schools before 2010, but had wanted to organize a peer-review process 
after 2010 in order to replace the disappearing local authority advisor team. 
This had, however, been resisted by the six other (generally lower attaining) 
schools in the cluster. The headteacher of one of the five TSA schools argued 
that: ‘Literally, as soon as we mentioned doing inspections in each other’s 
schools, the room just divided in two, from “over my dead body” to those 
which were, “fine”’.
The five schools decided to progress peer-review among themselves 
and subsequently applied together to become a TSA, with one school meeting 
the Teaching School eligibility criteria and the other four named as strategic 
partners. Within the TSA – called SUCCESS – the headteacher argued that 
relations had remained relatively equitable, with shared decision-making, 
no dedicated TSA manager and each school leading on an aspect of the ‘Big 
Six’, with research and development a shared theme. The schools had agreed 
a common approach to assessment without levels and moderation, while 
joint professional development and subject networks had been created for 
staff. The schools had, it was argued, built trust by sharing student data and 
agreeing shared priorities for improvement.
Externally, however, the TSA was exclusive. The headteacher 
explained that other local schools now wanted to join the alliance, but the 
five members ‘didn’t want too many voices around the table’: ‘It’s a more 
closed shop than it used to be’. The original larger cluster group did still 
meet, but its attendance was poor and ‘there’s a lot more suspicion than 
there has been in the past. The temperature drops by about 30 degrees 
as soon as you mention [the TSA]’. The headteacher admitted to feeling 
deeply conflicted by the way the partnership had developed, but argued 
that it was the only pragmatic response possible in the context of the wider 
government-imposed policy framework:
It’s about school-to-school competition, and the government’s very 
hot on that, and for that, there are winners and losers. And right now, 
I’ve taken the pragmatic, yet morally dubious position of ‘I want to be 
with the winners’, and that means I have to leave out some losers, some 
people who are vulnerable, on the outside. And we know that they’re 
there. SUCCESS appeared because we felt we couldn’t wait. The world 
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was changing around us, and if we didn’t do something, we’d be left 
on our own. … I think it’s unfortunate that probably the five strongest 
schools in [the cluster] formed SUCCESS. And that was to our shame, a 
little bit, I think, that the egalitarianism stopped. 
Headteacher, maintained primary, Ofsted Good 
A recent development was that as an LLE, the headteacher was now 
required by the TSA to charge other schools for his time (where previously 
this was paid by the Authority and so was free for the recipient school). The 
headteacher was ‘uncomfortable’ with this, ‘but we have been told, “You 
must not deviate from this funding model.”’
iii) Marketized network of providers
These emerging procedures for selling support were much more advanced 
in ‘Exchange’, which exemplified a third approach to organizing a TSA. 
Uptown Teaching School had developed the TSA as a network of school 
improvement providers straddling four LA areas. There was little aspiration 
for collaborative and reciprocal relations, other than strategic partners 
providing placements for and gaining access to the Teaching School’s 
SCITT. Rather the TSA was conceived as a loose affiliation, with strategic 
partners – all Outstanding or Good schools (at the time of the research) – 
focused on selling short-term support services to predominately external 
‘client’ schools. To organize the TSA as a commercial provider, the Teaching 
School had developed a framework of rules and regulations. All services 
bought and sold under the Alliance brand had to be directed through the 
Teaching School’s contract team and use the Alliance’s terms of sale. There 
was a price structure of daily rates for contracting a headteacher or an SLE 
and client schools had to pay a surcharge of 12.5 per cent to the Teaching 
School for facilitation and administration.
One of the headteachers of a strategic partner school we interviewed 
described the TSA as ‘very much a purchasing model’. The school had 
bought support from SLEs at the Teaching School on three occasions, with 
the deputy head reporting that an SLE would typically: ‘see the teaching, go 
through the data, probably with me and the head of department, because 
what we’re looking for is some quick fixes as well as some more durable 
ones we can roll out next year’. The school had also sold services through 
the TSA platform, which had helped to fund the inward purchasing of 
support and a factional ‘over-staffing’ of middle leaders in the school.
In this model there was little responsibility for either the client school 
or whether the purchased support had an effect. Within the TSA there was 
some disquiet about the unequal nature of relations within the SCITT, which 
was based at the Teaching School, but as strategic partners the schools 
benefited from the marketing exposure and ‘brand’ association of the TSA 
– which was marketed through tailored websites for both school-to-school 
support and ITT. The Teaching School was understood to be building and 
managing a sub-regional market place, from which it accrued economic, 
social and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986). 
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Teaching School ‘business models’ and moves towards MATs
These three trajectories – towards hierarchical, exclusive and marketized 
TSAs – can be partly understood in relation to what some respondents called 
the ‘business model’ of TSAs. Glover et al. (2014) provide a perspective 
on this in their review of ‘TSA business models’ for the DfE, arguing that 
Teaching Schools are influenced, simultaneously, by the need to: i) make 
sufficient income to be financially viable; ii) meet the real needs of other 
schools; and iii) ‘deliver’ policy priorities set for them by government. The 
Government’s 2010 White Paper was clear that core funding for Teaching 
Schools would be minimal, with a requirement that they sell services to 
other schools to remain viable. But, of course, the need to sell services in 
this way can detract from the ability of Teaching Schools to shape equitable 
partnerships or to meet the real needs of other schools. As core funding 
reduced, Teaching Schools faced a need to become ever more commercial in 
order to remain sustainable, as this TSA Director observed: 
I think the sustainability as well is something that’s on everybody’s mind, 
so certainly for us, it’s about thinking in a more business-like way ... . In 
terms of commercial work as well and building that sustainability for the 
future and not living in the present … So, you need to think about how 
you’re going to generate income through work that you do for other 
schools that is going to make you sustainable into the future.
In this context, leading an externally designated Lead Organization Network 
while also trying to balance Glover et al.’s three demands created significant 
challenges for Teaching Schools. We outlined these in Chapter 3, where we 
discussed the ways in which such designated system leaders are sometimes 
seen as a co-opted elite by their peers. We also highlighted two other 
concerns raised by Teaching School leaders themselves in that section: that 
they and their schools lacked the capacity or perceived authority required to 
intervene and address the needs of local schools and that they risked a drop 
in the performance of their own ‘home’ schools if they focused too much 
time and energy externally. Further, the policy context was seen to have 
changed – with much greater expectations on impact, over shorter time 
periods. The result was intense pressure on Teaching Schools, coupled with 
a realization that the resources that they could draw on were not sufficient 
to the task, as one Teaching School headteacher commented: ‘I think we’ve 
found already, we haven’t got the capacity for half of the work that’s needed 
in the city at the moment. We’ve got nine SLEs – it’s not enough.’ Another 
Teaching School headteacher reported having withdrawn support from a 
school that they had been asked to support:
I’ll tell you what has changed. This last two years has felt like nothing 
I’ve ever experienced before. The high-stress, high-stakes, in terms of 
the accountability system … That’s what has changed, the complexion 
of that has changed beyond all measure, I think … you are taking an 
amount of money to help, if you like, fix a problem, and you can’t fix it, 
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you feel obliged, somehow, to always show that there is improvement, 
improvement, improvement. And in this instance, I can’t. I can say there’s 
been limited impact, but that’s not what anybody wants to hear, really. 
They want to know that I can go in and change the world and fix it; but 
I couldn’t, and I can’t.
Principal, secondary academy, Ofsted Outstanding
These pressures were leading many of the Teaching School leaders in 
our sample to re-evaluate whether and how to continue in the role. A 
minority were choosing to step back from their externally facing work 
and refocusing their attention on their home school ‘because the pressure 
to keep Outstanding is huge’. More common was a view that the way to 
secure financial stability and to manage the demands of the accountability 
system was to form or lead a MAT. Such a move need not mean stopping as 
a Teaching School, indeed many MATs also operate as a TSA. Nevertheless, 
as one Teaching School headteacher argued:
The problem is, the Teaching School, you don’t know where your next 
meal’s coming from, do you? So I would say for security, the multi-
academy trust is a safer bet, really, because of the year on year nature of 
Teaching Schools.
Principal, secondary academy, Ofsted Outstanding
In addition to the somewhat greater financial security offered by MAT 
status, a trust was also commonly seen to offer a much stronger level of 
control over member schools in the context of a sharp accountability 
framework. Or, as one RSC interviewee put it, in MATs there are: ‘extra, 
um, levers, magnets to be able to do what you really want to do. You’ve got 
effectability’ (sic – emphasis added).
Multi-academy trusts
There are of course a variety of pathways into a MAT – by schools creating 
MATs, by schools being forced into MATs and by schools joining MATs 
through choice or without direct compulsion. In this section we explore 
this emergence, first from the perspective of the legal basis of MATs and 
how MATs have been encouraged to grow in policy guidance, drawing on 
our RSC interviews in particular. We then set out the headlines from our 
quantitative analysis of MATs, including their impact on student attainment 
by size of MAT. Finally, we explore the interpretations of school leaders 
around why and how MATs are developing locally and on the influences 
MATs are having within and on local school systems.
Are MATs partnerships?
MATs are commonly referred to as a form of partnership. For example, 
the House of Commons Select Committee (2015: 35) argued that: ‘In an 
autonomous system, collaborative partnerships are seen as essential in 
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order to provide challenge, expertise and economies of scale. MATs are 
one form of such partnerships’. We argue this is an inappropriate use of the 
term ‘partnership’ given the common definition of partnerships supplied 
above (‘legally autonomous organizations that work together’). As the DfE 
(2016c: 2) has set out, a MAT is a charitable company that has: ‘a single 
set of articles and therefore is a single legal entity accountable for a number 
of academies’. A central board of trustees is responsible for governing 
academies within a MAT and, crucially, each academy is not an independent 
entity but rather a unit of delivery within the larger hierarchical structure. 
Further, an academy cannot choose to leave a MAT of its own volition and 
it is for the MAT board to decide what powers, if any, are delegated to a 
member academy’s local governing body. This is true whether the school is 
a converter or sponsored academy. 
So, rather than partnerships, we argue that MATs are best understood 
in terms of ‘mergers and acquisitions’.23 A merger can be negotiated (i.e. 
for converter academies), whereas an acquisition or ‘take-over’ is often 
hostile (for sponsored academies), but crucially in both cases all properties 
of the ‘targeted’ school(s) are transferred into the central trust and the ‘non-
surviving’ organization no longer exists (Hawkins, 2005: 40). MATs are 
both charities and companies, so their governance model draws on the 
voluntary as well as the private sectors. However, as a number of observers 
have highlighted, the influence of business models and the language in MAT 
policy and practice has clearly emphasized private sector and corporate 
structures (Glatter, 2017; Courtney, 2016; Wilkins, 2014), for example in 
promoting corporate boards, executive leadership, standardized approaches 
and a wider encouragement for MATs to be ‘learning from business’ (DfE, 
2016b: 24).
Encouraged to develop in these ways, MATs have been positioned as 
a ‘generic solution’, not only to under-performing schools, but potentially 
for all schools, which stand to benefit from economies of scale, efficient 
use of resources, effective management and clearer oversight – a need 
created, ironically, by the roll back of Local Authorities. Yet, as has long 
been recognized in the literature on the private sector, claims about the 
positive effects of corporate mergers and acquisitions are often wildly over-
estimated (Caves, 1989; Hawkins, 2005). 
23 This was the intent and was the language used by both the Conservative and Labour 
Parties in their 2010 election manifestos. Building on the existing 2002 Education Act, 
which allowed for schools to form (hard) federations, and referencing early innovators 
who had sponsored multiple academies, the Conversatives (2010: 53) stated that: ‘any 
school that is in special measures for more than a year will be taken over immediately 
by a successful academy provider’. The Labour Party (2010: 3.3) stated that ‘through 
mergers and take-overs’ up to 1,000 schools would be ‘part of an accredited school 
group by 2015 – a new generation of not-for-profit chains of schools with a proven 
track record’. 
Toby Greany and Rob Higham
86
MATs as hierarchies
Cases of academy ‘failure’ within MATs, whole ‘MAT failure’, poor financial 
management and inappropriate vested interest in MAT boards have been 
widely reported (Greany and Scott, 2015; Savage and Mansell, 2018). 
In response the government has developed new policies and guidance 
over time. One clear trend has been towards a tighter level of prescription 
over how MATs structures must operate, with a move away from flexible 
models (such as Umbrella Trusts24) and a requirement for tight vertical 
accountability, both within MATs and between MATs and the government. 
As one of our RSC interviewees explained, the government will now ‘robustly 
challenge’ MATs that do not have both a single MAT leader who is ‘in 
charge’ and a single governing trust board, both because this is considered 
‘good practice’ and because the DfE needs a ‘direct line of accountability’: 
What we are prescribing very much is that clarity on the skillset that you 
need, at trust board level, but also the leader at what, what would be 
CEO level. Where we get [MATs] where that looks unclear, the executive 
leader and trust board, we will challenge robustly on that to be absolutely 
clear what the model is, because we need a direct line of accountability. 
(Emphasis added.)
Regional School Commissioner
Despite this increased prescription, the government has stressed that there 
is no ‘one “right” operating model’ (DfE, 2016b: 9) for a MAT and that 
a scheme of delegation allows for variation in how they are organized 
and governed,25 but any such variation must nevertheless be granted from 
above, with formal authority held centrally. The impact of this enforced 
hierarchical governance was visible within the larger MATs that we visited 
as part of our case study research, with a felt pressure for them to become 
more hierarchical and more prescriptive over time in the face of external 
pressure and accountability.26 
The largest MAT we visited – National – was strongly hierarchical in its 
focus on results, but much less prescriptive in setting out how these should be 
achieved.27 Formed before 2010 and containing more than 30 schools spread 
across the country, the MAT relied on vertical performance management to 
oversee its schools. We visited one secondary academy where we interviewed 
24 Umbrella Trusts allow for a greater level of independence for individual academies 
within a group compared with MATs. Umbrella Trusts were initially encouraged by the 
government after 2010, but RSCs do not now routinely authorize such arrangements. 
25 ASCL, BrowneJacobson and NGA (2016: 24) note that the ‘level of delegation may be 
proportionate to strength of the school – an “earned autonomy model”.’
26 Our case study research was not designed specifically to analyse individual MATs, 
however, we visited a range of academies that were working within (n=7) or in the 
process of joining or forming (n=9) a MAT.
27 The data on National MAT is drawn from a visit to one secondary academy in the MAT. 
This included an interview with an executive principal who oversees two local MAT 
primary schools. 
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an executive principal (EP) with responsibility for that school and two other 
local National MAT primary schools. The EP was sharply accountable for 
delivering results, primarily through their line management by the MAT’s 
Regional Director. The EP explained that s/he made a ‘big deal’ about exam 
results, including through a relentless focus on them at fortnightly meetings 
with senior leaders in each school. The secondary academy had seen high 
levels of staff turnover (around 85 per cent) and rapid improvements in 
GCSE results over the five years that the EP had been in post. Having taken 
over responsibility for two low performing local MAT primary academies 
more recently, the EP reported employing a similar approach that was: ‘a 
tried and tested formula … you leverage the results in year six’. Beyond 
this focus on test and exam results there was less evidence of the schools 
being shaped by a MAT ‘vision’ or improvement approach. INSET days 
and subject groups were offered by the MAT at regional level and there was 
some interaction with other MAT schools, but the EP was sceptical about 
‘collaboration’ with other schools in general as ‘it actually costs time and 
effort. … I think it’s a potential recipe for disaster’. Instead of joining the 
MAT-run subject networks, the EP had instructed their subject leaders to 
attend subject meetings organized by PiXL, a national organization. Other 
local primary schools were reported to have ‘refused’ to work with the 
MAT, while relationships with local secondaries were described in terms 
of sharp competition, so the three schools were essentially operating as an 
outpost of a distant MAT. 
By comparison, Regional MAT had tried to develop a more collaborative 
culture between its member schools.28 The MAT was responsible for more 
than a dozen primary and secondary schools in one region, the majority of 
which had been taken over as sponsored academies serving disadvantaged 
areas. The MAT’s CEO argued that this focus on disadvantage had helped 
to create a shared ethos among staff, with regular MAT-wide professional 
development days and academy leaders agreeing to let experienced staff 
work at other schools at short notice. It was notable, however, that these 
shared values were particularly central for a small group of leaders who had 
worked in the MAT from the outset and had then populated senior posts as 
the MAT grew. As one of these leaders acknowledged, relations were ‘much 
less strong at other (MAT) schools’. The CEO also identified how recent 
growth in the size of the MAT had been ‘bumpy’ and that the MAT was 
under pressure to rapidly improve student attainment and progress. As a 
result: ‘There was, I suppose, an identity crisis.’ The MAT had responded by 
establishing ‘executive’ posts, between the CEO and academy principals, to 
‘challenge and support’ schools. There was also more prescription, with all 
schools required to adopt the same curriculum in English and Maths and to 
participate in standardized tests to ‘benchmark performance’. This ‘greater 
standardization’, the CEO argued, was what ‘successful’ MATs do, and so 
there was a need to bring more ‘hard edge’ into the MAT, with any ‘school 
autonomy’ needing to be ‘earned’: 
28 The data in this vignette is drawn from ten interviews, including with the CEO, and two 
visits to schools in the MAT. 
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We know that some of the most successful [MATs] don’t muck about 
with thinking about autonomy. Let’s not kid ourselves. We’re not in this 
to be autonomous. It’s plan A, and that’s what everybody does. And 
you can scoff and think ‘what about creativity and innovation?’, but, 
ultimately, it does make them very successful in some ways. But there’s 
a hope that if you we were able to harness that collaborative spirit that 
we have, together with some of that more hard-edged – but we’re only 
going to do the things that really work, and we can see that, or we’re 
only going to allow those people to do it because they have a track 
record of doing it, and then increasingly that will be a feature of what 
we do I think. 
Regional MAT CEO
MAT size – pressure to achieve economies of scale 
The notion that these developments were a response to ‘bumpy’ growth 
relates to the second set of policy priorities for how MAT structures should 
be developed. This concerns the size of MATs. For Sir David Carter (2016: 
28), the National Schools Commissioner, the message is clear: ‘we need 
our existing MATs to grow’. The government, that is, needs MATs to take 
over ‘failing’ schools and academies, but also, Carter argues, MATs need 
to grow ‘to be sustainable’. MATs need to be a ‘minimum size’ that can be 
calculated, Carter argues, in economic terms from: the pupil income for the 
trust, the ‘contribution to running the central team and support structure’, 
and by considering ‘what are the services you want to provide at the core of 
the trust?’ (p.24). However, following persistent challenges with MATs that 
were seen to have grown too quickly after 2010, Carter also argues that a 
shift in policy is needed towards more gradual ‘growth with care’ (p.28). 
As one of our RSC interviewees argued, however, it is in fact the ‘system’s 
needs’ for MAT growth and the high levels of failure seen in larger MATs 
that have often been intertwined: 
The mistakes have been made around over ambitious growth that has 
not been built on solid foundations. Sometimes that’s not necessarily the 
fault of the trust, but that’s been the system’s needs that it meant we have 
not built capacity quickly enough, so that the same trust has been called 
upon each time to provide support. 
RSC
It is notable that changing policy on these issues has been the responsibility 
of unelected ministers, made Lords – Hill, Nash and Agnew29. The handover 
29 Following on from Lord Adonis under New Labour, there have been three ‘lords of 
multi-academization’ in the DfE since 2010: Lord Hill, a PR consultant and long-term 
Conservative political advisor; Lord Nash, a venture capitalist and sponsor of Future 
Academy Trust, which runs academies in central London; and Lord Agnew, a CEO of 
both insurance and outsourcing companies, sponsor of Inspiration Trust with academies 
in East Anglia, former chair of the DfE Academy Board and a trustee of the Policy 
Exchange think tank. 
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between each of these ministers has marked a shift in MAT policy: Lord 
Hill promoted a rapid expansion of large MATs working at national scale; 
by contrast, from 2013 onwards, Lord Nash increased central regulation of 
MAT growth, for example by introducing the RSC model and by encouraging 
the growth of smaller ‘geographically focused’ MATs, including in the 
primary phase; while since 2017 Lord Agnew has advocated the merger of 
small MATs together in the interest of financial viability, arguing that ‘the 
sweet spot is perhaps somewhere between 12 and 20 schools, or something 
like 5,000 to 10,000 pupils’ (2017 North Academies Conference speech). 
Lord Agnew offered no evidence for these claims.
Statistical analysis of MAT impact 
The broader lack of evidence to support both the expansion of academies 
and MATs has been noted by the Education Select Committee (2015; 
2016) and the Public Accounts Committee (2015). A number of statistical 
analyses of MAT and academy chain30 impact on pupil outcomes and Ofsted 
results have been published, although these assessments arguably remain 
provisional given the complexity of academy arrangements (as a result 
of frequent policy changes) and the significant changes that have taken 
place in the pupil assessment and school accountability framework since 
2010. Building on four years of analysis focused in particular on impact 
for disadvantaged students, Hutchings and Francis (2017: 5) conclude that 
there is significant variability within and between academy chains, but that 
‘the main picture is one of a lack of transformative change over the period.’ 
This picture of variability between MATs, with no conclusive evidence that 
schools in MATs are performing better or worse than non-MAT academies 
and maintained schools, is echoed in a range of other analyses (DfE, 2016; 
Ofsted, 2016; Andrews, 2016; Education Datalab, 2016). 
Our assessment of MAT impact provides an original analysis by 
matching a sample of schools in multi-academy trusts with schools that have 
equivalent characteristics in a number of dimensions and then analysing 
differences in pupil-level outcomes at Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 4 over 
a three-year period. The findings (which we publish in full in a separate, 
parallel paper31) show that, over a three-year period, there was no significant 
impact from MAT status for pupils in either primary or secondary academies 
when compared to pupils in similar standalone academies. When compared 
to pupils in maintained schools, we find pupils in converter academies in 
MATs do perform better than the matched sample, but there is no significant 
impact from MAT status for pupils in sponsored academies. 
30 Annual assessments of the impact of academy chains on outcomes for disadvantaged 
students by Hutchings and her collaborators include the small number of ‘non-MAT 
chains’, such as Umbrella Trusts, in existence. However, MATs are now by far the most 
common form of academy chain and so we use this terminology here. 
31 This can be downloaded from the publisher’s website at www.ucl-ioe-press.com/books/
education-policy/hierarchy-markets-and-networks/
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Furthermore, there are important differences between MATs of 
different sizes and across different phases. After controlling for other relevant 
characteristics, pupils in small and mid-sized MATs tend to perform better, 
on average, than their peers in comparable maintained schools in both 
phases and, in the primary phase, than comparable standalone academies. 
Conversely, secondary school pupils in larger MATs (16+ schools) tend 
to do worse in terms of attainment and progress in comparison to both 
standalone academies and maintained schools. Our analysis did not allow 
us to understand whether there were particular types of MAT that made 
a positive or negative impact within these size bands, but the findings 
nevertheless raise questions around whether the current policy emphasis on 
encouraging MATs to grow on the grounds of economies of scale is justified 
in educational terms. 
Further MAT impacts: fear, fragmentation and the 
formalization of local hierarchies
MAT developments were observed by many of our school-based 
interviewees with suspicion and sometimes fear. These concerns reflected a 
view that MATs are predatory and want to ‘take over’ schools by removing 
their autonomy and distinctive ethos through the imposition of hierarchical 
control. This view was often associated with larger, national MATs, but 
was also common among primary schools when discussing local secondary-
led MATs. In the case of the larger national MATs, there was also a view 
that MATs would impose a narrow, instrumental curriculum and pedagogy 
geared towards improving Ofsted and exam results, to the exclusion of 
other student outcomes. 
Several of the school leaders and teachers who expressed these views 
had direct experience of visiting or working in MATs, while others based 
their views on the experiences of colleagues, friends or family members 
who worked in MATs. For example, the maths co-ordinator in one primary 
school had worked in a school run by a national MAT, which she described 
as ‘absolutely bloody horrendous’, with ‘a very top-down … approach’ and 
‘bitter infighting’ between senior leaders. An acting principal in a converter 
academy had spent time researching MATs that the school could join if 
absolutely necessary, but the process had been very discouraging. One MAT 
‘came to us, basically, with an offer that, if I was to paraphrase it, basically 
said, “We’ll take you over”, and we weren’t interested in that offer’. A visit 
to another MAT had been particularly depressing, since it revealed a very 
narrow and unattractive school improvement philosophy:
It’s just shocking. There’s no drama. There’s no music. There’s nothing 
out of school that’s going on. The kids are all pinned in at break and 
lunchtime. It’s efficient. They’re in a lovely building and all the rest 
of it. I wouldn’t want my kids to go to that school. They got the best 
results in [their city] last year, though, big improvement, everybody’s 
happy, and all the rest of it. But they’re also – and I cannot believe this 
– they’re also effectively excluding kids, sending them home, and using 
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the code B ‘educated elsewhere’, because they’re providing them with 
online learning materials … He was absolutely open, the head there. He 
basically said: ‘Your good kids are going to do good everywhere. Your 
bad kids are crap, so we need to get rid of them. It’s those middle kids 
that you have to worry about.’ He was absolutely open. He said that in 
front of teachers, and there were schools there that loved it.
Acting principal, academy converter secondary, Ofsted Good 
For schools that felt vulnerable to external intervention these perspectives 
could drive a decision to form or join an alternative, ideally local, MAT, in 
order to pre-empt being pushed into an unknown national one. For example, 
we visited one primary school that had chosen to join a MAT led by a local 
secondary school. The primary school had been judged RI – from Good – a 
year before the case study visit and, with the roll back of the authority, the 
headteacher was keen to ‘secure the future of the school’, so that ‘it’s not 
dependent on me as a leader any more’. The school’s governing body had 
agreed to join the MAT on the basis that the headteacher knew the MAT 
CEO and felt that there would be a ‘good fit’ in terms of the school’s values: 
in the headteacher’s words, ‘We’re interested in local solutions. If I’m really 
honest, what we’re not interested in is national solutions.’ 
This suspicion of ‘national MAT solutions’ was also referenced by 
convertor academy principals who were active in creating new ‘local’ 
MATs, because: ‘there should be local solutions to local problems and I 
feel very strongly about that’ and that ‘you will have authorities where the 
big chains have gone in, and we don’t want that to happen’. These views 
were often presented as both a critique of, and a pragmatic response to, 
national policy: 
Whether we like forced academization or not, there is a case whether you 
sit outside of it and leave it to people who you consider to be predatory, 
or do you say ‘we don’t like the model, but let’s get knee deep in it’, in 
a way that sends out a clear message that your autonomy is valued, this 
isn’t a clone. 
Principal, secondary converter academy, Ofsted Outstanding
In these ways, ‘local solutions’ were often cast as ‘offering alternatives’ to 
intervention and hierarchical control. ‘Local’ MAT-building principals in 
our sample often stressed their commitment to: human-scale development 
and growth (‘I wouldn’t want to move too quickly too soon’), with an 
emphasis on equal relationships between schools (‘we’re looking at a 
lateral model, where you’re having heads of equal status … there certainly 
isn’t any desire, certainly for me, to go to the top-down model’). These 
aspirations appeared genuine, but respondents also tended to recognize that 
such ideals remained open to refinement and further doses of ‘pragmatism’. 
Indeed, in practice, new MATs were quickly presented with ‘opportunities’ 
to grow by RSCs and other DfE brokers (‘I was just asked about another 
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one’). As these local MATs began their own cycle of growth, and decided 
whether and which schools to ‘take on’, the work of principals became 
more concerned with ‘the business side of things’, where there could be, 
one secondary principal argued, early benefits that encouraged further 
hierarchical growth: 
There is so much benefit, particularly on the business side, because as 
we’ve developed, and I think our support staff structure has improved in 
the last year, so we now have an HR manager, we have a finance director. 
… We now have the same health and safety; we have the same catering 
– the procurement, on the business side, I think, makes so much sense 
… I think it’s economies of scale. … It would be great if we got another 
primary school.
Executive principal, primary academy converter, Ofsted Outstanding
For these reasons, claims that MAT developments were driven by ‘moral 
purpose’ was a complicated position to adopt and then sustain; not least, as 
one academy principal argued, because schools building MATs were often 
used to seek out comparative advantage:
If we are saying it is a highly moral, ethical TSA or MAT that we are, 
at some point we will be tested, about whether our own selfish needs 
are the ones that we follow, or whether it’s a school’s genuine needs. 
Yes there’s an investment on our side, but the system is important to 
us. Working with feeder schools, that might give us 30–40 kids who are 
[currently] in special measures, but might enhance our own attainment 
in the long run. Providing opportunities for staff that might otherwise 
go elsewhere, to engage them in system leadership helps to keep and 
develop our staff and prepare them for leadership. How a burgeoning 
reputation helps [staff] recruitment for us. 
Academy principal, secondary academy converter, Ofsted Outstanding
There was also recognition that MATs were contributing to two further 
processes in the systems we visited, albeit to differing degrees. 
The first was that they further entrenched the local dominance of 
higher-status and higher-performing schools, because they tended to have 
converted earlier and were more likely to be approved by the DfE as a 
sponsor. In many cases this tendency overlapped with the dominance of 
secondaries over their feeder primaries. Local MAT building was not led 
exclusively by secondary schools, but in our localities the most common 
‘local MAT model’ was of a secondary school-led MAT incorporating 
predominantly primary schools. This was occurring in a variety of ways, 
but initial growth typically involved the sponsorship of one or more lower-
performing primary school. Meanwhile, the MAT was usually working 
to attract other local primary schools, whether as converter or sponsored 
academies. These efforts were by no means guaranteed though, due to the 
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concerns among primaries that we highlighted above about secondary 
takeover. For example, one secondary principal that we visited had 
approached his local feeder primaries to form a MAT, but his offer was 
rebuffed and the primaries subsequently announced that they were forming 
their own, separate MAT, so the secondary was now forming a MAT with 
another secondary in another LA. 
Partly as a result of such haphazard developments, MATs were also 
contributing to fragmentation. The creation of MATs was seen widely 
to be accelerating the creation of different and separate ‘groupings’ of 
schools. In the context of STARS, for example, not only had rival TSAs 
put at risk the secondary collaborative, but the development of three local 
MATs (by the two Teaching Schools and a third school) had created new 
forms of competition. There was the beginning of a race to either take over 
or attract local primary schools into each MAT. One of these secondary 
principals recognized that the school was actually contributing to this local 
fragmentation into ‘lots of little tribes and islands that are all working 
independently’, but argued that the alternative, of being left behind with no 
local primary partners, was not an option. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the ways in which networks and partnerships 
have developed across the system, influenced by the roll back of LAs and 
a policy narrative that isolated schools are at risk. It has highlighted the 
continuing importance of local clusters and the ways in which LAs are 
working with them, particularly in the primary phase, to try and sustain 
coherence and improvement support, but also the challenges and inequities 
that this presents. It also maps three broad trajectories that Teaching Schools 
appear to be adopting, often in combination and hybrid forms, as they seek 
to navigate the complexities of shifting demands from government, the real 
needs of other schools, and the requirement for financial viability. 
This chapter shows how and why schools are choosing or being 
forced to join MATs, but challenges the notion that such arrangements are 
partnerships. Instead, we illustrate how MATs are being incentivized and 
required to adopt hierarchical and increasingly standardized approaches 
that limit the autonomy and agency of individual schools. We also highlight 
the pressure on MATs to grow, but suggest that the findings from our 
statistical analysis of MAT impact, which indicates that only smaller 
MATs have a consistently positive impact on pupil outcomes, challenges 
this. Furthermore, we suggest that the somewhat random development of 
MATs is encouraging further fragmentation and the entrenchment of status 
hierarchies across the system. 
Of course, while we have focused here on clusters, TSAs and MATs 
and described these separately, the reality is that the three models frequently 
overlap and interweave with each other across our four localities. In general 
the direction of travel appeared to be from clusters to TSAs and MATs, and 
we indicated some of the reasons for this, such as the desire for financial 
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security and stronger hierarchical authority among some TSA leaders. We 
also signalled the challenges that could be faced, for example when clusters 
tried to become TSAs and when TSAs break up into multiple MATs. The 
consequence of these shifts was that local networks of schools were being 
permanently changed, away from informal clusters and towards hierarchical, 
corporate structures. This could leave less well positioned schools with 
decisions about whether and, if so, which asymmetric ‘grouping’ the school 
should join.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Our research questions for this project asked how school leaders are 
interpreting and responding to the ‘self-improving school-led system’ policy 
agenda and whether or not changes emerging at the local level represent 
a genuine basis for equitable and inclusive improvement. We also asked 
about the factors that support and hinder the development of ‘school-led’ 
approaches and the implications of this for schools and school leadership.
Chapter 2 explored the government’s conception of a SISS as well as 
Hargreaves’s (2012) idealized model founded on ‘deep’ partnerships, system 
leadership and a culture of co-creation and local solutions. We reviewed a 
range of existing evidence on the development of the system in England 
that highlights, among other things, the diversity of responses to change, 
concerns over capacity and funding, the risks of fragmentation and a two-
tier system, and the national pressure for conformity and prescription.
We also identified two perspectives on how local systems might be 
reshaped as a result of these changes. The first sees local agency being 
fatally diminished in the face of centralization and data surveillance: a 
model of ‘unbalanced’ governance and ‘highly centralized system steering’ 
(Ozga, 2009: 149). The second allows more room for local agency, while 
acknowledging significant centralization: as power moves away from 
traditional democratic structures, space is created for the local to be remade 
by both new private and third-sector actors and existing public-sector actors 
willing to reform themselves (Lubienski, 2014).
Our research evidences how these moves are increasingly part of the 
same set of processes. At a local scale, the SISS agenda has encouraged a re-
making of local school systems – with a sharp reduction in LA oversight and 
capacity and with new operational freedoms for academies. For a minority 
of schools and school leaders, in particular nationally designated ‘system 
leaders’ and those forming MATs, there is scope for new entrepreneurial 
agency and to influence and reshape local landscapes, albeit while being 
bound closer to the performance management of central government.
At a national scale, we have shown how the SISS agenda allows 
for hierarchical accountability and intervention to be intensified and the 
criteria power of the state to be strengthened, further constraining local 
professionalism and steering the system through ‘coercive autonomy’. In the 
process, we highlight two particular ironies: first, that recent policy reforms 
have sought to move the system away from the original SISS agenda narrative 
of school-level autonomy and towards MAT-level authority; second, as 
MATs get larger, the number of managerial levels increases, meaning that 
LA ‘bureaucracy’ is replaced by another more complex and less accountable 
form of bureaucracy that lacks any local democratic mandate.
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How these broad trajectories manifest locally is influenced by a range 
of factors, including prior processes of policy enactment (Ball et al., 2012). 
What our analysis across the four localities reveals is that three factors 
do consistently influence local responses to change: the history of local 
relationships between schools and with the local authority and the ways in 
which these have shaped local provision; the context of individual schools and 
where and how they are situated socially, economically and geographically; 
and the agency of local actors, including their freedom and capacity to act 
and how this is informed by their personal and professional values.
Our analysis also sheds new light on the ways in which hierarchy, 
markets and networks intersect to influence change across different 
contexts. Our findings are unambiguous in illustrating the importance of 
Ofsted and the accountability framework in influencing the behaviour of 
schools, suggesting that hierarchy through accountability is more influential 
than either market-based choice mechanisms or the power of networks. But 
it is also more complex than this, because hierarchical governance operates 
in combination with market mechanisms to create such strong incentives 
for schools. This is illustrated by our analysis of Ofsted judgments and 
student composition between 2005 and 2015, which points towards the 
co-influence of Ofsted in shaping both parental choice and competitive 
practices by schools. These influences have clear implications for socio-
economic inequalities, for example where schools that perform higher in 
Ofsted terms have become, on average, less deprived.
Turning to the question of whether or not ‘deep partnerships’ and 
inclusive local models of improvement support are emerging or not, there 
seems no doubt that partnerships and networks have become more important 
to schools since 2010, in particular as LA support has been rolled back and 
as ‘school-led’ models of improvement have become established. However, 
these networks are by no means an alternative to hierarchy and markets: 
they tend to represent local responses to those coordinating mechanisms 
as schools work together to respond to accountability requirements (for 
example through peer review) or form more or less exclusive clubs that 
reflect and protect their position in the local status hierarchy. The policy 
focus on centrally designating ‘system leaders’ and their schools is also 
creating an increasingly co-opted elite who are afforded opportunities to 
enhance their position within local status hierarchies and, increasingly, to 
embed this through the MAT structure.
In these ways the SISS policy agenda further develops and overlays New 
Labour’s evolution of New Public Management and involves the government 
in meta-governance (Jessop, 2011), including as it simultaneously:
❯ redesigns hierarchical governance, with more demanding accountability 
requirements and new regional structures that seek to more actively 
monitor and intervene into schools;
❯ reshapes quasi-markets, with liberalized entry for new academy 
‘providers’ and new incentives for schools to commoditize and sell 
‘best practices’; and
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❯ restructures networks, with new nationally designated organizational 
forms and the contractual management of multi-academy trusts.
The overarching policy aim is to strengthen ‘incentives for continuous 
improvement’ to create a ‘self-improving system’ (Cabinet Office, 2006), 
but our findings clearly highlight the dilemmas of meta-governance. As 
central government works across this wide canvas of influence, it tries to 
manage a complex array of relations and to balance the tensions between 
hierarchy, markets and networks while also securing a level of fairness 
and equity, yet this is often prone to failure and ongoing searches for new 
temporary solutions (Jessop, 2011). As we have shown, this can lead central 
government to refine its policy objectives regularly and to increasingly coerce 
local change in order to try to ‘get things done’, in the process moving ever 
further away from the ideal of a ‘self-improving’ system based on lateral 
networks and towards ‘chaotic centralization’.
Certainly, among our respondents there was a prevailing view that 
the school system has become increasingly incoherent since 2010, not least 
because the SISS agenda had set up a series of problems without articulating 
viable solutions, as the following quote indicates:
‘System’ implies that there’s a good degree of articulate design. And I 
think what’s happening nationally is that there are all sorts of systems. 
The academization of secondary schools, more than primary schools, 
in fact, has meant that there has been a range of responses. And I don’t 
think it was thought through politically, how to structure that with 
the loss – no one had really worked out what to do if you lost local 
authorities. ... So, I think there is an education system trying to work out 
what the system for school-to-school support is. ... So, there isn’t really 
a system, and I think there are lots of emergent means of managing the 
problem that was set up. But nobody knows what works.
Principal, secondary academy, Ofsted Outstanding (original emphasis)
In addition to this incoherence, our school leader interviewees also often 
saw the SISS agenda to be problematic because of the incentives to act 
‘selfishly’ in a competitive, highly regulated marketplace. For example, one 
of our interviewees argued that:
We are quite fiercely sort of determined that we’ll pick and choose on 
our terms. And that’s all very well, but that doesn’t naturally become an 
all-encompassing, self-improving school system ... It’s selfish in a sense 
that there are a number of schools that I wouldn’t touch with a barge 
pole either, to ask for support or to provide it if asked. Simply because 
there might not be the added value from those partnerships, they might 
take out of us more than they gave back to us and in the end – and this 
is perhaps pivotal, isn’t it? – in the end my responsibility is still to this 
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school ... I don’t know how I go from being what I am now with the 
accountability I’ve got now to being that system leader.
Headteacher, maintained secondary, Ofsted Good
As a result, while some of our interviewees, in particular nationally 
designated ‘system leaders’, were optimistic about the potential for their 
local system to become ‘self-improving’, a more common view was that the 
SISS agenda was creating a fragmented system of ‘winners and losers’. One 
deputy head used the analogy of the football leagues to describe this:
I suppose it’s quite frightening when you go down that track, because 
you’ve just got a system that will collapse without the LA, whether that 
will happen I don’t know ... We’ll probably be forced to join with a 
MAT down the line, so no matter how much you think you’ve got to 
give or how much we think we could benefit from that, if you’re not a 1 
[in Ofsted] you’re not a 1. Then I wonder how much licence to improve 
you’ll have. Because I suppose, to use a football analogy, it seems a bit 
like the premier league, where all the rich clubs will swim about at the 
top and all the poorer clubs will swim around below them.
Deputy head, maintained primary, Ofsted Good
What are the implications for schools and school leaders? On the one 
hand, in spite of the turbulent and chaotic context we have evidenced, the 
majority of our survey respondents (89 per cent) agreed that their school 
had the overall capacity it needed to improve over the next three years. 
However, this did not mean that schools supported current government 
policy. Half (53 per cent) of our respondents reported that they did not 
support the overall trajectory of current education policy, while only 20 per 
cent did (with a similar proportion in both primary and secondary schools). 
Further, a majority (56 per cent) of respondents did not agree that their 
school would have sufficient funding over the next three years to employ 
the staff they need (and just 19 per cent agreed).
Our findings also serve to illustrate the challenges for school leaders 
as they seek to balance the needs of pupils with the institutional self-interest 
of the school in the context of local and national landscapes that are 
frequently incoherent and increasingly unequal. Greany and Earley (2017) 
argue that policymakers often place conflicting requirements on front-line 
leaders who are expected to resolve, or at least mitigate, the tensions that 
arise. Further, as Newman and Clarke (2009: 127) observe, navigating and 
managing these policy-driven tensions can create ‘personal, professional or 
ethical dilemmas’ for front-line leaders. In our case study schools, active 
policy resistance was largely absent and school leaders tried to resolve these 
dilemmas often through ‘pragmatic’ compliance or, less commonly, ‘passive’ 
resistance, where they sought to hold true to their professional values and 
beliefs about education while mediating external change. Such passive 
resistance was generally only possible if the school was performing well 
above minimum benchmarks. Furthermore, such resistance often relied to 
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some degree on solidarity between schools within a locality: if one school 
broke ranks and started to adopt more self-interested behaviours then 
others often felt a need to respond in kind or face being disadvantaged in a 
competitive environment.
Four themes
We end by setting out four themes that emerge from the research and 
which, we argue, merit further focus and attention among policy makers, 
researchers and practitioners. 
i) A new economy of knowledge: in the context of our findings that 
highlight the incentives for higher-status schools to codify and sell ‘best 
practice’ knowledge geared towards the demands of the accountability 
system, we ask how the system could be reshaped to encourage more 
effective and inclusive forms of knowledge development and mobilization.
Drawing on the research of Fielding et al. (2005), Hargreaves (2012) 
argued that joint practice development between teachers across schools 
offers both a model for professional learning and disciplined innovation 
and a way of building shared cultures and commitment to the success of 
all schools. The existing evidence on effective approaches to professional 
development and learning for teachers does not fully support this assertion 
(Cordingley et al., 2015), but it seems unarguable that any school system 
(whether ‘self-improving’ or otherwise) must enable all teachers to enhance 
their professional practice in support of inclusive learning for students. 
Throughout the report we have outlined examples of how schools, 
TSAs and MATs are working to support professional development for 
staff. Two observations stand out from this. The first is that very few of the 
leaders we interviewed appeared to have a clearly articulated approach for 
how they worked to identify, develop and share evidence, knowledge and/or 
expertise across their school/s so that it genuinely changed practice. Second, 
we identified three dominant approaches to knowledge mobilization – 
‘protect’, ‘sell’, ‘share’. We argued that the SISS incentivizes the ‘sell’ model 
above the ‘share’ one, for example in the way that Teaching Schools are 
encouraged to generate income in a competitive marketplace. Yet where 
knowledge and expertise are ‘sold’ in this way, there is a tendency to focus 
on the types of knowledge that can be easily codified and commoditized (as 
‘best practices’), rather than on the kinds of developmental learning processes 
that are argued to support professional growth (Winch et al., 2015). 
ii) Fragmentation: in the context of our findings on Ofsted and student 
intakes, we ask how could changes to the existing model of hierarchical and 
market governance, including changes to the ‘middle tier’ above schools, 
reduce the trend towards a system of ‘winners and losers’?
The research revealed widespread concern that the system is becoming 
more fragmented; one interviewee argued that this is creating ‘winners 
and losers’ among schools. We have detailed specific examples of this: for 
instance, the schools at the bottom of their local hierarchies that struggle to 
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recruit students, or the networks that form between the higher-performing 
schools, but leave lower-performing schools out if they are not prepared to 
engage on the terms of the former. 
These concerns around fragmentation often relate to the role of ‘the 
middle tier’ and how proactive it should be in securing a level playing field 
for schools. One premise of the ‘self-improving’ system agenda is that schools 
should be more autonomous, with existing bureaucratic structures stripped 
back. Yet if schools are left to find their own improvement solutions, then 
in a quasi-market context it is inevitable that some will have more capacity 
than others to succeed. Therefore we argue that the middle tier must play a 
mediating role – with sufficient formal powers to: create and enforce common 
ground rules, for example on local admissions; and to identify and support 
schools that are struggling to meet national performance indicators. Since 
this research was conducted, the RSCs have been charged with establishing 
sub-regional improvement boards to try and co-ordinate activity and to 
distribute central funding for school improvement, particularly in the 
government-defined Opportunity Areas. It remains to be seen how effective 
these sub-regional and area-based approaches will be, but they largely 
appear to replicate the existing ‘school-led’ approaches described in this 
report, albeit at a smaller scale. As we discuss below, we argue any new 
arrangements for the middle tier need to have a clear democratic mandate 
if they are to be seen as legitimate. 
iii) Equity: in the context of our findings on the concentration of 
vulnerable children in the most deprived schools, we ask how could key 
aspects of policy on admissions and fair access be reformed and how could 
services for the most vulnerable children be reshaped to redress the trend 
towards further stratification? 
Three themes emerge from our data in relation to equity across the 
system. Firstly, we noted in Chapter 3 the ways in which the accountability 
framework can encourage school leaders to place the needs of the school 
ahead of the needs of particular groups of, usually vulnerable, students. The 
recent debates about ‘off-rolling’ – essentially by excluding children, echoes 
this point.32 
Secondly, local school systems remain highly stratified by socio-
economic status. Chapter 4 explored examples of ‘selective competition’ 
by schools and outlined the analysis of Ofsted data, which showed the 
correlation between schools improving their Ofsted grade between 2010 
and 2015 and relative reductions in proportions of children with free school 
meals in those schools. 
Thirdly, support for the most vulnerable children is reducing, with a 
tendency for these pupils to become more concentrated in certain schools as 
32 See, for example, ASCL general secretary Geoff Barton’s blog on off-rolling – www.
tes.com/news/school-news/breaking-views/rolling-unethical-inappropriate-and-beyond-
repugnant-consequences (accessed 14 January 2018).
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a result of systemic pressures and practices and also for specialist educational 
support services to support vulnerable children to have been cut back. 
We outlined some of the ways in which LAs in particular were 
attempting to co-design and enforce common approaches, such as fair 
access protocols and panels, as a way of ensuring that all schools, including 
academies, abided by their obligations. But these approaches were often 
seen to be ‘sticking plasters’ for a wider set of systemic issues. 
Overall, two-thirds of our survey respondents (66 per cent) agreed 
that inequalities between schools are becoming wider as a result of current 
government policy.
iv) Legitimacy: in the context of our findings on an increasing local 
democratic deficit, we ask how could the school system secure trust among 
professionals as well as parents and students, and what might be required to 
create meaningful engagement for these core stakeholders? 
This final theme is one that was rarely raised explicitly by our 
interviewees and the study was not designed to capture views from parents, 
so we raise it as one that is worthy of consideration, rather than as a 
direct finding. 
Several observers of recent developments in England have raised 
legitimacy as an important issue for an academized system to consider 
(Gibton, 2017; Glatter, 2017; Hatcher, 2014). Without oversight of schools 
by democratically elected LAs and with the power of local governing 
bodies largely neutered in MATs, parents can quickly feel that they have 
no mechanisms to influence the schools that their children attend. Further 
concerns arise from the frequent scandals that have hit the academies sector, 
and MATs in particular, as a result of poorly managed conflicts of interest 
and other financial scandals (Greany and Scott, 2014). 
These concerns can spread from teachers to parents more widely 
(Waslander, 2010). We note, for example, findings by YouGov, that there is 
shrinking support for academization among both the public and education 
sector. While 40 per cent of people supported the idea of schools being 
encouraged to convert into academies in 2011, by 2016 that support had 
fallen to 25 per cent with more people unsure. Among teachers, only 17 per 
cent asked by YouGov in March 2016 agreed that academization would 
make standards better; 48 per cent thought it would make standards worse 
(YouGov, 2016). 
Final thoughts
We conclude by reflecting briefly on the significance of this research. First, 
it provides original empirical evidence in several areas, including from the 
analysis of MAT impact and from the exploration of Ofsted data, but also 
by combining the perspectives of multiple case-study schools in the same 
locality. Second, it challenges any simplistic reading of the policy narrative 
on a school system being ‘school-led’ or ‘self-improving’, including by 
revealing the dominant influences of hierarchical and market mechanisms 
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on the thinking and actions of schools and school leaders and the networks 
they are developing. Third, it provides a unique set of insights into how 
different governance regimes interact across different local contexts to 
influence patterns of schooling and school-to-school collaboration: insights 
that we hope will have relevance for research and practice on school system 
governance more widely. 
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Annex 1. Methodology 
Ethics
Ethical approval for the research was secured at the outset from the 
IOE Ethics Committee and in line with the British Educational Research 
Association (BERA) ethics framework.33 Participation in the research was 
voluntary and based on informed consent, with the right to withdraw at 
any point for any or no reason. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity 
in any publication or other output resulting from the research and some 
minor details of the locality descriptions have been changed or omitted 
in this report in order to ensure that they cannot be easily identified. The 
research also complied with the Data Protection Act 1998 by ensuring that 
all personal data gathered through field research or accessed through the 
national pupil database was stored securely. 
Qualitative phase
Localities research sampling
The four localities for the qualitative strand were purposively selected on 
the basis of an analysis of nationally available data in autumn 2014.34 Our 
aim was to identify two areas with relatively high densities and two areas 
with relatively low densities of academies and nationally designated system 
leader roles, such as Teaching Schools and National Leaders of Education, 
so as to research areas that had, on average, engaged differently with these 
core aspects of the SISS policy agenda. We also aimed to reflect national 
variation in levels of measured school performance, levels of deprivation 
and geography and LA type. 
In order to do this we identified and ranked all local authorities in 
England according to the proportion of schools that had convertor or 
sponsored academy status (i.e. as a percentage of all schools in the LA); 
and the proportion of schools with formal system leadership designations 
(including Teaching Schools, National Leaders of Education and Local 
Leaders of Education). We also collected data on LA type (shire, unitary, 
Metropolitan Borough Council), externally measured school performance 
differentiated by phase (including percentage of schools judged Good or 
Outstanding by Ofsted and percentage of pupils achieving either Level 
4 in reading, writing and maths or 5 A*–C including English and Maths 
at GCSEs) and levels of deprivation using the proxy of free school meals 
eligibility any time over the previous six years. From this analysis we selected 
33 See www.bera.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/BERA-Ethical-Guidelines-2011.
pdf?noredirect=1 (accessed 26 February 2018). 
34 In order to categorize LAs by the density of academies, we downloaded national data on 
all schools and LAs from Edubase in April 2014. This was then matched with nationally 
available data on Teaching Schools, NLEs and Local Leaders of Education, which was 
downloaded from the National College for Teaching and Leadership. Support for the 
LA sampling was provided by Dave Thomson, Fisher Family Trust.
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four LA areas, two from the highest quintile and two from the lowest 
quintile in terms of academization and system leadership designation, while 
also seeking to ensure diversity in terms of the other criteria listed above. 
The final selection comprised the four localities below.
Two localities selected from the highest quintile of LAs nationally in 
2014 in terms of density of academy schools and density of nationally 
designated system leaders (e.g. TSAs, NLEs, LLEs)
Brief description Additional sampling criteria in 2014
1. Eastern LA 
‘Eastern’ is a regional city that 
has experienced significant 
regeneration. It has above 
average levels of deprivation 
and ethnic diversity, but with 
significant differences between 
different parts of the city. (Two 
of the schools we visited were 
located on the outskirts of the 
city, but in a neighbouring local 
authority.) 
- Above average levels of 
deprivation34 (2nd quintile)
- Below average performance at 
Key Stage 235 (5th quintile)
- Below average performance at 
Key Stage 436 (5th quintile)
- Average proportion of schools 
judged Good or Outstanding by 
Ofsted (3rd quintile) 
2. Northern LA
‘Northern’ is a small suburban 
local authority within a large 
metropolitan area. It has low 
levels of deprivation, but notable 
pockets of higher deprivation. 
The locality has substantially 
above average ethnic diversity.
- Below average levels of 
deprivation (4th quintile)
- Above average performance at 
Key Stage 2 (2nd quintile)
- Above average performance at 
Key Stage 4 (1st quintile)
- Above average proportion 
of schools judged Good or 
Outstanding in Ofsted (1st 
quintile)
35 Percentage of compulsory age pupils eligible for free school meals at any time in previous 
six years, January 2014.
36 Percentage of pupils in LA that achieved Level 4b or above in reading, writing and 
maths in 2013.
37 Percentage of pupils in LA that achieved 5 A*–C including English and maths in 2013.
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Two localities selected from the lowest quintile of LAs nationally in 2014 
in terms of density of academy schools and the density of nationally 
designated system leaders (e.g. TSAs, NLEs, LLEs)
Brief description Additional sampling criteria in 2014
3. Southern LA
‘Southern’ is a small suburban 
local authority within a 
large metropolitan area. It 
has relatively high levels 
of deprivation and average 
ethnic diversity. The locality 
is characterized by de-
industrialization and recent 
attempts at regeneration amid 
urban poverty. Alongside this, 
however, there are several ‘leafy 
suburbs’.
- Above average levels of 
deprivation (2nd quintile)
- Average performance at Key Stage 
2 (3rd quintile)
- Below average performance at Key 
Stage 4 (5th quintile)
- Average proportion of schools 
judged Good or Outstanding in 
Ofsted (3rd quintile)
4. Western LA
‘Western’ spans a wide 
geographical area and includes 
large sparsely populated rural 
areas, dotted with small market 
towns, together with some urban 
centres. The authority as a whole 
has relatively low levels of ethnic 
diversity. Levels of deprivation 
overall are slightly below 
average, but with a significant 
minority of areas in the ten per 
cent most deprived nationally. 
- Below average levels of 
deprivation (4th quintile)
- Above average performance at 
Key Stage 2 (2nd quintile)
- Below average performance at Key 
Stage 4 (4th quintile)
- Below average proportion 
of schools judged Good or 
Outstanding in Ofsted (4th 
quintile)
Table A1: Overview of the four localities 
School sampling in the four localities 
We selected schools for case study visits in each area, aiming to ensure 
that we visited a representative range in terms of school type (convertor 
and sponsored academy, maintained, faith), phase (primary/secondary38); 
levels of deprivation and school performance (based on Ofsted grades and 
performance in national tests/exams). In each area we visited between 10 
and 14 schools and, at each school, interviewed an average of 3.5 staff 
(and a range of 1 to 7 staff) including the headteacher and, depending on 
38 We visited primary and secondary schools, but not special schools, except one in 
Northern LA. The decision to exclude special schools was partly driven by resource 
limitations, but also by the advisory board’s view that special schools tend to collaborate 
with other schools in unique ways, partly depending on the nature of their specialism 
and context, thus making it difficult to draw out common findings from a relatively 
small sample. 
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availability on the day, middle and senior leaders, teachers and the school 
business manager. In many cases we were able to triangulate perspectives 
between schools, for example by interviewing two or more schools that 
were involved in the same partnership. In addition we interviewed four 
or five ‘system informants’ in each locality, including the Regional Schools 
Commissioner (RSC), Ofsted regional directors/senior HMI (SHMI), 
teaching and leadership associates working for the National College for 
Teaching and Leadership, senior leaders in the LA and, where appropriate, 
other key observers (for example, the leader of a local partnership). 
Within each of the four areas, the sampling approach for selecting 
case study schools combined a mix of purposive, random and, in a small 
number of cases, snowball sampling. Purposive sampling was applied for 
categories of school where it was important to include such schools in the 
study design. This included nationally designated system leader schools 
and academies, particularly in the two localities (Western and Southern) 
where such schools were under-represented. Purposive sampling was 
also applied to other sampling criteria as required. For example, in areas 
where very few schools were categorized as Ofsted Requires Improvement 
or Inadequate, the entire population of these schools was approached. 
Random sampling was then applied for all other categories of school. Once 
we began interviewing schools, we also asked interviewees whether there 
were particular schools or system informants they felt we should approach 
because they had unique insights into the development of the local system, 
which led to a small number of additional interviews. Schools were invited 
to participate in the research by email and telephone call. Response rates 
were relatively low – for example, in Western LA we approached 94 schools 
in total, with only 14 agreeing to participate. The majority that responded 
with a decline said this was due to time pressures on school staff. 
In total we conducted 47 school case studies, based on 164 interviews 
with a range of staff. We also interviewed 18 ‘system informants’. We set 
out below a short summary of the case studies completed in each of the four 
localities below. 
eaStern la
Eleven school case studies were completed – six primary schools, one junior 
school, and four secondary schools – involving 38 interviews in total. 
Nine of the schools were in Eastern itself, while two were in schools on 
the outskirts of the city but in a neighbouring LA. The schools reflected a 
range of levels of deprivation (from six per cent to 51 per cent free school 
meals eligiblity – FSM) and Ofsted category (Requires Improvement to 
Outstanding). Two schools were Teaching Schools and NLEs, one was an 
NLE and a further two were LLEs. Six schools were academies, of which 
four were part of a MAT. Two of these schools were part of the same 
regionally based MAT and so the CEO and Teaching School director of 
the MAT were interviewed in order to provide a fuller picture of how the 
MAT operates. One primary school was voluntary controlled. In addition, 
four system informant interviews were undertaken – the Regional Schools 
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Commissioner, a senior HMI from Ofsted, a senior leader from the local 
authority and a regional representative from NCTL. 
WeStern la
Fourteen school case studies were completed in Western – eight primary 
schools, one junior school, and five secondary schools – involving 47 
interviews in total. Due to the size of the county, we approached schools 
for interview in two separate areas, one rural and sparsely populated 
and the other semi-urban with higher levels of deprivation. The achieved 
sample was broadly representative of schools in the LA; for example, FSM 
levels ranged from four per cent to 33 per cent and Ofsted grades ranged 
from Inadequate to Outstanding. Western is one of the two localities with 
low proportions of academies and ‘system leader’ schools, so these were 
purposively sampled: one sponsored and three converter academies were 
included and one Teaching School, one NLE and two LLEs were visited. 
One primary school was voluntary controlled. In addition, five system 
informant interviews were undertaken: the Regional Schools Commissioner, 
three local authority representatives, and the NCTL regional associate. 
northern la
Ten school case studies were completed in Northern – six primary schools 
and four secondary schools (including one special school) – involving 37 
interviews in total. The achieved sample was broadly representative of 
schools in the LA; for example, FSM levels range from four per cent to 
42 per cent. Reflecting the overall high levels of measured performance 
in the LA, all schools in our sample were either Good or Outstanding in 
Ofsted. Northern is one of the two LAs with high proportions of academies 
and ‘system leaders’: we visited one sponsored academy and five converter 
academies and two Teaching Schools/NLEs, one additional NLE and one 
LLE. In addition we interviewed four system informants: the RSC; a NCTL 
TLA; a Ofsted regional director; and a senior leader from the local authority.
Southern la
Twelve school case studies were completed in Southern – eight primary 
schools and four secondary schools – involving 42 interviews in total. The 
achieved sample was again broadly representative of schools in the LA; for 
example, FSM levels range from six per cent to 42 per cent, while Ofsted 
grades ranged from Inadequate to Outstanding. Southern was one of the 
two LAs with low densities of academies and ‘system leader’ schools, so 
these were purposively sampled: we visited two converter academies and one 
Teaching School/NLE and two LLEs. Two schools were voluntary aided. In 
addition we interviewed three system informants: the RSC; a senior leader 
from the local authority; and a local CPD provider.
Case study approach and analysis
The interviews were based on a semi-structured set of questions that were 
shared with interviewees in advance. Each case study headteacher was also 
asked to complete a pro-forma in advance, listing all the schools with which 
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it partnered in a meaningful way and to categorize these in terms of the types 
of partnership activity in place, the length and regularity of the partnership 
tie and their assessment of its impact. These proforma responses were then 
discussed and developed as part of the interview process. All interviews 
were recorded and the headteacher and system informant interviews were 
transcribed in full. These were used to write a detailed case study for each 
school. We then undertook a cross-case analysis for each locality, using 
a parallel inductive and deductive approach that was informed by the 
conceptual framework for the project, but that also allowed new themes 
and codes to emerge from the data. This work informed the production 
of four detailed locality case studies, which were then further analysed for 
overarching themes and findings as the basis for this report. 
The national survey
The survey was conducted between October 2015 and January 2016 by an 
independent survey company (Qa Research), with the statistical analysis 
undertaken with NfER. A sample of 5,000 schools was drawn from all 
state-funded schools in England. The stratifying variables used in drawing 
the sample were: phase/sector, region, level of free school meal eligibility, 
and school (governance) type. The survey contained around 23 questions 
(with some routing to reflect differences between phase and school type), 
several of which included sub-questions, and three open-ended questions. 
It lasted approximately 20 minutes and explored leaders’ views on, and 
responses to, each theme in the conceptual framework – hierarchy, markets 
and networks – and the themes that had emerged from the initial case 
study visits. 
Six hundred and ninety-nine leaders completed the survey in total, 
mostly through a telephone interview (n=653), although with a small 
number of online responses (n=46). Responses were drawn from a random 
stratified sample of 5,000 primary, secondary and special schools, although 
a small number of the online responses came via an open email to ASCL and 
NAHT members. The majority of respondents were headteachers/principals 
(n=537), with smaller numbers of executive heads, deputy heads, heads of 
school, co-heads and other senior leadership roles. The characteristics of 
respondent schools are shown in Charts 1 to 4 below. Survey responses were 
analysed to identify differences by phase and size of school, governance 
type, Ofsted category, geography and level of deprivation. The primary 
and secondary school samples have a precision level of approximately 4.4 
per cent. In practice this means that, for either of these samples, we are 
95 per cent confident that for any quoted percentage the population figure 
is within a range of +/- 4.4 per cent. Weightings have been applied to the 
achieved sample based on school sector and stratification variables. 
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Chart 1: Response by phase/sector Chart 2: Response by school type
Chart 3: Response by Ofsted category Chart 4: Response by governance type 
About the statistical analysis of MAT impact and 
Ofsted results 
The analysis of multi-academy trust (MAT) impact on pupil attainment was 
undertaken with NfER. We compared the outcomes of pupils in schools 
that have been part of a MAT over a three-year period to the outcomes 
of pupils in comparable standalone schools. Using a propensity score 
matching (PSM) methodology, we created two comparison groups, a group 
of standalone academies, and a group of standalone maintained schools. 
The analysis used pupil level attainment and demographic data and then 
aggregated this to assess impact at school and MAT level, including by size 
of MAT. The headline findings from this research are included in Chapter 
5, but for reasons of space the full research paper, including a detailed 
methodology, is published separately alongside this main report.39 
The second strand of statistical analysis with NfER explored trends 
and patterns in Ofsted ratings, and how these related to changes in school 
39 This can be downloaded from the publisher’s website at www.ucl-ioe-press.com/books/
education-policy/hierarchy-markets-and-networks/
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characteristics over the decade 2005–1540. We used historic data on Ofsted 
ratings, from NfER’s registry of schools, from the Ofsted website and from 
Edubase, and considered the latest available rating at each point in time. 
The Ofsted inspection and rating system was radically changed in 2005, 
and all open schools have since been inspected under the new regime. We 
also controlled for subsequent changes in the Ofsted framework during 
this period, including the introduction of ‘earned autonomy’ (meaning that 
schools deemed Good and Outstanding receive less frequent inspections) 
and reflected these changes in our analysis. We excluded from the analysis 
all schools with multiple predecessors. The first stage of the analysis looked 
at how Ofsted ratings have changed over the period. It showed how likely 
schools were to retain their grades, or to move up or down the scale. We 
focused on two five-year periods – 2005 to 2010 and 2010 to 2015 – and 
created transition matrices to show the likelihood of having a certain Ofsted 
rating at August 2015, given the rating at August 2010. We also estimated 
transition probabilities derived using a multinomial logit model to control 
for school type and changes in Ofsted regime. The second stage of the 
analysis looked at how the school socio-economic composition (proportion 
of pupils eligible for FSM) related to changes in Ofsted ratings over time. 
To control for FSM rates, we created five-year averages for the two periods, 
and looked at how these averages changed over the decade. In order to 
retain as many schools as possible in the analysis, we included schools with 
at least three years of data in each five-year period. The analysis looked 
at how starting Ofsted categories related to changes in the proportion of 
FSM pupils over the decade; and how the evolution of FSM rates ultimately 
relate to changes in Ofsted ratings over the decade. 
40 Due to space restrictions in this report we have not included the full findings from 
this analysis. We intend to publish further details and findings from the analysis in 
subsequent publications. 
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